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ARTICLES
THE RISE OF INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS
IN THE UNITED STATES, 1950-2005:
OF SHAREHOLDER VALUE AND
STOCK MARKET PRICES
Jeffrey N. Gordon*
Between 1950 and 2005, the composition of large public company boards
dramatically shifted towards independent directors, from approximately 20%
independents to 75% independents. The standards for independence also became
increasingly rigorous over the period. The available empirical evidence provides
no convincing explanation for this change. This Article explains the trend in
terms of two interrelated developments in U.S. political economy: first, the shift to
shareholder value as the primary corporate objective; second, the greater
informativeness of stock market prices. The overriding effect is to commit the firm
to a shareholder wealth maximizing strategy as best measured by stock price
performance. In this environment, independent directors are more valuable than
insiders. They are less committed to management and its vision. Instead, they
look to outside performance signals and are less captured by the internal
perspective, which, as stock prices become more informative, becomes less
valuable. More controversially, independent directors may supply a useful
friction in the operation of control markets. Independent directors can also be
more readily mobilized by legal standards to help provide the public goods of
more accurate disclosure (which improves stock price informativeness) and
better compliance with law. In the United States, independent directors have
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become a complementary institution to an economy of firms directed to maximize
shareholder value. Thus, the rise of independent directors and the associated
corporate governance paradigm should be evaluated in terms of this overall
conception of how to maximize social welfare.
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INTRODUCTION
“Independent directors”—that is the answer, but what is the question?
The now-conventional understanding of boards of directors in the diffusely
held firm is that they reduce the agency costs associated with the separation of
ownership and control. Elected by shareholders, directors are supposed to
“monitor” the managers in view of shareholder interests. Who should serve on
the board of a large public firm? Circa 1950, the answer was, as a normative
and positive matter, that boards should consist of the firm’s senior officers,
some outsiders with deep connections with the firm (such as its banker or its
senior outside lawyer), and a few directors who were nominally independent
but handpicked by the CEO. Circa 2006, the answer is “independent directors,”
whose independence is buttressed by a range of rule-based and structural
mechanisms. Inside directors are a dwindling fraction; the senior outside
lawyer on the board is virtually an extinct species.
The move to independent directors, which began as a “good governance”
exhortation, has become in some respects a mandatory element of corporate
law. For controversial transactions, the Delaware courts condition their
application of the lenient “business judgment rule” to board action undertaken
by independent directors.1 The New York Stock Exchange requires most listed
companies to have boards with a majority of independent directors2 and audit
and compensation committees comprised solely of independent directors.3 The
NASD requires that conflict transactions be approved by committees consisting
solely of independent directors.4 Post-Enron federal legislation requires public
companies to have an audit committee comprised solely of independent
directors.5 But why has the move to independent directors been so pronounced?
One of the apparent puzzles in the empirical corporate governance
literature is the lack of correlation between the presence of independent
directors and the firm’s economic performance. Various studies have searched
in vain for an economically significant effect on the overall performance of the
firm. Some would deny there is a puzzle: theory would predict that firms will
select the board structure that enhances the chance for survival and success; if
competitive market pressure eliminates out-of-equilibrium patterns of corporate
governance, the remaining diversity is functional. Others would note that
corporate governance in the United States is already quite good, and thus
marginal improvements in a particular corporate governance mechanism would
expectedly have a small, perhaps negligible, effect.

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

See infra text accompanying note 54.
Unless the company has a 50% shareholder. See infra text accompanying note 51.
See infra text accompanying notes 102, 107.
See infra note 115.
See infra text accompanying note 102.
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The claim of this Article is that the rise of independent directors in the
diffusely held public firm is not driven only by the need to address the
managerial agency problem at any particular firm. “Independent directors” is
the answer to a different question: how do we govern firms so as to increase
social welfare (as proxied by maximization of shareholder value across the
general market)? This maximization of shareholder value may produce
institutions that are suboptimal for particular firms but optimal for an economy
of such firms. Independent directors as developed in the U.S. context solve
three different problems: First, they enhance the fidelity of managers to
shareholder objectives, as opposed to managerial interests or stakeholder
interests. Second, they enhance the reliability of the firm’s public disclosure,
which makes stock market prices a more reliable signal for capital allocation
and for the monitoring of managers at other firms as well as their own. Third,
and more controversially, they provide a mechanism that binds the
responsiveness of firms to stock market signals but in a bounded way. The turn
to independent directors serves a view that stock market signals are the most
reliable measure of firm performance and the best guide to allocation of capital
in the economy, but that a “visible hand,” namely, the independent board, is
needed to balance the tendency of markets to overshoot.
This Article develops this general theme through an account of the
changing function of the board over the past fifty years, from the post-World
War II era to the present. During this period, the board’s principal role shifted
from the “advising board” to the “monitoring board,” and director
independence became correspondingly critical. Although other factors are at
work, there were two main drivers of the monitoring model and genuine
director independence. First, the corporate purpose evolved from stakeholder
concerns that were an important element of 1950s managerialism to unalloyed
shareholder wealth maximization in the 1990s and 2000s. Inside directors or
affiliated outside directors were seen as conflicted in their capacity to insist on
the primacy of shareholder interests; the expectations of director independence
became increasingly stringent.
Second, fundamental changes in the information environment reworked the
ratio of the firm’s reliance on private information to its reliance on information
impounded in prevailing stock market prices. Over the period, the central
planning capabilities of the large public firm became suspect. Instead, a
Hayekian spirit, embodied in the efficient capital market hypothesis, became
predominant.6 The belief that markets “knew” more than the managers of any

6. See F. A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945).
Hayek addresses the problem of the society’s central planner, but his extolling of the
superiority of the market in coordinating and guiding behavior becomes the ultimately
successful critique of the planning capacities of the large firm heralded in books such as
JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE (4th ed. 1985):
The peculiar character of the problem of a rational economic order is determined precisely by
the fact that the knowledge of the circumstances of which we must make use never exists in
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particular firm became increasingly credible as regulators and quasi-public
standard setters required increasingly deep disclosure and this information was
impounded in increasingly informative stock prices. The optimal boundaries of
the firm changed as external capital markets advanced relative to internal
capital markets in the allocation of capital. The richer public information
environment changed the role of directors. Special access to private
information became less important. Independent directors could use
increasingly informative market prices to advise the CEO on strategy and
evaluate its execution, as well as take advantage of the increasingly wellinformed opinions of securities analysts. Independents had positional
advantages over inside directors, who were more likely to overvalue the firm’s
planning and capital allocation capabilities. In the trade-off between advising
and monitoring, the monitoring of managers in light of market signals became
more valuable. The reliability of the firm’s public disclosures became more
important. Indeed, by the end of the period, boards came to have a particular
role in assuring that the firm provided accurate information to the market.
Thus, fidelity to shareholder value and to the utility of stock market signals
found unity in the reliance on stock price maximization as the measure of
managerial success. From a social point of view, maximizing shareholder value
may be desirable if fidelity to the shareholder residual (as opposed to balancing
among multiple claimants) leads to maximization of the social surplus. This is
the shareholder primacy argument. Independently, maximizing shareholder
value may be socially desirable if stock prices are so informative that following
their signals leads to the best resource allocation. This is the market efficiency
argument.
Over the period, boards eventually undertook measures that assured
management’s responsiveness to stock market signals, in particular through the
use of stock-related compensation and retention decisions based on stock
market performance. But there was an additional twist in the board’s
intermediation between managers and markets: the board, acting through the
independent directors, came to have power to limit the potency of stock market
signals in the takeover market. There was skepticism as to whether markets
were perfect, even at the height of the prestige of the efficient capital market
hypothesis. After the 1987 stock market crash, economists developed
increasingly more persuasive accounts of how stock market prices—even
though, on average, the best estimate of intrinsic value—could deviate for a
substantial time period from economic fundamentals. The board gained power
under state law to hinder the operation of the takeover market, i.e., to weigh the
reliability of the market price as a measure of shareholder value at a particular
time. The problem is this: given the imperfection of market prices, what is the

concentrated or integrated form, but solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently
contradictory knowledge which all the separate individuals possess.

Hayek, supra, at 519.
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optimal degree of responsiveness to price changes, not just for any particular
firm but across the entire economy? Investors may optimally adjust portfolios
of liquid financial assets on one time line; managers may optimally adjust
internal investment decisions over real assets on another. In light of potentially
negative systematic effects from quick responses in the takeover market to
imperfect market signals, it may be optimal to have a firm-specific institution
that could slow the pace of control market activity to test the market for price
reversals. The “visible hand” of the well-functioning board could, in theory,
serve this function.
Independent directors have a comparative advantage for these different
tasks. They are less dependent on the CEO and more sensitive to external
assessments of their performance as directors; they are less wedded to inside
accounts of the firm’s prospects and less worried about the disclosure of
potentially competitively sensitive information. They also have credibility in
the “checking” of market signals against intrinsic measures of the firm’s
prospects. In other words, genuinely independent directors might create
significant value in the allocation of resources, not just in their firm but more
generally as other firms are forced to adapt to the best performers. Thus, one of
the hallmarks of the period was the development of various mechanisms of
director independence aimed at producing directors who were independent in
fact.
This emphasis on the critical role of independent directors as an efficiencyjustified strategy for importing stock market signals into the firm’s (and the
economy’s) decisionmaking will strike some as a radical interpretation of the
history. I make no claim that the various actors have been fully aware of the
implications of each step—much may have happened through inadvertence,
and the role of independent directors could have been otherwise—but this is the
end point of this non-teleological process.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I reviews the overall trend of board
composition of large U.S. public companies since 1950. On the basis of data
assembled from a number of different sources, the fraction of independent
directors for large public firms has shifted from approximately 20% in the
1950s to approximately 75% by the mid-2000s. Part I also reviews the
strengthening of various mechanisms of director independence that enhanced
the independence-in-fact of directors over the period. Part II surveys the
empirical studies that fail to find significant economic effects from this
pronounced move toward director independence and concludes that the studies
are looking in the wrong place. The studies look at board composition
differences across firms. Yet if the main advantage of independent directors is
to help commit firms throughout the economy to a shareholder wealth
maximization strategy, then systematic effects will swamp cross-sectional
variation.7 Part III non-exhaustively canvasses the 1950-2005 period to explore
7. This generalizes the argument made regarding hostile takeovers: that ultimately
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one important driver in changing board composition: the shift toward
shareholder wealth maximization as the dominant corporate purpose. Director
independence became linked to the monitoring of managerial performance in
order to serve shareholder ends. Part III also traces a complementary
development: managers who once vigorously resisted board independence as a
limitation to their autonomy came to champion the independent board as a
buffer from the hostile takeover and as a substitute for greater government
intervention in the wake of scandals.
Part IV non-exhaustively canvasses the 1950-2005 period to explore
another driver of the change in board composition: the increasing
informativeness and value of stock market signals. Informativeness was
enhanced by increased disclosure resulting from regulatory initiatives by the
Securities and Exchange Commission and the quasi-public accounting
standards setting authorities. New information processing technology and
increasing investments in securities analysis helped make prices more
informative as well. It’s not that the disclosure system changed to
accommodate a demand for independent directors. Rather, as stock prices
became more informative, the concern about the independents’ potential
debility—their lack of a well-informed view about the firm—subsided. Indeed,
an increasingly important element of the independent board’s monitoring role
came to be the appropriate use of market signals in executive compensation
contracts and in CEO termination decisions. Additionally, directors came to
have an increasingly important function in assuring the accuracy of the firm’s
financial disclosure, i.e., “controls monitoring.”
Part V concludes with the suggestion that the rise of independent directors,
at least in the United States, is tied to a new corporate governance paradigm
that looks to the stock price as the measure of most things. Maximizing the
stock price serves two normative ends: promoting the interests of shareholders
and making use of the information impounded by the market to allocate capital
efficiently. In this time of increased shareholder activism, one important
question is whether the enhanced independence of directors will create a space
for a public firm to resist stock market pressure in the pursuit of currently
disfavored business strategies (and whether this would be desirable) or whether
the very pressures that give rise to director independence will in the end swamp
this possibility.
I. CHANGING BOARD COMPOSITION, 1950-2005: THE RISE OF INDEPENDENT
DIRECTORS AND DIRECTOR INDEPENDENCE
One of the most important empirical developments in U.S. corporate
governance over the past half century has been the shift in board composition
their benefits (costs) are not adequately reckoned by summing bidder and acquirer gains
(losses), but rather in the systematic effects from a robust market in corporate control.
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away from insiders (and affiliated directors) toward independent directors. This
trend is consistent throughout the period and accelerates in the post-1970
subperiod. This Part describes the trend, looking at a number of studies that use
different samples of firms and that apply somewhat different definitions of
“independence.” In addition to the numerical shift, the independence-in-fact of
directors has been buttressed in the post-1970 period by a series of rule-based
and structural mechanisms. In its own way, the effort to create independencein-fact is as striking as the numerical shift.
A. Changing Board Composition, 1950-2005
No single study traces the rise of independent directors over the 1950-2005
period. The study that best captures the changing board composition over the
period is Lehn, Patro and Zhao’s paper reporting the insider-outsider
breakdown for all publicly traded U.S. firms that survived from 1935 through
2000, namely eighty-one predominantly large firms.8 Lehn et al. find a
consistent decline in the average percentage of insiders over the 1950-2000
period, from approximately 50% to approximately 15%, with accelerating
change after 1970.9 The available data, however, apparently do not readily
8. Kenneth Lehn et al., Determinants of the Size and Structure of Corporate Boards:
1935-2000 (Nov. 2003) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=470675. They describe their sample as all firms in the Center for Research on
Security Prices (CRSP) database which survive over the period and for which data are also
available in the Moody’s Industrial Manual. Id. (manuscript at 12). The sample of course
imperfectly represents the universe of firms existing at any point in time and tilts toward the
largest firms. Id. Interestingly, the fraction of insiders monotonically increases over the
1935-1950 period, from approximately 45% to 50%. Id. (manuscript at 36 tbl.1 panel C)
(presenting descriptive statistics of sample firms with five-year frequency). The
abovementioned survivorship bias in the sample suggests an adaptive quality in the shift
away from insiders and toward independent directors in the post-1950 period.
9. This table, drawn from the Lehn et al. data, describes the shift over the period.
Percent change is based on my own calculations.
Percentage of Inside Directors, 1950-2000
Year
Mean
Decade-to-decade percent change
1950
49%
n/a
1955
47%
1960
43%
-12%
1965
42%
1970
41%
-5%
1975
39%
1980
33%
-20%
1985
30%
1990
26%
-21%
1995
21%
2000
16%
-38%
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Figure 1. Board Composition, 1950-2005
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10%
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Affiliated

2005

2000

1995
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1985

1980

1975

1970

1965
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1955

1950

0%

Inside

Source: Year values (means) are derived from various sources. See infra
Appendix Table 1. Data are from every five years; where multiple data
points existed (including for immediately adjacent years), data were
averaged to create a single value. Off-year values are not shown. For a
statistical trendline, see infra Figure 2.

permit a further breakdown of the “outside” directors into “affiliated” and
“independent” directors over the entire period. Other studies, typically crosssectional in nature, examine proxy filings to classify directors. The earliest such
study was in 1970.10 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) did a
detailed survey covering 1977-1978,11 the academic studies began in 1985, and
the Investor Responsibility Research Center began its database for
approximately 1500 public firms in 1996.12
I have put together these studies to construct a “time series” showing the
board composition trend over the 1950-2005 period,13 which is depicted

10. Ephraim P. Smith, Interlocking Directorates Among the ‘Fortune 500,’ 3
ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV., Summer 1970, at 47, 48 (assessing board composition as
sidelight to director interlocks).
11. S. COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 96TH CONG., SEC STAFF
REPORT ON CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY 590-98, 598 tbl.2 (Comm. Print 1980) [hereinafter
SEC STAFF REPORT] (surveying 1200 major firms drawn from NYSE, Amex, Nasdaq, and
OTC/regional exchanges in 1978-79). The SEC study led to a rule proposal, subsequently
withdrawn, that would have required precise categorization of the outside directors.
12. See INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVS. (ISS), BOARD PRACTICES/BOARD PAY
2006, at 1 (2006) (describing database compilation). (The Investor Responsibility Research
Center was acquired by ISS in 2005.)
13. See infra Appendix Table 1. Perhaps the right metaphor is to think of these figures
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Figure 2. Changing Proportion of Inside and
Independent Directors, 1950-2005
90%
80%

Inside

Independent

70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Source: Values are derived from various sources. See infra Appendix Table 1.
The trend line is produced using the polynomial–fitting command in
Excel.

graphically in Figures 1 and 2.14 These figures show a steady increase in the
representation of independent directors on the board, from approximately 20%
in 1950 to approximately 75% in 2005. This is a powerful change in board
composition that calls out for an explanation.
The limitations of this demonstration are obvious: I have used crosssectional studies to reclassify the Lehn et al. category of “outsiders” into the
more useful “affiliated” and “independent” categories, assuming in particular
that the 1970 breakdown of outsiders is applicable to the 1950-1970 period for
which there are no earlier cross-sectional studies. (In light of the history
discussed below, it is likely that this overstates the fraction of independents on
pre-1970 boards, which thus understates the change over the period.) Also, the
various studies used different samples and undoubtedly applied different
criteria in coding proxy disclosure about directors into the relevant
classifications. These classification decisions would have been influenced by
whether the researcher was trying to assess whether non-insiders augmented the
corporation’s capacities (thus referring to affiliated directors as “instrumental”
directors)15 or enhanced monitoring (calling affiliated directors “grey”
as “snapshots on a string.”
14. Figure 1 shows the assembled data in five-year increments. Figure 2 shows all data
points and trend lines graphed using the Excel polynomial-fitting command.
15. E.g., Barry D. Baysinger & Henry N. Butler, Corporate Governance and the
Board of Directors: Performance Effects of Changes in Board Composition, 1 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 101, 110 (1985).
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directors).16 Notwithstanding the inevitable noise, the overall trend that
emerges is quite striking, as reflected by Figure 1 and by the fitted curves of
Figure 2.
There has been an additional trend in the latter part of the period toward
what Bhagat and Black call “supermajority” independent boards.17 As recently
as 1989, boards with only one or two insiders were unheard of. In a Korn/Ferry
1989 survey of large public companies, 67.5% reported three insiders and
32.5% reported four insiders.18 By 2003, the pattern was strikingly different:
65% reported two or fewer insiders; 35% reported three insiders; none reported
more than three insiders.19 By 2004, under the influence of Sarbanes-Oxley and
the stock exchange listing rules, the shift was virtually complete: 91% reported
two or fewer insiders; 9% reported three insiders.20 Large public firms have
moved to a pattern of one, perhaps two, inside directors and an increasing
number of independent directors. Some academics and practitioners have
characterized the emerging pattern as the cynosure of corporate governance
because of its maximum control of managerial agency costs.21

16. E.g., Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, The Determinants of Board
Composition, 19 RAND J. ECON. 589, 591 (1988).
17. Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Non-Correlation Between Board
Independence and Long-Term Firm Performance, 27 J. CORP. L. 231, 239 (2002).
18. KORN/FERRY INT’L, BOARD OF DIRECTORS SIXTEENTH ANNUAL STUDY 1989, at 15,
25 (1989) (Diefenbacher calculations based on survey data). The largest firms reported four
insiders on average. Id. at 15.
19. KORN/FERRY INT’L, 30TH ANNUAL BOARD OF DIRECTORS STUDY 2003, at 8-9
(2003); KORN/FERRY INT’L, 30TH ANNUAL STUDY SUPPLEMENT 12 (2004) (reporting 20022003 proxy data and Diefenbacher calculations).
20. KORN/FERRY INT’L, 31ST ANNUAL BOARD OF DIRECTORS STUDY 2004, at 10 (2004)
(reporting 2003-2004 proxy data and Diefenbacher calculations); see also BUS.
ROUNDTABLE, BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE SURVEY: KEY FINDINGS
(2006), available at http://www.businessroundtable.org/publications/publication.aspx?qs=
2AC6BF807822B0F1AD34484 (reporting that 85% of its approximately 160 members
expect to have a board in 2006 consisting of at least 80% independent directors, 98% expect
that their boards will be at least 60% independent, and 42% expect an entirely independent
board); SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, TRENDS IN THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRACTICES
100 LARGEST US PUBLIC COMPANIES 4 (2005), available at
OF
THE
http://www.shearman.com/cg_survey05/ (reporting that independent directors comprised
75% or more of the board of eighty-one of the top 100 companies in 2004 and 2005 and that
the CEO was the only non-independent director of thirty-seven of the top 100 companies in
2005).
21. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen, The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the
Failure of Internal Control Systems, 48 J. FIN. 831, 865 (1993); Martin Lipton & Jay W.
Lorsch, A Modest Proposal for Improved Corporate Governance, 48 BUS. LAW. 59, 67-68
(1992) (recommending a board size of eight or nine directors, comprised of at least two
independent directors for every one insider or affiliate, and arguing that “five or six
independent directors, who are carefully selected, should provide the breadth of perspective
and diversity required”).
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B. Mechanisms of Enhanced Director Independence, 1950-2005
The preceding section described the long-term numerical trend away from
inside directors and toward independents. Nominally independent directors can
of course be passive, ineffectual, and otherwise be found in management’s
pocket, as famously described in Myles Mace’s 1971 book.22 In 1989, nearly
two decades later, Jay W. Lorsch and Elizabeth MacIver argued that the
independent director was still more likely to be a “pawn” than a “potentate.”23
Nevertheless, one of the striking elements of the 1950-2005 period was the
development of various mechanisms to create and enhance the independence of
directors. The genesis of many of these mechanisms was the 1970s wave of
corporate governance reform, which tried to establish preconditions for the
monitoring board. Indeed, “independent director” entered the corporate
governance lexicon only in the 1970s as the kind of director capable of
fulfilling the monitoring role. Until then, the board was divided into “inside”
and “outside” directors.24 Further developments favoring director independence
occurred in the 1990s as part of the post-hostile bid settlement among
institutional investors, managers, and boards.25 The last wave, post-2002, was
spurred by the Enron, WorldCom, and other board failures, which led to new
efforts to strengthen director independence in light of the board’s additional
role of controls monitoring as well as performance monitoring.
Analytically, these mechanisms of director independence can be broken
down into four categories: (1) tightening the standards and rules of
disqualifying relationships; (2) increasing negative and positive sanctions, such
as legal liability for fiduciary duty breach, reputational sanctions, and stockbased compensation; (3) development of intra-board structures, such as taskspecific committees and designation of a “lead director”; and (4) reducing CEO
influence in director selection and retention by, for example, the creation of a
nominating committee staffed solely by independent directors. Without being
Panglossian, it does seem that the accumulating effects of changes in each of
these mechanisms, as well as the accumulating cultural shift fostered by the

22. MYLES L. MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY 108 (1971); see also Laura Lin,
The Effectiveness of Outside Directors as a Corporate Governance Mechanism: Theories
and Evidence, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 898, 898-903, 912-17 (1996) (discussing the “managerial
hegemony” theory which asserts that management controls the board regardless of its
composition).
23. JAY W. LORSCH WITH ELIZABETH MACIVER, PAWNS OR POTENTATES: THE REALITY
OF AMERICA’S CORPORATE BOARDS (1989).
24. Professor Mitchell argues that the principal role of the pre-1970s outside director
was to provide cover for conflict transactions entered into by insiders and to provide a
liability shield for insiders in other respects. He also suggests that this function still
continues. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Trouble with Boards (Sept. 9, 2005) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
25. See infra text accompanying notes 103-06, 256-58.
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successive reform efforts, should have increased the independence-in-fact of
directors over the period.
1. Relationship standards and rules
A straightforward way to strengthen director independence is to select
candidates who have no ongoing (or even prior) relationship with the
corporation other than as a director. Over the 1950-2005 period the relationship
measure of independence tightened considerably. Initially the relationship test
focused narrowly on the director’s employment status. Those who were not
current officers were, by definition, outsiders,26 including non-executive
directors who had what would be regarded today as a disqualifying material
relationship—such as employment with a supplier or a customer, or with the
firm’s investment bank or law firm.27 This consensus was reflected by the 1962
New York Stock Exchange statement that accepted a description of an outside
director as simply one who is non-management.28
Standards tightened considerably in the wake of the 1970s corporate
governance crisis, which for the first time produced a concerted demand for
“independent” directors. The well-publicized business failures of the period led
to increasing acceptance of the “monitoring model” of the board, which
required independent directors.29 The contemporaneous revelations of
widespread corporate bribery and illegal campaign contributions at home and

26. Stanley C. Vance, Functional Control and Corporate Performance in Large-Scale
Industrial Enterprise (1955) (unpublished manuscript) (described in Stanley C. Vance,
Corporate Governance: Assessing Corporate Performance by Boardroom Attributes, 6 J.
BUS. RES. 203, 204-05 (1978)).
27. See, e.g., CONFERENCE BD., CORPORATE DIRECTORSHIP PRACTICES 17 (1959)
(describing “officers of creditor banks and insurance companies or of financial institutions
that regularly serve the company, and the corporate counsel” as outsiders).
28. N.Y. STOCK EXCH., THE CORPORATE DIRECTOR AND THE INVESTING PUBLIC 7, 1920 (1962); see also STANLEY C. VANCE, BOARDS OF DIRECTORS: STRUCTURE AND
PERFORMANCE 5 (1964) (defining outsiders as those who “have no significant personal
holdings in the company even though they are associated with banks, brokerage firms,
insurance companies, and other investment companies; . . . are executives of other
organizations; or . . . are primarily public figures”). This was a view apparently held by
academics as well. See Jeffrey Pfeffer, Size and Composition of Corporate Boards of
Directors: The Organization and Its Environment, 17 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 218, 219 n.6 (1972)
(“Inside directors are directors who are currently involved in the management of the
organization and, in some definitions, former executives as well. . . . Outside directors do not
have a direct management relationship with the organization.”). See generally JEREMY
BACON & JAMES K. BROWN, CONFERENCE BD., CORPORATE DIRECTORSHIP PRACTICES: ROLE,
SELECTION AND LEGAL STATUS OF THE BOARD (1975) (classifying non-officer directors as
“outside” even though they are chosen by management).
29. See infra notes 207-14 and accompanying text. The “monitoring model” was
promoted most notably by MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A
LEGAL ANALYSIS 162-70 (1976).
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abroad, so-called “questionable payments,” spurred the SEC to insist on
independent directors in the settlement of various enforcement actions.30
The unresolved question was what exactly constituted “independence”—
how should one deal with economic interests and personal ties that would
potentially undercut independence. Federal regulatory guidance, stock
exchange listing standards, state fiduciary law, and “best practice”
pronouncements have all played a role in line-drawing.
The 1978 Corporate Director’s Guidebook, an influential product of
mainstream corporate lawyers, drew a two-level distinction: first distinguishing
between “management” and “non-management” directors, and then between
affiliated and non-affiliated non-management directors.31 A former officer or
employee was to be regarded as a managerial director. A director with other
economic or personal ties “which could be viewed as interfering with the
exercise of independent judgment” was an affiliated non-managerial director—
for example, “commercial bankers, investment bankers, attorneys, and others
who supply services or goods to the corporation.”32
In 1978, the SEC went so far as to propose proxy disclosure that would
categorize outside directors as “affiliated” or “independent, with the obvious
intention of using disclosure to obtain Chairman Harold Williams’ objective of
boards staffed principally, if not entirely, by independent directors.33 In
response to corporate objections, it rapidly withdrew the proposal,34 lamely
explaining that “the ability to exercise independent judgment is not solely
dependent upon the label attached to a particular director.”35 On the NYSE
front, its 1977 audit committee listing standard, which required staffing by
“directors independent of management,” split the difference: it permitted
30. See, e.g., Arthur F. Mathews, Recent Trends in SEC Requested Ancillary Relief in
SEC Level Injunctive Actions, 31 BUS. LAW. 1323, 1326-28, 1334-35 (1976). The SEC also
insisted on other corporate governance measures, such as the creation of audit committees
and special committees. For a contemporaneous skeptical account of the effectiveness of
these corporate governance elements in particular consent decrees, see Lewis D. Solomon,
Restructuring the Corporate Board of Directors: Fond Hope—Faint Promise?, 76 MICH. L.
REV. 581 (1978).
31. ABA Comm. on Corporate Laws, Corporate Director’s Guidebook, 33 BUS. LAW.
1591, 1619-20 (1978).
32. Id. at 1620.
33. Proposed Rules Relating to Shareholder Communications, Shareholder
Participation in the Corporate Electoral Process and Corporate Governance Generally,
Exchange Act Release No. 14,970, 15 SEC Docket 291 (July 18, 1978); see Harold M.
Williams, Corporate Accountability, in COMMENTARIES ON CORPORATE STRUCTURE AND
GOVERNANCE 513 (Donald E. Schwartz ed., 1979).
34. Shareholder Communications, Shareholder Participation in the Corporate Electoral
Process and Corporate Governance Generally, Exchange Act Release No. 15,384,
Investment Company Act Release No. 10,510, 16 SEC Docket 348 (Dec. 6, 1978).
35. SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 11, at 469. A survey of the 1978-1979 proxy
season undertaken in connection with the proposal revealed that nearly 30% of “outside”
directors were in fact “affiliated” and thus not “independent.” See id. at 598 tbl.2 (surveying
1200 major firms drawn from the NYSE, Amex, Nasdaq, and OTC/regional exchanges).
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directors from organizations with “customary commercial, industrial, banking,
or underwriting relationships with the company” to serve on an audit
committee unless the board found that such relationships “would interfere with
the exercise of independent judgment as a committee member.”36 That
definition remained intact until 1999, when the criterion of audit committee
independence was significantly tightened in response to the prodding of the
Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving Audit Committee Effectiveness. Audit
committees were required to consist of at least three “independent directors,”
and the “customary” economic relationships of the 1977 were now off limits
for committee members.37
Another federal regulatory tightening of the “independence” standard came
through the 1996 IRS criteria for “outside” directors who could approve
performance-based remuneration that was excepted from the $1 million
deductibility cap on executive compensation established by section 162(m) of
the Internal Revenue Code.38 Those criteria disqualified a former officer of the
corporation and a director who receives remuneration from the corporation
“either directly or indirectly, in any capacity other than as a director.”39 The
criteria also place stringent limits on the extent to which the director could have
an ownership interest in or be employed by an entity that received payments
from the corporation.40 In turn, the IRS regulations influenced the SEC’s 1996
rules specifying independent director approval of certain stock-related
transactions as a condition of exemption from the short-swing profit recapture
provisions of section 16(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act.41 The
definition of a “non-employee director” with such approval power followed the
substance of the IRS regulation.42 The tests of economic distance for director
36. NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual § 303 & supp. (1983) (embodying Proposed
Rule Change by Self-Regulatory Organizations, 42 Fed. Reg. 8737 (Feb. 11, 1977), and
Order Approving Proposed Rule Change, 42 Fed. Reg. 14,793 (Mar. 16, 1977)).
37. See April Klein, Likely Effects of Stock Exchange Governance Proposals and
Sarbanes-Oxley on Corporate Boards and Financial Reporting, 17 ACCT. HORIZONS 343,
346 & tbl.1 (2003); NYSE, Inc., NYSE Corporate Accountability and Listing Standards
Committee 6 n.2, 7 n.3 (2002).
38. 26 U.S.C. § 162(m) (2007). The code provision was added as part of the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13211, 107 Stat. 312, which
became effective as of January 1, 1994. The provision required the setting of performance
goals by a compensation committee “which is compromised solely of 2 or more outside
directors.” 26 U.S.C. § 162(m)(4)(C)(i) (2007). The compensation committee then needs to
“certif[y] that the performance goals and any other materials terms were in fact satisfied.” Id.
§ 162(m)(4)(C)(iii).
39. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-27(e)(3)(i) (1995).
40. The regulations include a $60,000 “de minimis” exception for payments to an
entity where the director is a minority owner or employee.” Id. § 1.162-27(e)(3)(ii)-(iii).
41. Ownership Reports and Trading by Officers, Directors and Principal Security
Holders, Exchange Act Release No. 37,260, Investment Company Act Release No. 21,997,
62 SEC Docket 138 (May 31, 1996).
42. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-3(b)(3) (2007). This regulation also includes a quantitatively
similar de minimis exception for consulting arrangements.
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independence established by these two important federal regulatory agencies
were important benchmarks.43
State courts grappling with the right of shareholders (as opposed to the
board) to maintain derivative litigation alleging corporate wrongdoing were
another important source of heightened standards of director independence
midway in the period. The “questionable payments” scandal of the 1970s led to
a spate of shareholder derivative suits. Corporations sought to take control of
the actions to avoid their potentially disruptive effects and to eliminate alleged
“strike suits.” In the important decision of Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado,44 the
Delaware Supreme Court held that even for a “demand-excused” derivative
action, a “special committee” constituted of independent directors could
nevertheless obtain dismissal of the action if it demonstrated this was in the
best interests of the corporation. In its dismissal request, the special committee
had the burden of demonstrating its independence. This, of course, increased
the demand for directors with minimal prior connection to the corporation and
its management, and helped ratchet up the independence standard. Moreover,
the standards developed in derivative litigation in the 1970s and early 1980s
also set criteria for the bona fides of directors who needed judicial sanction for
their approval of target defensive measures in the face of a hostile bid.45
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, various panels and “blue ribbon”
committees developed somewhat influential “best practice” guidelines for
relationship tests. The most important exposition, the American Law Institute’s
(“ALI’s”) 1992 Principles of Corporate Governance, recommended that the
board of a public corporation “should have a majority of directors who are free
of any significant relationship with the corporation’s senior executives.”46
“Significant relationship” was defined in a way to disqualify many affiliated
directors, both through categorical exclusions relating to the firm’s principal
outside law firm or investment bank, and through attention to customer/supplier
relationships crossing a relatively low ($200,000) economic materiality
threshold.47 The Principles of Corporate Governance also called for the firm’s
nominating committee to engage in a more individualized review of factors that

43. Additionally, as part of its 1992 executive compensation disclosure rules, the SEC
established similar independence standards. The standards were not mandatory for
compensation committee members; rather, disclosure was required of directors who did not
meet the standards. See Executive Compensation Disclosure, Securities Act Release No.
6962, Exchange Act Release No. 31,327, Investment Company Act Release No. 19,032, 52
SEC Docket 1961 (Oct. 16, 1992) (currently reflected in Regulation S-K Item 402(j)).
44. 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981); see also Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994 (N.Y.
1979).
45. See cases cited infra note 49.
46. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 3A.01 (1994) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES] (as adopted and
promulgated in 1992); see also NAT’L ASS’N OF CORPORATE DIRS., REPORT OF THE NACD
BLUE RIBBON COMMISSION ON DIRECTOR PROFESSIONALISM 9-10 (1996).
47. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 46, § 1.34.
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could undermine the independence of particular directors.48 The ALI project
had influence beginning in 1982 with its tentative first draft, whose “significant
relationship” test was similar to the final version.49
Ultimately, the Enron corporate reform wave at the end of the period
worked a sea change.50 Seeking to avoid corporate governance legislation, the
NYSE in 2002 initiated a significant revision of its board composition
standards. A majority of directors were required to be independent, and
stringent independence criteria applied to all such directors, not just audit
committee members.51 Under prodding from institutional investors, issuers,
and the SEC, the NYSE revised the proposals over a yearlong period, adding
and subtracting stringency. The 2004 version (as further refined) contains a
48. Id. § 3A.01 cmt. d.
49. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Independent Directors and the ALI Corporate
Governance Project, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1034, 1035 n.6 (1993). Many claimed—with
good reason—that reliance on nominal markers of independence was superficial, arguing
that psychological and social fellow-feeling among the class of people chosen as directors
creates a “structural bias” that undercuts true independence. See, e.g., EISENBERG, supra note
29, at 146; James D. Cox & Donald E. Schwartz, The Business Judgment Rule in the Context
of Termination of Derivative Suits by Independent Committees, 61 N.C. L. REV. 541, 542-43
(1983) (describing structural bias as “a predisposition toward the defendant because the
members who serve on the special litigation committee have a common cultural bond with
the defendants on whom they are passing judgment”). Whatever its reality, the “structural
bias” objection to director independence has been rejected by most courts in most instances
where independence-in-fact has been challenged. See, e.g., Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040,
1050-52 (Del. 2004); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 815 n.8 (Del. 1984). But cf. Miller v.
Register & Tribune Syndicate, Inc., 336 N.W.2d 709, 716 (Iowa 1983) (noting that potential
for structural bias leads to greater judicial scrutiny). Courts seemed to take
“disinterestedness” plus nominal independence, as defined by then-applicable criteria, as
sufficient for the purpose. E.g., Beam, 845 A.2d at 1050 (holding that “[a]llegations of mere
personal friendship or a mere outside business relationship, standing alone, are insufficient to
raise a reasonable doubt about a director’s independence”). There might be some
disagreement between the Delaware Supreme Court and the Delaware Chancery Court,
which has examined independence more searchingly. See In re Oracle Corp., 824 A.2d 917,
939-42 (Del. Ch. 2003) (deciding that professors did not satisfy independence standards for
special committee and adopting a contextual approach); Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 25
n.50 (Del. Ch. 2003) (explaining that independence turns on whether a director’s decision is
“controlled by another,” such as from domination “through close personal or familial
relationship or though force of will,” or if the director is “beholden” to the controller because
of that party’s unilateral power to decide whether the director will receive a significant
enough benefit). See generally Julian Velasco, Structural Bias and the Need for Substantive
Review, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 821 (2004) (exploring the courts’ response to structural bias and
proposing a standard of review of the substantive merits of directors’ decisions).
50. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, A Critique of the NYSE’s Director Independence
Listing Standards (UCLA Sch. of Law Research Paper Series, Paper No. 02-15, 2002),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=317121.
51. NYSE, Inc., Corporate Governance Rule Proposals Reflecting Recommendations
from the NYSE Corporate Accountability and Listing Standards Committee as Approved by
the NYSE Board of Directors, August 1, 2002 (2002), available at http://www.nyse.com/
pdfs/corp_gov_pro_b.pdf. The majority independent directors requirement does not apply to
a company with a 50% shareholder, though the independent audit committee requirement
does. Id.
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general standard requiring an affirmative board determination that a
purportedly independent director has “no material relationship with the listed
company” (including “as a partner, shareholder or officer of an organization
that has a relationship with the company”).52 It also has a series of carefully
defined exclusions and safe harbors that cover in detail the effect of prior
employment, familial ties, consulting relationships, and charitable ties. And, of
course, the SEC, exercising regulatory authority under Sarbanes-Oxley,
specified minimum conditions in 2003 for director independence for directors
who serve on the audit committee.53
2. External sanctions and rewards
A different mechanism for director independence focuses on incentives—
sanctions and rewards, sticks and carrots—for particular director behavior.
Most commonly these are economic, but reputation matters too.
a. Sanctions (sticks)
The most potent stick during the period was the risk of monetary liability
for breach of various duties under state fiduciary law and the federal securities
law; both sets of duties foster director independence by requiring director
attention to the business and affairs of the corporation, a precondition to the
exercise of independent judgment.54 But how real was such liability exposure?

52. See NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual § 303A.02 (2007); see also NYSE, Inc.,
NYSE Listed Company Manual Section 303A Corporate Governance Listing Standards
Frequently Asked Questions (Feb. 13, 2004), available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/
section303Afaqs.pdf.
53. See Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, Securities Act
Release No. 8220, Exchange Act Release No. 47,654, Investment Company Act Release No.
26,001, 79 SEC Docket 2876 (Apr. 9, 2003); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10A-3(b) (2007) (codifying
Exchange Act Rule 10A-3(b)).
54. The traditional formulation of the duty of care, requiring of directors the care level
that “ordinarily careful and prudent [people] would use in similar circumstances,” Graham v.
Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963), dates back to the 1800s. 1 DENIS J.
BLOCK ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS
117 (5th ed. 1998).
The duty of loyalty is also a precondition for director independence. Moreover,
monetary exposure for breach of the duty of loyalty is a more plausible threat because selfinterested behavior forfeits the protection of the business judgment rule and the exculpatory
statutes and may be hard to insure against. Nevertheless, the liability threat associated with
the duty of loyalty may offer only limited incentives for director independence because it is
not ordinarily triggered by complaisance in the self-interested behavior of others. At least
historically, the conflicts that lead to liability are gross, not subtle. In other words, where the
director has not personally profited from the action in question, it may be difficult to tag him
for the profits wrongfully obtained by others, such as a controlling shareholder. But cf. In re
Emerging Commc’ns, Inc., No. Civ.A. 16415, 2004 WL 1305745, at *40 (Del. Ch. May 3,
2004, revised June 4, 2004) (finding that a conflicted director failed to use his financial
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Early in the period, liability for breach of the duty of care uncomplicated by
self-dealing was famously described as the “search for a very small number of
needles in a very large haystack,”55 and risk of securities fraud liability was
non-existent. At the end of the period, Professors Black, Cheffins, and Klausner
tell us that liability in duty of care cases is still quite rare and that outside
director liability exposure in securities fraud litigation is limited to rare “near–
perfect-storm” cases.56 Nevertheless the directors’ perception of risk seems to
have increased over the period, perhaps because of lawyers’ exaggerations,57
perhaps because of scare-mongering by liability insurers,58 or perhaps because
of the saliency of outlier cases like Enron and WorldCom, in which outside
directors paid out-of-pocket to settle claims.59
Indeed, a better (though softer) measure of director apprehension than
monetary payouts may be the series of liability insulation mechanisms that
were adopted during the period. State corporate indemnification statutes
diffused rapidly in the 1950s, and soon covered all negligent behavior.60
Director and Officer (“D&O”) insurance arose in the 1950s and 1960s to cover
liability that was not indemnifiable.61 Yes, these measures protected directors,
but their promotion, which required concerted political activity at the state
level, presumably stemmed from growing liability concerns and the risks of
liability “loopholes.” The most famous liability insulation measure was the
expertise in a going-private transaction that shifted value to controlling shareholder).
55. Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the
Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1099 (1968)
(finding four cases); accord Stuart R. Cohn, Demise of the Director’s Duty of Care: Judicial
Avoidance of Standards and Sanctions Through the Business Judgment Rule, 62 TEX. L.
REV. 591, 591 nn.1-2 (1983) (noting only seven successful cases); Henry Ridgely Horsey,
The Duty of Care Component of the Delaware Business Judgment Rule, 19 DEL. J. CORP. L.
971, 982 (1994) (confirming Bishop’s study).
56. Bernard Black et al., Outside Director Liability, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1061,
1139 (2006). See generally Bernard Black et al., Liability Risk for Outside Directors: A
Cross-Border Analysis, 11 EUROPEAN FIN. MGMT. 153 (2005); Brian R. Cheffins & Bernard
S. Black, Outside Director Liability Across Countries, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1385 (2006). Black et
al. found approximately ten post-1980 cases in which outside directors made out-of-pocket
payments to settle securities fraud claims. Black et al., Outside Director Liability, supra, at
1070 tbl.2. They argue that appropriate D&O insurance should eliminate liability even
further, leaving open only cases of insolvency and losses beyond D&O policy limits like
Enron (where the directors paid out approximately $13 million) and WorldCom
(approximately $25 million). Id. at 1057-62.
57. Bernard Black et al., Outside Director Liability (Before Enron and WorldCom) 51
(Stanford Law & Econ. Olin Working Paper No. 250, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=382422.
58. See Bishop, supra note 55, at 1078.
59. See Joann S. Lublin et al., Directors Are Getting the Jitters—Recent Settlements
Tapping Executives’ Personal Assets Put Boardrooms on Edge, WALL ST. J., Jan. 13, 2005,
at B1.
60. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 4(o) (1957); JOSEPH BISHOP, LAW OF CORPORATE
OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS: INDEMNIFICATION AND INSURANCE § 6.01-.02 (1996).
61. See sources cited supra note 60.
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mid-1980s adoption by Delaware (and then quickly by other states) of director
exculpation statutes for breach of the duty of care.62 This followed immediately
upon the visible ratcheting up of liability standards in Smith v. Van Gorkom.63
In the immediate aftermath of the Enron et al. financial scandals, it
appeared that state courts, particularly the Delaware courts, might become more
receptive to liability theories that would increase a director’s monetary
exposure for the insiders’ wrongful behavior, on the ground of directors’ failure
to undertake adequate inquiry or oversight.64 These new theories of director
malfeasance often flew under the banner of “good faith.”65 The speculative
flurry was soon put to rest, however. Prolonged litigation over the $130 million
severance paid by the Walt Disney Company to former president Michael Ovitz
ended in victory for the directors (but after eight years of litigation), despite
behavior that fell far below “best practices.”66 In affirming, the Delaware
Supreme Court made it clear that “gross negligence (including a failure to
inform oneself of available material facts), without more” does not constitute
bad faith,67 which seemed to require something like scienter, “intentional
dereliction of duty, a conscious disregard for one’s responsibilities.”68
Subsequently, the Delaware Supreme Court went even further, holding that
“bad faith” was not an independent basis for director liability but rather one
precipitating condition for liability under the duty of loyalty.69 Nevertheless,
62. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001); see also Carl Samuel Bjerre, Note,
Evaluating the New Director Exculpation Statutes, 73 CORNELL L. REV 786, 786 (1988).
63. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). The case was ferociously criticized, see, e.g., Daniel R.
Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union Case, 40 BUS. LAW. 1437, 1455
(1985) (criticizing the majority opinion as “one of the worst decisions in the history of
corporate law”), and raised the specter of a D&O liability insurance crisis, see generally
Roberta Romano, Corporate Governance in the Aftermath of the Insurance Crisis, 39
EMORY L.J. 1155 (1990). Romano observes that within two years of Van Gorkom, forty-one
states adopted exculpatory statutes. Id. at 1160.
64. Some speculated that Delaware might feel pressure to demonstrate that state
corporate law could check managerial wrongdoing to protect its domain against further
encroachment by the federal government. See generally William B. Chandler III & Leo E.
Strine, Jr., The New Federalism of the American Corporate Governance System: Preliminary
Reflections of Two Residents of One Small State, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 953 (2003).
65. See Hillary A. Sale, Delaware’s Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 456 (2004). See
generally Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Good Faith in Corporate Law, 11 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 1, 1 (2006) (“[T]he explicit recognition of the duty of good faith in recent Delaware cases
shines a spotlight on that duty and therefore makes it especially important to develop the
contours of the duty and to examine the duty from a normative perspective.”).
66. See In re Walt Disney Co., 907 A.2d 693, 697 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d, 906 A.2d 27
(Del. 2006).
67. 906 A.2d at 64-65.
68. Id. at 66.
69. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369-70 (Del. 2006). The Stone court also refused to
broaden the prior pre-Enron standard of directors’ oversight liability, affirming the standard
articulated in In re Caremark International Inc., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996) (opining
that “only a sustained or systematic failure of the board to exercise oversight—such as an
utter failure to attempt to assure a reasonable information and reporting system exists—will
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the protracted litigation, the courts’ willingness to set forth in embarrassing
detail the deficiencies of directors’ decisionmaking processes, and the implicit
threat about liability “next time” may increase directors’ vigilance and
independence.
Similarly, the potential stick of directors’ liability under the federal
securities law was muted by institutional realities, yet the fear remained. Even
if managers’ wrongful conduct could be framed as also constituting a
disclosure violation, the applicable liability standard that emerged over the
period for directors’ liability was a “scienter” test: whether the directors had
knowledge of the wrongful disclosure (or were reckless in not knowing).70
Moreover, plaintiffs’ attorneys in securities class actions have no incentive to
prove scienter because this could undercut the D&O insurers’ obligation to
fund settlements.71
Yet for disclosure in connection with a public offering of securities,
directors have a “due diligence” obligation to assure the accuracy of the
disclosed statements. A recent WorldCom decision on this due diligence
obligation means that directors cannot necessarily rely on an auditor’s
certification where there are “red flags” in the issuer’s financials.72 Rather than
face a trial on what precisely they knew or should have known, and opposed by
a public pension fund plaintiff who insisted on personal liability for the
directors rather than simply insurance proceeds, the WorldCom independent
directors agreed to settle the litigation. Each director’s contribution was
designed to be approximately 20% of his or her net worth, approximately $20
million in total.73 In general, the “shelf-registration” rules that permit
immediate issuance of debt and equity securities by large public firms
heightened the negligent disclosure liability risk for directors.74 Since detailed
knowledge about the corporation’s financial disclosure enhances the capacity

establish the lack of good faith that is a necessary condition to liability”). See Stone, 911
A.2d at 370.
70. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
71. See Black et al., Outside Director Liability, supra note 56, at 1103-04.
72. In re WorldCom, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 2d 628 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). WorldCom seems to
impose greater demands on directors than the previous leading case on director liability for
prospectus misstatements, Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y.
1968).
73. Gretchen Morgenson, Ex-Directors at WorldCom Settle Anew, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
19, 2005, at C1.
74. This is mostly because of the time crunch, which deprives underwriters of time to
scrutinize the issuer’s financial statements before issuing securities. See JOHN C. COFFEE, JR.
& JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 271-85 (9th ed. 2003) (discussing shelf
registration rules and liability risks). Indeed, Bernard Black et al. found that the negligence
standard of section 11 was the critical element in most of the identified post-1980 instances
of outside director out-of-pocket payments. Black et al., Outside Director Liability, supra
note 56, at 1070 tbl.2, 1074.
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for independent judgment, WorldCom—which creates additional reasons for
directors to acquire such knowledge—should enhance director independence.75
b. Rewards (carrots)
There were a number of innovations during the period aimed at creating
incentives for good performance by outside directors.76 Circa 1950, director
compensation was low and sometimes nonexistent. The tradition, going back to
the nineteenth century, was not to pay directors, on the view that the
opportunity to monitor management was reward enough for a substantial
stockholder.77 As it became desirable for firms to put “outsiders” on the board
and necessary to compensate them for their time, significant compensation
became common; indeed, it became increasingly lavish throughout the
period.78 Such compensation, of course, can undercut independence if the CEO
has influence over director retention.
One 1990s-era governance innovation was to compensate directors in stock
(or stock options) to strengthen the alignment of director and shareholder
interests.79 Despite some evidence that suggests a connection between stockbased director compensation and improved governance,80 stock-related

75. For a recent discussion of the post-Disney, post-WorldCom environment for
directors, see Symposium, Director Liability, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1011 (2006).
76. See generally David Yermack, Remuneration, Retention, and Reputation
Incentives for Outside Directors, 59 J. FIN. 2281 (2004) (investigating the incentives
received by outside directors of Fortune 500 firms from 1994 to 1996).
77. Charles M. Elson, Director Compensation and the Management-Captured Board—
The History of a Symptom and a Cure, 50 SMU L. REV. 127, 135-36 (1996). Indeed, director
compensation was not legally recognized in the United States until the late 1940s, although
informal modes flourished, such as meeting fees, passing of stock tips, and even salaries. Id.
at 138, 142. As of 1979, the median NYSE firm paid an annual director retainer of less than
$10,000. SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 11, at 605 tbl.9.
78. Elson, supra note 77, at 147-56.
79. See Eliezer M. Fich & Anil Shivdasani, The Impact of Stock-Option Compensation
for Outside Directors on Firm Value, 78 J. BUS. 2229, 2229 (2005) (noting that the number
of Fortune 1000 firms using stock-based remuneration increased from just over 200 in 1992
to almost 500 in 1995).
80. Fich and Shivdasani report that the presence of outside director stock-option plans
is associated with economically significantly higher market-to-book ratios, a greater fraction
of independent directors on the board, higher institutional investor ownership, and stock
price effects that suggest that investors believe that such plans improve monitoring. See id. at
2230-31. Some studies have associated significant stock ownership with increased firm
value, see Randall Morck et al., Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An
Empirical Analysis, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 293 (1988) (using Tobin’s q as the measure of value),
and with lower executive compensation and better connection to pay for performance, see
Tod Perry, Incentive Compensation for Outside Directors and CEO Turnover (July 1999)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=236033. Moreover,
courts came to give greater deference to target board defensive measures where the outside
directors were substantial stockholders, most notably in Unitrin, Inc. v. American General
Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995).
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compensation was hardly a panacea. Few directors actually acquired a great
enough equity interest to generate a strong incentive effect (assuming that
incentives are increasing in ownership levels). Directors typically obtained their
equity stake through annual stock-based compensation rather than an initial
grant of stock options or restricted stock. Over time the stake accumulates, but
this also undercuts director independence where the CEO has influence over
director retention.
More seriously, perhaps, stock-based compensation may create a
distinctive set of perverse incentives for the directors, as demonstrated by the
wave of financial disclosure problems in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The
director receiving stock-based compensation, like the similarly compensated
CEO, may be tempted to accept aggressive accounting rather than stock-pricepuncturing disclosure.81 It is important to remember that with respect to
disclosure obligations, the public board has a dual duty—not only to the firm’s
shareholders, but to capital market participants more generally. This is because
of the positive (negative) externalities associated with accurate (misleading)
disclosure.82 With such divided duties, it’s hard to know which way to set the
optimal stock-based incentive effects.83
c. Reputation
Reputation provides another sort of stick or carrot that could enhance
director independence. Presumably directors would not want to be associated
with a poorly performing firm or a firm that is stigmatized because of a
business scandal, and instead would want to be associated with a bellwether
firm. But the incentive effects of reputation consist not merely in the director’s
subjective distaste for embarrassment and his preference for respect, but also in
the business opportunities, including other directorships, that are affected by
reputation.84 The effectiveness of reputation-based incentives is limited by the
noisiness of reputation markets. Plainly a director suffers a reputational

81. For example, there is some evidence that outside directors participated along with
managers in taking backdated stock options. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., Lucky
Directors (John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Bus., Harvard Law Sch., Discussion Paper
No. 573, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=952239.
82. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Governance Failures of the Enron Board and the New
Information Order of Sarbanes-Oxley, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1125 (2003).
83. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management and Control of the
Modern Business Corporation: Some Initial Reflections, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1233 (2002)
(arguing that audit committee members should receive no stock-based compensation).
84. See, e.g., Stuart C. Gilson, Bankruptcy, Boards, Banks, and Blockholders:
Evidence on Changes in Corporate Ownership and Control When Firms Default, 27 J. FIN.
ECON. 355 (1990) (finding that directors of firms that go bankrupt subsequently serve on
fewer boards); Yermack, supra note 76 (2004) (finding that association with highperforming firms leads to new board seats and reputation provides half of directors’ total
incentives). See generally Black et al., supra note 57.
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sanction if there is a financial catastrophe or major legal problem at the firm. In
the more typical case of firm underperformance or a minor legal problem,
however, there may be little or no reputational effect.85
In general, reputation markets became more effective over the period,
particularly beginning in the 1980s. The salience of hostile takeovers drew
media attention—newspapers, books, magazines, and movies—not simply to
the actors in a particular case but to governance activity more generally.86
High-stakes transactions gave rise to high-stakes litigation, which often was
closely followed by the business press. Delaware courts issued opinions that
publicly evaluated the behavior of directors as well as other corporate actors,
often in harsh terms.87 Indeed, in light of the Delaware courts’ reluctance to
impose monetary liability on directors, the most significant independenceenhancing effect of litigation is probably through improving the operation of
the reputation market rather than through the threat of monetary sanctions.88
Reputation markets also became more effective because of the activity of
activist institutional investors. For example, beginning in the 1990s CalPERS
publicly targeted firms (and their boards) for poor performance and for
noncompliance with its corporate governance code.89 Other activist
85. First, a relatively routine problem will not attract sufficient media attention to
achieve the salience necessary to attach the director to the matter. Second, it is generally
hard to make judgments about director responsibility when a firm underperforms. In the
egregious cases, Enron or WorldCom for example, particularized judgments seem hardly
necessary since surely someone on the board should have been sounding an alarm. No
longtime director’s reputation emerged unscathed. In the more typical case, the competence
of director monitoring rarely seems relevant.
86. See generally Alexander Dyck & Luigi Zingales, The Corporate Governance Role
of the Media (Ctr. for Research in Sec. Prices, Working Paper No. 543, 2002), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=335602.
87. See, e.g., Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del.
1994); Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989); In re Walt
Disney Co., 907 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 2005). See generally Edward B. Rock, Saints and
Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1103-04
(1997); David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1811 (2001).
88. Thus the greatest importance of Disney may be the scope of director decisions
potentially subject to detailed public scrutiny. Previously high-profile litigation arose in
hostile takeovers or management buyouts. But Disney signals that the Delaware courts may
be willing to scrutinize director actions in important but not bet-the-company matters,
particularly where management interests may clash with shareholder interests (like executive
compensation). This will improve the effectiveness of the reputational sanction and thus
strengthen director independence.
89. In 1990, for example, CalPERS and the New York State and Local Retirement
System published a letter to the GM board that attacked the board and that spurred
governance reform. Letters to GM Directors Trigger Pension Fund Uproar, CORP.
GOVERNANCE BULL. (Investor Responsibility Research Ctr., Gaithersburg, Md.), Jan.-Feb.
1990, at 18. More generally, see, for example, Calpers, Politicians Respond to Corporate
Downsizing, CORP. GOVERNANCE BULL. (Investor Responsibility Research Ctr.,
Gaithersburg, Md.), Apr.-June 1996, at 11. CalPERS began filing corporate governance
proposals in 1986. In 1991, Shareholders Will Cast Sharp Eye on Boards of Directors,
CORP. GOVERNANCE BULL. (Investor Responsibility Research Ctr., Gaithersburg, Md.),
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shareholders also began to use press campaigns to promote change.90 A 1993
article by Professor Joseph Grundfest unleashed what became the institutional
investor’s reputational strategy of choice: a “just vote no” campaign against
directors as a group or individually.91 A full-blown proxy campaign to replace
the board or particular directors was not attractive to the institutions because of
familiar collective action problems. Yet they could “just vote no” against
management’s candidates, and publicize their reasons for doing so.92 The
potential embarrassment factor of being a targeted director heightened the
potency of reputation markets.
3. Intra-board structures and functions
Another important mechanism for director independence is the creative use
of board structure to create a spirit of teamwork and mutual accountability
among independent directors that helps foster independence-in-fact. Structural
innovations multiplied over the period, including: board committees tasked
with specific functions, “special committees” for specific legal or transactional
issues, and various institutions to restrain the CEO’s agenda-setting authority,
such as the “lead director” and the “executive session.”
a. Board committees
One particularly important innovation was the board committee assigned a
specific key function. Beginning in the 1970s, “best practice” pronouncements
called for three specific committees: the audit committee, the compensation
committee, and the nominating committee, each with a majority of independent
directors.93 Each committee is functionally tasked in areas where the interests
of managers and the shareholders may conflict. Independence-in-fact may be
enhanced in two respects. First, the ownership and accountability for a specific
critical task may lead to greater autonomy from the CEO in performing that
Sept.-Oct. 1990, at 3.
90. In 1992, for example, activist shareholder Robert Monks publicly shamed the
Sears-Roebuck board into accepting proposed reforms through disparaging advertisements in
the Wall Street Journal. Dyck & Zingales, supra note 86, at 2.
91. Joseph A. Grundfest, Just Vote No: A Minimalist Strategy for Dealing with
Barbarians Inside the Gates, 45 STAN. L. REV. 857 (1993).
92. This strategy was facilitated by the SEC’s 1992 amendment of the proxy rules that
loosened some constraints on coordinated institutional action. See Regulation of
Communications Among Shareholders, Exchange Act Release No. 31,326, Investment
Company Act Release No. 19,031, 52 SEC Docket 2028 (Oct. 16, 1992). The rules permitted
institutions to engage in “conscious parallelism” without triggering proxy filing
requirements. Such “non-concerted” behavior does not trigger filing obligations as a “group”
under section 13(d) of the 1934 Act.
93. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Corporate Laws, supra note 31; Bus. Roundtable,
Statement, The Role and Composition of the Board of Directors of the Large Publicly
Owned Corporation, 33 BUS. LAW. 2083, 2108-10 (1978).
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task. Second, the practice of acting jointly and autonomously in a targeted area
may carry over to other important roles of the board, such as evaluating
managerial performance and strategy. The potential for enhanced independence
from this structural/functional mechanism source grew gradually over the
period, beginning in the 1970s. One limiting factor was that only at the end of
the period, via a NYSE rule, were these committees necessarily staffed solely
by independent directors.94
The most important board committee was the audit committee, a major
objective of corporate governance reformers. Although calls for the creation of
an audit committee began as early as 1939,95 critical mass did not coalesce
until the 1970s.96 In 1974, the SEC began requiring disclosure of the existence
of an audit committee (or lack thereof),97 and in 1978 the SEC published
general guidelines for what an audit committee should do.98 The NYSE began
requiring audit committees in 1977.99 Indeed, by 1979, virtually all NYSElisted companies had audit committees, and for 92% of the firms, the members
were non-management directors.100 By the end of the 1980s, the NASDAQ and
the Amex introduced audit committee requirements as well.101 Current
94. See NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual §§ 303, 303A (2007); text
accompanying notes 36-37. It should also be noted that the Enron audit committee was
staffed solely by independents, and that the structural innovation of the compensation
committee coincided with the controversial run up in executive compensation.
95. The NYSE made such a suggestion in 1939. Edward F. Greene & Bernard B. Falk,
The Audit Committee—A Measured Contribution to Corporate Governance: A Realistic
Appraisal of Its Objectives and Functions, 34 BUS. LAW. 1229, 1233 n.16 (1979) (citing
Report of Subcommittee on Independent Audit and Audit Procedure of NYSE Commission
on Stock List 7 (1939)). The SEC made an audit committee proposal in 1940. In re
McKesson & Robbins, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 2707, [1940 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 72,020 (Dec. 5, 1940).
96. The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants advocated the use of audit
committees in 1967; the leading accounting firm, Arthur Anderson & Co., signed on in 1972.
See Greene & Falk, supra note 95, at 1233 & n.16, 1234. An important congressional
committee picked up the theme in 1976. See SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT & INVESTIGATIONS OF
THE H. COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 94TH CONG., REPORT ON FEDERAL
REGULATION AND REGULATORY REFORM 29-42 (Subcomm. Print 1976).
97. Item 8(e), Schedule 14A, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (1978).
98. Proposed Rules Relating to Shareholder Communications, Shareholder
Participation in the Corporate Electoral Process and Corporate Governance Generally,
Exchange Act Release No. 14,970, 15 SEC Docket 291 (July 18, 1978).
99. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
100. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 46, § 3.05 n.4 (citing a 1979 study of the American
Society of Corporate Secretaries). On the other hand, apparently one-third of audit
committee members were “affiliated” directors, and affiliated directors constituted the
majority of the audit committee for nearly a quarter of firms. See David Vicknair et al., A
Note on Audit Committee Independence: Evidence from the NYSE on “Grey” Area
Directors, 7 ACCT. HORIZONS 53, 55, 56 (1993) (using a sample of 100 NYSE firms in the
1980s). This was permitted until the 1999 amendment of the NYSE listing standard. See
supra text accompanying note 37.
101. The ASE “recommended” audit committees to its listed companies in 1980 and
made them mandatory in 1991. Douglas C. Michael, Untenable Status of Corporate
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standards, through both exchange listing rules and Sarbanes-Oxley, mandate
audit committees for every publicly owned company, as well as stringent
standards of independence and financial expertise.102
Instituting the compensation committee came somewhat later than the audit
committee. For example, the SEC began to require disclosure of whether a firm
had a compensation committee and the committee’s composition only in
1992.103 Throughout much of the period, it was common for management
directors to sit on the compensation committee, although outsiders were
typically the majority.104 Nominating committees (separately discussed below)
also became more prevalent during the period,105 in response to pressure from
institutional investors.106 Compensation and nominating committees, both
staffed by independent directors, are now required by the NYSE listing
standard.107
At best, functionally tasked board committees should enhance
independence, particularly in regard to the targeted task. Actual practices, until
the post-Enron reform wave, made the committees less effective in that regard.
For the audit committee, management hired (and fired) the auditor and also
determined the level of more lucrative non-auditing consulting work assigned
to the auditor, undercutting the auditor’s allegiance to the audit committee. This
managerial power over the auditor relationship was, of course, known to the
audit committee members and would have dampened their independent
engagement with significant auditing issues. Sarbanes-Oxley, passed in 2002,
now gives the audit committee power (and responsibility) over the firm’s
Governance Listing Standards Under the Securities Exchange Act, 47 BUS. LAW 1461, 1474
(1992). The NASDAQ required its listed companies to have independent audit committees in
1987. Id. at 1475.
102. See sources cited supra note 53; see also BUS. ROUNDTABLE, PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 16 (2002), available at http://www.businessroundtable.org/pdf/
704.pdf.
103. See Executive Compensation Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 6962, Exch.
Act Release No. 31,327, Investment Company Act Release No. 19,032, 52 SEC Docket
1961 (Oct. 16, 1992) (currently reflected in Regulation S-K Item 402(j)). The proposed
release had much more stringent disclosure standards for ties and interests that might
undercut independence, including non-profit organization director interlocks. Compare
Securities Act Release No. 6940, Exchange Act Release No. 30,851, 57 Fed. Reg. 29,583, at
29,596 (proposed July 2, 1992), with Securities Act Release No. 6962, Exchange Act
Release No. 31,327, Investment Company Act Release No. 19,032, 57 Fed. Reg. 48,126, at
48,142-43 (adopted Oct. 21, 1992).
104. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 46, § 3A.05 n.1.
105. A 1992 Korn/Ferry study showed that, of the companies studied, 98% had audit
committees, 95% had compensation committees, and 67% had nominating committees.
KORN/FERRY INT’L, BOARD OF DIRECTORS NINETEENTH ANNUAL STUDY 9 (1992). By 1995,
those percentages had increased to 100%, 99%, and 71%, respectively. KORN/FERRY INT’L,
TWENTY-SEVENTH ANNUAL BOARD OF DIRECTORS STUDY 13 (2000).
106. GREGORY V. VARALLO & DANIEL A. DREISBACH, FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE: A GUIDE FOR DIRECTORS AND CORPORATE COUNSEL 24 (1996).
107. NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual § 303A.04-.05 (2007).
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auditor relationships and audit policies.108 This, in turn, should make the audit
committee a stronger source of director independence.
The compensation committee also has a similar story of dampened
independence. In setting executive pay, compensation committees typically
have relied on the compensation consultant who also provided firm-wide
compensation and human resources guidance. Such a management-retained
consultant, earning the largest portion of its fees from the firm-wide
assignment, is unlikely to make recommendations or offer viewpoints that
senior management would find distressing. Reliance on such a consultant will
inevitably dampen the committee’s independence.109
b. The “special committee”
The model for the maximally independent board committee is the “special
committee” that a company sets up in cases where the interests of senior
management seem to most directly conflict with the corporation’s. This
structural innovation came into widespread use beginning in the 1970s, but
only in a limited set of circumstances.110 One case was a control transaction,
such as a management buyout, in which management is part of a group that

108. Section 301 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 makes the audit committee
“directly responsible for the appointment, compensation, and oversight of the work” of the
firm’s auditor. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(2) (2007). Section
202 of Sarbanes-Oxley provides that “[a]ll auditing services . . . provided to an issuer by the
auditor of the issuer shall be preapproved by the audit committee of the issuer.” Id. § 78j1(i)(1)(A). Section 201 of Sarbanes-Oxley prohibits the provision of certain non-audit
services by the firm’s auditor, id. § 78j-1(g), and required preapproval of the audit
committee for non-prohibited services, id. § 78j-1(h). See Strengthening Requirements
Regarding Auditor Independence, Securities Act Release No. 8183, Exchange Act Release
No. 47,265, Public Utility Holding Company Act Release No. 27,642, Investment Company
Act Release No. 25,915, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2103, 68 Fed. Reg. 6006
(Feb. 5, 2003).
109. See LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 37-39 (2004). As part of a new
initiative on executive compensation disclosure, the SEC now requires more stringent
disclosure of relationships that potentially undercut the independence of the compensation
committee members (and other directors) and disclosure of whether the committee itself
retains any compensation consultant. The Commission does not require disclosure of the
consultant’s other possible economic relationships with the corporation. See Executive
Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 8732A, Exchange
Act Release No. 54,302A, Investment Company Act Release No. 27,444A, 71 Fed. Reg.
53,158, at 53,205 (Sept. 8, 2006) (discussing compensation committee disclosure as required
in new Item 407(e) to Regulation S-K). In the 2007 proxy season, shareholder activists
began to press for the disclosure of such potential conflicts for compensation consultants.
110. See generally Scott V. Simpson, The Emerging Role of the Special Committee—
Ensuring Business Judgment Rule Protection in the Context of Management Leveraged
Buyouts and Other Corporate Transactions Involving Conflicts of Interest, 43 BUS. LAW.
665 (1988).
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seeks to buy out the public shareholders;111 or a parent-subsidiary merger, in
which it is assumed that the target management’s allegiance is likely to be
towards the controlling shareholder who appointed them.112 Another case was a
shareholder derivative suit, in which officers and directors allegedly violated a
fiduciary duty to the corporation.113 In these cases the nominal independence of
the committee was buttressed by the committee’s hiring of independent
advisors, particularly independent legal counsel. Such independent advisors,
whose allegiance was not to management, could drive the process and promote
the directors’ sense of independence. However, “special committees” had little
pervasive effect on board practice. Most often, they were convened in “final
period” situations, after which the entity disappeared. Moreover, the potency of
a committee’s (or the board’s) retaining its own advisors was well understood
by corporate management and thus strongly resisted.114 The lesson learned
from special committees underpins the Sarbanes-Oxley decision to give the
audit committee authority over the auditor’s employment (and to give the audit
committee the power to hire its own counsel and other advisors).115
c. Executive session; “lead director”
Another notable structural element was the emerging practice of the
board’s meeting in executive session (meaning, without senior management
present) under the guidance of a “lead director,” as part of each regularly
scheduled board meeting. An executive session gives the board the opportunity
for candid discussion free of senior management’s possibly inhibitory presence.
Holding executive sessions became regular practice in the 1990s.116 The 1996
Korn/Ferry study indicated that the boards of 62% of respondents met in
executive session during that year.117 General Motors’ 1994 Corporate
Governance Guidelines, a bellwether in U.S. corporate governance
development, established executive sessions to be held at least three times per

111. See generally William T. Allen, Independent Directors in MBO Transactions:
Are They Fact or Fantasy?, 45 BUS. LAW. 2055 (1990).
112. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 709 n.7 (Del. 1983).
113. E.g., Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
114. See, e.g., ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 46, § 3.04 cmt. c (imposing full-board or
judicial approval requirements for such retentions).
115. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(5)-(6) (2007).
Similarly, NASDAQ has adopted a requirement that related party transactions be approved
by the audit committee or another committee consisting solely of independent directors.
NASDAQ, Inc., Marketplace Rules R. 4350(h) (2007).
116. See Working Group on Corporate Governance, A New Compact for Owners and
Directors, HARV. BUS. REV., July-Aug. 1991, at 141, 142 (suggesting outside directors meet
in executive sessions “no less than once a year”).
117. KORN/FERRY INT’L, 24TH ANNUAL BOARD OF DIRECTORS STUDY 21 (1996).
Interestingly, however, this percentage dropped to 60% by 2000. KORN/FERRY INT’L, 27TH
ANNUAL BOARD OF DIRECTORS STUDY 13 (2000).
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year.118 “Regularly scheduled executive sessions” are now required by the
NYSE listing requirements.119 Because institutionalized, such a meeting does
not require special director initiation that might well be regarded by senior
management as a hostile act.
The naming of a “lead director”—an independent director who convenes
the board, where the chair is a senior executive, typically the CEO—was itself
a structural innovation. It represented a compromise between those who,
following the U.K. model, wanted to separate the roles of chair and CEO by
making a non-executive director the chair, and those who felt that such
separation would undermine the CEO’s authority.120 Following the 1992
release of the Cadbury Report in the United Kingdom,121 calls for lead
directors became more pronounced.122 Lead directors came to play an
increasingly important role in U.S. corporate governance practice,123 providing
an organizational focal point for crises where the CEO’s actions have been
challenged.124
118. GEN. MOTORS BD. OF DIRS., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE GUIDELINES 7 (1994).
119. NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual § 303A.03 (2007). See Working Group on
Corporate Governance, supra note 116.
120. Two leading corporate reform groups, the Council of Institutional Investors and
Institutional Shareholder Services, argue for separation of roles. Apparently such separation
is relatively common among all public companies—approximately 50%, according to the
National Association of Corporate Directors—but still uncommon among the largest firms—
only 14% of the top 100, according to a Shearman & Sterling report. See Ann Therese
Palmer, Should the Top Roles Be Split?, CHIEF EXECUTIVE, May 2005, at 16, 16.
121. CADBURY COMM., THE FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 58
(1992) (“Where the chairman is also the chief executive, it is essential that there should be a
strong and independent element on the board, with a recognized senior member.”).
122. See, e.g., Lipton & Lorsch, supra note 21, at 70.
123. The fraction of Business Roundtable firms with an independent chairman, lead
director, or presiding director increased from approximately 25% in 2002 to 55% in 2003, to
71% in 2004, to 83% in 2005, and to 91% in 2006. See BUS. ROUNDTABLE, supra note 20;
Press Release, Bus. Roundtable, New Business Roundtable CEO Survey Shows Continuing
Improvements in Corporate Governance Practices (Mar. 9, 2004), available at
http://www.businessroundtable.org/newsroom/document.aspx?qs=5626BF807822B0F13D
3429167F75A70478252; Press Release, Bus. Roundtable, The Business Roundtable
Releases Corporate Governance Survey (July 15, 2003), available at
http://www.businessroundtable.org/newsroom/document.aspx?qs=55B6BF807822B0F1DD6
449167F75A70478252.
124. Take two examples from 2005 and 2006: First, as the investigation of AIG Corp.
began to reveal evidence of senior management’s involvement in transactions that produced
questionable accounting results, the lead director steered the board towards the ouster of the
incumbent chair and CEO and the selection of a new CEO. Second, in the face of widespread
dissatisfaction within Morgan Stanley and its shareholder base with the strategy and
leadership of the chairman and CEO, the lead director eventually promoted the resignation of
the incumbent and his replacement with a former senior executive.
The NYSE listing standards require that a company specify in its proxy statement the
name or method of selection of the “presiding director” for executive sessions. NYSE, Inc.,
Listed Company Manual § 303A.03 (2007). In many cases the role of “lead director” is
played by the chair of the nominating/corporate governance committee. See SHEARMAN &
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4. Reducing CEO influence in director selection and retention
A director’s independence-in-fact may be seriously affected by the route by
which the director arrived on the board—the director’s “genealogy.” Until
recently, CEOs heavily influenced—if not controlled outright—director
selection.125 Directors picked in this way are likely to feel a strong sense of
loyalty, even gratitude, to the CEO.126 Moreover, as CEO-influenced director
selection also implies some CEO role in the director retention decision, a
director whose “independence” aggravates the CEO may find himself politely
invited not to stand for reelection.127 Throughout almost the entire period from
the 1950s to the 2000s, CEOs successfully resisted reforms that would have
increased shareholder influence in director selection, including the SEC’s 2003
shareholder ballot access proposal. On the other hand, the increasing use of
nominating committees later in the period, and the growing practice of staffing
the nominating committee solely with independent directors, did reduce CEO
influence to some extent.
CEOs won a number of battles in the period over the practical scope of the
shareholders’ nominal right to present director nominees at the annual meeting.
The most important barrier facing dissidents is the expense, including the
compliance costs of the SEC’s proxy rules and the printing, mailing, and
publicity costs of waging an election contest in a diffusely owned firm.128 The
STERLING LLP, supra note 20, at 5.
125. See, e.g., LORSCH WITH MACIVER, supra note 23, at 20-23 (arguing that even with
the advent of nominating committees, CEOs still have a strong hand in the selection
process); MACE, supra note 22, at 94-101 (arguing that CEOs pick directors).
126. See, e.g., James Wade et al., Golden Parachutes: CEOs and the Exercise of
Social Influence, 35 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 587 (1990) (finding that directors elected during the
CEO’s tenure may feel obligation and loyalty); James D. Westphal & Edward J. Zajac, Who
Shall Govern? CEO/Board Power, Demographic Similarity, and New Director Selection, 40
ADMIN. SCI. Q. 60 (1995) (finding that CEO influence in director selection leads to
demographically similar directors sympathetic to the CEO); see also Anil Shivdasani &
David Yermack, CEO Involvement in the Selection of New Board Members: An Empirical
Analysis, 54 J. FIN. 1829 (1999) (finding that boards with CEO involvement in director
selection have a higher fraction of pick-affiliated (“grey”) directors than of true independents
and finding a recent trend away from CEO involvement); Edward J. Zajac & James D.
Westphal, Accounting for the Explanations of CEO Compensation: Substance and
Symbolism, 40 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 283 (1995).
127. An interesting variation on the CEO/board selection question arises when the
board recruits the CEO. (An inside CEO successor probably has been groomed, if not
directly chosen, by the outgoing CEO and may inherit, instead of independently generating,
the board’s support.) A board that has recruited the CEO presumably will be more
independent, particularly when the CEO is an outsider. Common lore is that one of the
missions of a new CEO is to stock the board with his loyalists.
128. The cost of waging a proxy contest is also affected by the fraction of institutional
ownership; concentrated ownership reduces the costs of solicitation. In January 2007, the
SEC adopted a rule that would allow an insurgent to post proxy materials on the Internet
rather than to print and mail the materials (though it must provide a paper copy to a
requesting shareholder). See Internet Availability of Proxy Materials, Exchange Act Release
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campaign finance rules that emerged in the 1950s strongly favor the managerial
incumbents: the dissidents must fund their campaign from their own pockets;
the incumbents have virtually unlimited access to the corporate treasury. As a
practical matter, the dissidents are reimbursed only if they successfully obtain
control of the board.129 Subsequent proposals for qualified reimbursement—for
example, tied to the dissident’s fraction of the votes received—have gone
nowhere.
The obvious low cost alternative to a separate proxy contest would be to
grant shareholders access to the management proxy to present director
candidates. However, CEOs won a victory from the SEC in the 1950s and
again in the 2000s that have kept shareholders from accessing the management
proxy. In fashioning its shareholder proposal rule in the 1950s following a
series of high profile proxy contests, the SEC gave the issuer the right to
exclude a proposal “that relates to an election for membership on the
company’s board of directors” from the management proxy.130 As a result,
instead of piggy-backing on the management proxy, a dissident needs to wage
an independent proxy contest. Five decades later, in 2003 the Business
Roundtable successfully fended off the SEC’s proposed “security holder
nomination” rule, which would have provided dissidents with access to the
management proxy in specified circumstances.131 Similarly, CEOs prevailed in
a campaign to unwind cumulative voting, a historically important mechanism

No. 55,146, Investment Company Act Release No. 27,671, 72 Fed. Reg. 4148 (Jan. 29,
2007). This will significantly reduce an insurgent’s costs.
129. Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., 128 N.E.2d 291 (N.Y. 1955).
The consequence is that insurgent efforts will be undersupplied because insurgents are likely
to bear the full cost of the election contests while at best receiving only the gains
proportional to their ownership stake. Such a reimbursement rule creates a particular barrier
to electoral success. Shareholders who might be persuaded to add one or two dissident
directors will be very leery about a shift in control through an election contest to insurgents
who, by hypothesis, are unwilling to pay a control premium. Yet if the insurgents run and
win with a “short slate” that substitutes one or two dissident directors for management’s
nominees, the new board—on which the dissidents are an unwelcome minority—is unlikely
to reimburse the insurgents despite their electoral success.
130. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Rule 14a-8(i)(8), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(8)
(2007). See generally Jeffrey N. Gordon, Institutions as Relational Investors: A New Look at
Cumulative Voting, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 124, 152-54 (1994) (describing how an increased
number of high profile proxy contests in the 1950s led to Congressional and SEC hearings
and fanned general alarm about the potential power of shareholder dissidents). A recent
Second Circuit case has apparently opened the door to shareholder-proposed bylaws that
would mandate access to the management proxy for shareholder nominees. See Am. Fed’n
of State, County & Mun. Employees v. Am. Int’l Group Inc., 462 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2006).
131. See Security Holder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 48,626,
Investment Company Act Release No. 26,206, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,784 (proposed Oct. 23,
2003). For a discussion of the Business Roundtable lobbying efforts, see Lucian Arye
Bebchuk, The Case for Shareholder Access: A Response to the Business Roundtable, 55
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 557 (2005).
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that uses proportional representation in a way that facilitates shareholder access
to the board.132
One piece of the reform agenda did prevail: the creation of a nominating
committee with responsibility for vetting and selecting director candidates. In
1979, only 19% of the companies sampled in a SEC study had nominating
committees; by 1981, a subsequent SEC study showed an increase to 30%; in
1989, a Korn/Ferry study reported that 57% of the responding firms had a
nominating committee.133 As of 1992 when ALI published Principles of
Corporate Governance, “best practice” called for a nominating committee that
had no officer members but could have affiliated directors as members.134 As
per the 2003 revision of the NYSE listings standards, NYSE-listed companies
were required to have a nominating committee consisting solely of
“independent” directors, under a standard that would exclude most affiliated
directors as well as officers.135
The usefulness of a nominating committee in promoting independence-infact of directors is not altogether clear.136 On the one hand, the ALI project
made it clear that a CEO “can be expected to be highly active” in
recommending and discussing candidates with the committee and in recruiting
candidates for the board.137 The CEO often will select the executive search
firm that the committee uses to look for director candidates. On the other hand,
the nominating committee process might shield a director who has begun to
challenge the CEO from retaliation. Extensive new SEC rules adopted in 2004
132. See Gordon, supra note 130. Cumulative voting operates in two distinct settings.
First, a single shareholder (or cohesive group) owning a significant minority block can
automatically elect a director to the board. But second, cumulative voting lowers the cost of
mobilizing diffuse shareholders because electoral success—in the sense of placing a
nominee on the board—requires much less than 50% of the votes. For example, for a tenperson board elected annually, a dissident need to rally only a 10% shareholder vote to put a
director on the board. So cumulative voting offers significant potential for shareholder
selection of at least some directors who would be independent in this genealogical sense.
Alarmed by the role that cumulative voting played in some prominent proxy contests of the
1950s, CEOs and their allies went to work. The hostile takeovers of the 1980s brought a
further wave of managerial efforts to eliminate cumulative voting as a route to board
representation. Circa 1950, twenty-two states had mandatory cumulative voting; circa 1990,
only six did. Id. at 142-46, 148-54.
133. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 46, § 3A.04 reporter’s n.1.
134. Id. § 3A.04.
135. See NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual §§ 303, 303A (2007). NASDAQ’s
rules, which are geared to the size diversity of NASDAQ-listed companies, require either a
nominating committee or a practice under which nominations are made by the independent
directors of the board.
136. See, e.g., MACE, supra note 22, at 95 (quoting a CEO who stated, “Once I have
decided on the man who should be our new board member, I discuss this informally outside
of board meetings with our three-man committee of the board that officially nominates
people to the board”). Writing in 1989, LORSCH WITH MACIVER, supra note 23, at 20, found
that 55% of the directors they surveyed said that the CEO was heavily involved in the
identification of possible candidates.
137. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 46, § 3A.04 cmt. c.
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require disclosure of nominating committee practices, particularly the attributes
the committee regards as essential and the committee’s search and evaluation
process, including the process for vetting director candidates suggested by
shareholders.138 The goal, presumably, is to force the nominating committee to
set forth the standards that guide its work so as to provide a basis for ex post
scrutiny. Moreover, involvement by the CEO presumably would be a point for
disclosure and that alone may tamp down the CEO’s influence.
In measuring the effect of a nominating committee, the different
conceptions of “independence” are important. By the end of the period, CEOs
came to accept a nominating committee composed of “independent” directors,
if only because the directors’ views of the firm were likely to be have been
shaped by the CEO’s vision. However, CEOs continued to fight tooth and nail
against measures that would increase direct shareholder access to the board.
From the CEO’s perspective, the shareholder-nominee director was not
independent, but rather dependent on the proposing shareholder group and its
particularistic agenda.139 On this view, nominating committees produce
directors independent of both shareholders and the CEO.
C. Summary of Part I.B
This nonexhaustive survey of the mechanisms of director independence
shows that reform efforts over the 1950-2005 period did, on balance, enhance
substantially the conditions that foster director independence. The relationship
rules created obvious protections, and the structural innovations within the
board have been promising. Putting aside the independent nominating
committee, which will have some pro-independence effect, other efforts to
strengthen the shareholder hand in director selection did not succeed. However,
it is reasonable to conclude that the cumulative effect of innovations in these
various mechanisms significantly increased director independence over the
period. But the difficult problem remains: independence is more a disposition, a
state of mind, rather than a concrete fact. What might have been more
significant than the mechanisms themselves was the constant advocacy of
director independence that led to their adoption. Adoption of these various
governance innovations both reflected a cultural change in the expectations of
director behavior and helped create the cultural change. Thus the shift in the

138. See Disclosure Regarding Nominating Committee Functions and
Communications Between Security Holders and Boards of Directors, Securities Act Release
No. 8340, Exchange Act Release No. 48,825, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,262,
68 Fed. Reg. 66,992 (Nov. 28, 2003); see also NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual
§ 303A.02 (2007); NASDAQ, Inc., Marketplace Rules R. 4350(c)(4) (2007).
139. This perception significantly influenced the Business Roundtable’s opposition to
the SEC’s shareholder ballot access proposal. See, e.g., Letter from Henry A. McKinnell,
Chairman, Bus. Roundtable, to Jonathan Katz, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Dec. 22,
2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s71903/s71903-381.pdf.
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proportion of independent directors on the board from 20% in the 1950s to 75%
by the mid-2000s is more than a superficial increase of nominally identified
outsiders: board composition and board attitude have notably shifted toward
independence-in-fact.
II. CHANGING BOARD COMPOSITION: THE SEARCH FOR EVIDENCE THAT IT
MAKES A DIFFERENCE
Evidence that connects the increased presence of independent directors to
shareholder benefit is weak at best. The empirical studies on the effects of
board composition can be broken down into two types: (1) effects on firm
performance, using, variously, accounting measures, stock price returns, and
market valuation metrics such as Tobin’s q; and (2) effects on discrete tasks,
such as CEO compensation and termination and decisions in connection with
takeovers, whether as acquirer or target.140 Teasing out the effects of board
composition from the many other factors that affect performance is
economically and econometrically difficult,141 so the lack of a strong positive
connection between board independence and performance is perhaps
unsurprising. This has motivated the “discrete tasks” line of research, on the
theory that even if ultimate performance effects are hard to find in the data,
certain governance actions should have a bottom-line effect. Yet even for
discrete tasks, there is only limited evidence that board independence generates
differences in board behavior, and the differences are not stark.
A. Uncertain Effect on Firm Performance and Behavior
1. Firm performance tests
The most thorough survey of the empirical evidence on board composition
effects is a 1999 paper by Bhagat and Black. In describing efforts to show
correlation between firm performance and board independence, they report that
140. The leading surveys are Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain
Relationship Between Board Composition and Firm Performance, 54 BUS. LAW. 921 (1999);
Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, Boards of Directors as an Endogenously
Determined Institution: A Survey of the Economic Literature, FRBNY ECON. POL’Y. REV.,
Apr. 2003, at 7; Jonathan L. Johnson et al., Boards of Directors: A Review and Research
Agenda, 22 J. MGMT. 409 (1996). Bhagat and Black are more precisely focused on the role
of independent directors.
141. For example, underperforming firms may add more independent directors in the
hope that the governance change will improve performance; on cross-sectional comparison,
that causal connection will be blurred. Alternatively, the tests may be underpowered, thus, in
the absence of a relatively large impact, performance effects will be obscured by statistical
noise. For example, if the average effect were +$0.01 per firm for the 25% of firms that were
early adopters of board independence, that would cash out to a nontrivial $30 billion across
$12 trillion in equities but might be undetectable through conventional methodology. (Of
course the undetectable effect could, in principle, be negative.)
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“[m]ost studies find little correlation, but a number of recent studies report
evidence of a negative correlation between the proportion of independent
directors and firm performance—the exact opposite of conventional
wisdom.”142 They include their own 1999 study in those negative studies, with
results driven by negative outcomes in firms that have an especially high
fraction of independent directors, firms with only one or two insiders. One
criticism of cross-sectional studies that regress board composition on
performance measures is the potential lag between good governance and the
visible effect on performance. Bhagat and Black attempt to address this in a
detailed 2001 follow-on study with a large sample and long horizon, but the
conclusion is the same: that increasing the degree of board independence does
not improve firm performance.143
2. Discrete task tests
Bhagat and Black’s 1999 survey also takes a dim view as to whether
boards with a majority (or supermajority) of independent directors do a better
job on important discrete tasks undertaken by boards. A possible exception is
avoiding financial fraud, where the studies suggest that a predominance of
independent directors on the board may make a difference. Here are some
important examples of board decisionmaking that test whether board
composition matters.

142. Bhagat & Black, supra note 140, at 942; accord Bhagat & Black, supra note 17,
at 235-37. The 2003 survey by Hermalin & Weisbach, supra note 140, reaches a similar
conclusion.
In contrast, two other studies find a positive correlation; however, both are
methodologically flawed in ways that undercut their conclusion. Baysinger & Butler, supra
note 15, purport to show a correlation between board composition in 1970 and performance
ten years later in 1980. A statistically significant persistence of such an effect over such an
extended period seems highly unlikely. Statistical significance was tested only with respect
to one measure of performance and has not been replicated by other studies. MacAvoy and
Millstein argue that prior studies fail to take account of the emergence of the “active board”
in the 1990s and that the critical variable is not board composition per se but its attitude.
They report that firms with the best boards generate significantly higher returns than all
others. Ira M. Millstein & Paul W. MacAvoy, The Active Board of Directors and
Performance of the Large Publicly Traded Corporation, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1283 (1998).
Given their board evaluation measure, the results seem so remarkable as to be improbable.
MacAvoy and Millstein focus on the extent to which boards followed the 1992 activist
stance of the GM board, as measured by grades (A+ to F) that CalPERS assigned in 1995.
CalPERS’s grades were based on a board’s response to the guidelines fashioned by the GM
board, not by activism in practice. In other words, if the board went through a process and
adopted GM-like guidelines, it would get an A+. Moreover, there was no systematic
correlation for grades below A+ and relative performance. See id. at 1313. These results do
not seem robust.
143. Bhagat & Black, supra note 17. The time horizon is important because of the
potential lag between board changes and performance improvements.
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a. CEO terminations
Weisbach’s widely-cited 1988 study of CEO terminations in NYSE-listed
firms over the 1974-1983 period concludes “that when boards are dominated by
outside directors, CEO turnover is more sensitive to firm performance than it is
in firms with insider-dominated boards.”144 But the effect is relatively minor:
for firms in the bottom decile of performance, CEO turnover is roughly 5%
more likely for boards with more than 60% independent directors than boards
with less than 40%. Moreover, during the subsequent period from 1984 to
1993, the board composition effect on CEO turnover disappears.145 This
suggests that the increasing pressures in the market for control swamped the
pro-governance effects of independent directors. Thus Bhagat and Black
conclude that, at most, there is “some evidence that independent directors
behave differently than inside directors when they decide whether to replace the
current CEO”; but the differences are small, and, after taking into accout posttermination stock price studies, it’s not clear whether the sign is positive or
negative when independents dominate the board.146
b. Takeover activity as target
Evidence is mixed on whether target firms in fact benefit from the
theoretical advantages of board independence.
Target gains. Consistent with theory, target firms with majorityindependent boards get a higher bid price. A widely-cited study by Cotter et al.
(1997) of tender offers from 1989 to 1992 reports that targets with majority
independent boards obtained substantially higher premia (twenty percentage
points higher on average) than firms without such boards.147 Similarly, Lee et
al. find that the presence of a majority-independent board increased shareholder
returns upon the announcement of a management buyout.148 This suggests that
majority-independent boards may be more effective bargaining agents and are
less likely to succumb to managerial pressure in the takeover process.
Target defensive measures. Theory would also predict that majorityindependent boards should behave differently in adopting preemptive defensive
measures. However, various studies do not find differences in majority144. Hermalin & Weisbach, supra note 140, at 14 (characterizing Michael S.
Weisbach, Outside Directors and CEO Turnover, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 431 (1988)).
145. Wayne H. Mikkelson & M. Megan Partch, The Decline of Takeovers and
Disciplinary Managerial Turnover, 44 J. FIN. ECON. 205 (1997).
146. Bhagat & Black, supra note 140, at 925-26.
147. James F. Cotter et al., Do Independent Directors Enhance Target Shareholder
Wealth During Tender Offers?, 43 J. FIN. ECON. 195, 202 tbl.1 (1997) (finding that targets
with majority-independent boards received on average a 62% premium versus a 41%
premium for those without such boards).
148. Chun I. Lee et al., Board Composition and Shareholder Wealth: The Case of
Management Buyouts, FIN. MGMT., Spring 1992, at 58, 66.
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independent boards’ likelihood of adopting the poison pill, opting out of
Pennsylvania’s highly protective antitakeover laws, or having a classified
board.149 Other studies present an inconsistent pattern of board composition
effects on stock market returns upon the adoption of defensive measures.150
Thus the potential post-bid performance advantages of an independent target
board may be undercut by its pre-bid performance, which does not improve the
rate at which bids are made.
c. Takeover activity as acquirer
Acquisitions give rise to many species of managerial agency problems that
board independence might better control, such as managerial empire building,
over-optimism bias, and winner’s curse. But the evidence conflicts on whether
firms with independent boards are less likely to make value reducing bids; in
any event, the effect is small. Byrd and Hickman (1992) report that majority
independent boards deliver marginally better returns to shareholders in bidding
for acquisitions.151 Although the average announcement-date abnormal return
for their whole sample was negative (-1.23%), the average return for acquirers
with majority independent boards was roughly zero (-0.07%) while return for
others acquirers was more negative (-1.86%). Yet Subrahmanyam, Rangan, and
Rosenstein (1997), in a sample of firms from the banking industry, find that
abnormal returns are negatively related to the proportion of outside directors.152
d. Executive compensation
Executive compensation decisions arguably present the sharpest clash
between shareholder and managerial interests. The empirical evidence on the
compensation effects of independent directors is equivocal, with “little
evidence that independent directors do a better job than inside directors in

149. See Bhagat & Black, supra note 140, at 930.
150. Compare, e.g., James A. Brickley et al., Outside Directors and the Adoption of
Poison Pills, 35 J. FIN. ECON. 371 (1994) (finding positive returns for pill adoption with
majority independent board and negative returns without), with Chamu Sundaramurthy et al.,
Board Structure, Antitakeover Provisions, and Stockholder Wealth, 18 STRAT. MGMT. J. 231,
237 (1997) (finding negative returns increasing with independent directors). See generally
Bhagat & Black, supra note 140, at 929-30.
151. John W. Byrd & Kent A. Hickman, Do Outside Directors Monitor Managers?,
32 J. FIN. ECON. 195 (1992) (regressing a sample of 128 tender offer bids from 1980 to
1987). Using regression analysis, the authors also identify a curvilinear relationship between
the fraction of independent directors and improved acquirer returns that is positive except at
the high end of independence where returns become negative. Interestingly, that inflection
point is 60%, a low percentage by today’s standards. Id. at 213.
152. Vijaya Subrahmanyam et al., The Role of Outside Directors in Bank Acquisitions,
FIN MGMT., Autumn 1997, at 23, 34. The authors also suggest that the regulatory structure of
the banking industry may explain the surprising result. Id. at 24.
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establishing CEO pay.”153 One surprising result is that boards with more
independent directors are more likely to award “golden parachutes” (change-incontrol severance payments typically equal to approximately three times annual
salary and average bonus).154 One defense of these plans is that they may
reduce managerial resistance to a takeover bid, but a more independent board
presumably should be better able to control managers directly.
One implication of the studies is that the definition of “independent” may
be insufficiently granular. Core, Holthausen, and Larker (1999) show that
executive compensation is positively correlated with the fraction of outside
directors and that the percentage of compensation associated with board
composition is negatively correlated with firm performance.155 Yet what
explains these results are the characteristics of the outside directors, in
particular, the number of outside directors appointed during the CEO’s tenure,
the number of “gray directors,” and the presence of interlocked directors.156
This fits with what compensation practitioners have called the “giraffe
effect”—the sharp increase in CEO pay associated with the influx of CEOs or
former CEOs on the board and on the compensation committee, in response to
pressure to add independent directors in the late 1970s and 1980s.
e. Avoidance of financial fraud
The best-developed evidence of board composition effects is the positive
association between board independence and financial reporting accuracy. The
exact channel of this effect is not well-specified, but some studies suggest it
could be through the independent audit committee.
A strong negative association between accounting fraud and a more
independent board are reported by Beasley157 and Dechow, Sloan, and
Sweeney,158 who compare firms with a high likelihood of having committed
153. Bhagat & Black, supra note 140, at 931.
154. See Philip L. Cochran et al., The Composition of Boards of Directors and
Incidence of Golden Parachutes, 28 ACAD. MGMT. J. 664, 668 (1985); Harbir Singh & Farid
Harianto, Management-Board Relationships, Takeover Risk, and the Adoption of Golden
Parachutes, 32 ACAD. MGMT. J. 7, 20 (1989).
155. John E. Core et al., Corporate Governance, Chief Executive Officer
Compensation, and Firm Performance, 51 J. FIN. ECON. 371 (1999).
156. Id. at 388; see also Kevin F. Hallock, Reciprocally Interlocking Boards of
Directors and Executive Compensation, 32 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 331, 332
(1997).
157. Mark S. Beasley, An Empirical Analysis of the Relation Between the Board of
Director Composition and Financial Statement Fraud, 71 ACCT. REV. 443, 455 (1996); see
also Mark S. Beasley et al., Fraudulent Financial Reporting: Consideration of Industry
Traits and Corporate Governance Mechanisms, 14 ACCT. HORIZONS 441, 452 (2000)
(finding a negative relationship between board independence and financial fraud across
several industries).
158. Patricia M. Dechow et al., Causes and Consequences of Earnings Manipulation:
An Analysis of Firms Subject to Enforcement Actions by the SEC, 13 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES.
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accounting fraud (e.g., targeted by an SEC enforcement action) with control
firms. Klein also finds a negative association between board independence and
abnormal accruals, often a fraud precursor.159 Uzun et al. use a broader
definition of fraud and find a similar relationship.160
Subsequent studies emphasize the importance of audit committee
independence161 and even the financial expertise of the board or the audit
committee.162 These studies, plus the various others that show no independent
effect of board composition beyond audit committee effects,163 suggest once
again that structural elements may be crucial to directors’ independence in fact.
3. Understanding the evidence
It is thus possible to read the U.S. evidence as suggesting that board
independence has only minimal effects on board behavior and shareholder
value. In my view, this interpretation would be mostly wrong. First, the
anomalous empirical results may have conventional explanations. The strongest
explanation is the diminishing marginal returns hypothesis: most of the
empirical evidence assesses incremental changes in board independence in
firms where there is already substantial independence and after the cultural
entrenchment of norms of independent director behavior.164 But, as I will
argue, the most important effects of the move to independent directors,
particularly over the long term, are systematic rather than firm specific and thus
are unlikely to show up in cross-sectional studies. One systematic effect, the
1, 21 (1996).
159. April Klein, Audit Committee, Board of Director Characteristics, and Earnings
Management, 33 J. ACCT. & ECON. 375, 387 (2002); see also Biao Xie et al., Earnings
Management and Corporate Governance: The Role of the Board and the Audit Committee, 9
J. CORP. FIN. 295, 296, 305 (2003) (finding a statistically significant negative relationship
between discretionary current accruals and directors with corporate backgrounds but not
other backgrounds).
160. Hatice Uzun et al., Board Composition and Corporate Fraud, FIN. ANALYSTS J.,
May-June 2004, at 33.
161. See Jeffrey Cohen et al., The Corporate Governance Mosaic and Financial
Reporting Quality, 23 J. ACCT. LITERATURE 87, 99-102 (2004) (surveying studies assessing
the relationship between governance characteristics and incidences of earnings manipulation
and fraud).
162. See Anup Agrawal & Sahiba Chadha, Corporate Governance and Accounting
Scandals, 48 J.L. & ECON. 371 (2005).
163. See, e.g., Lawrence J. Abbott et al., The Effects of Audit Committee Activity and
Independence on Corporate Fraud, MANAGERIAL FIN., Nov. 11, 2000, at 55, 56; Lawrence J.
Abbott et al., Audit Committee Characteristics and Financial Misstatement: A Study of the
Efficacy of Certain Blue Ribbon Committee Recommendations 3 (Mar. 2002) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=319125.
164. Cf. Bernard S. Black et al., Does Corporate Governance Predict Firms’ Market
Values? Evidence from Korea, 22 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 366 (2006) (finding a significant effect
in Korea from more independent directors even though such an effect does not appear in the
United States).
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lock-in of shareholder value as virtually the exclusive corporate objective,
could have benefits for early adopters, but other effects, such as the facilitation
of accurate financial disclosure and corporate law compliance, have principally
external effects.
a. Tradeoffs
One explanation for the weak evidence on director independence is a
potential tradeoff between the different attributes that insiders and independents
bring to a board. Yes, a higher fraction of independent directors may produce
outcomes that could be associated with value-increasing governance. But there
may well be costs. Inside directors or affiliated directors—outsiders with an
interest—may contribute valuable advice and insights that are lost in a
thoroughly independent board.165 Although the predominant model of board
behavior has moved towards the monitoring board and away from the advisory
board, boards still participate in the firm’s strategic planning and otherwise
advise the CEO and the senior management team. If the monitoring and other
governance functions are better in a predominantly independent board, perhaps
the advising is not as good.166
b. Sorting (optimal differences)
Another explanation for the data is a variant on the tradeoff hypothesis that
looks to the diversity among firms. If there is no “one size fits all” for board
composition, then the heterogeneity in the board composition data may reflect
firms finding their optimal insider/independent mix. Take, for example, the
cross-sectional data that regresses firm performance on the fraction of
independent directors. Assume that firms differ in the optimal fraction because
of firm-specific tradeoffs: for particular firms inside directors or affiliated
165. Compare, e.g., JEFFREY PFEFFER & GERALD R. SALANCIK, THE EXTERNAL
CONTROL OF ORGANIZATIONS: A RESOURCE DEPENDENCE PERSPECTIVE (1978) (discussing
“resource dependence” theory and suggesting that affiliations may help firms obtain critical
resources), with A. Burak Güner et al., The Impact of Boards with Financial Expertise on
Corporate Policies (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11914, 2006),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=875673 (suggesting that commercial bankers on boards
may lead to excessive debt finance and that investment bankers on boards may lead to
acquisitions that reduce firm value). Indeed, even Eugene Fama and Michael Jensen, who
argued on behalf of the monitoring role of boards, suggest that some insider presence
(beyond the CEO) is valuable as a distinctive source of information for the board and as a
proving ground for prospective CEO candidates. See Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen,
Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301 (1983).
166. Indeed, such a tradeoff in making good acquisition decisions is suggested by the
curvilinear relationship found by Byrd & Hickman, supra note 151, in which acquirer
returns start decreasing as the fraction of independent directors exceeds 60%. See also April
Klein, Firm Performance and Board Committee Structure, 41 J.L. & ECON. 275 (1998)
(finding that insiders on strategic development committees may increase performance).
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outsiders may be more (less) useful, influenced perhaps by the relevant
ownership structure or product market competition that reduces (increases) the
managerial agency costs addressed by independent directors.167 In any event, in
a competitive market, we would expect firms to move toward their optimal
governance structure. On this view, the regression results are expectedly
economically insignificant—as is the general pattern—but only because out-ofequilibrium governance structures do not persist, not because director
independence has little value for many firms.
The weakness, or rather, incompleteness, of the sorting hypothesis (as well
as the general tradeoff hypothesis) is that it cannot account for the long-term
secular trend towards director independence, a quite radical shift, as noted
above, and mostly occurring over only a thirty-year period. The story is not
only the increasing average fraction of independent directors in public firms but
also the increasing fraction of firms with only one or two inside directors, 90%
according to the 2004 Korn/Ferry Study. It seems unlikely that the local, firmby-firm pursuit of shareholder value could produce such a strong trend.
c. Diminishing marginal returns
The most persuasive conventional explanation for the nominal results of
the general empirical pattern is that director independence may well be positive
for shareholder value but that above a critical fraction, the returns are
diminishing, and, given the plausibility of firm-specific tradeoffs, sometimes
may even be negative. Bhagat and Black, for example, say their negative
performance measures are driven by firms with “super-majority” independent
boards—instances where the board went beyond majority independent directors
to only one or two insiders.
A significant part of the reason for the diminishing marginal returns from
greater independence is the important institutional complement of hard and soft
control markets that also help control managerial agency problems. In robust
control markets managers face ouster for subpar performance, which in turn
disciplines managerial performance. As will be elaborated on below, although
hostile bids have become rare in the United States following the 1980s, their
influence is still ubiquitous, particularly through the pervasive focus on
shareholder value. This is built into managerial compensation packages through
stock-related compensation, “golden parachutes” that blossom lucratively in a
takeover, and termination decisions keyed to lagging stock prices. Moreover,
the culture of shareholder value has become entrenched on U.S. boards and,
indeed, among managerial elites. There is probably a critical threshold of
independent directors that exposes the firm to significant control market

167. For a model of a tradeoff between outside and inside control, see Milton Harris &
Artur Raviv, A Theory of Board Control and Size (Ctr. for Research in Sec. Prices, Working
Paper No. 559, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=607861.
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pressure, both in the board’s willingness to entertain a takeover bid and in the
board’s willingness to terminate an underperforming CEO. So long as that
threshold is achieved, control market pressure has a greater effect than
incrementally more vigorous board monitoring that might be associated with
more independent directors.168
d. Firm-specific vs. systematic effects
The evidence is also consistent with a view that the main effects of the
change in board composition are systematic and that the firm-specific effects
are very hard to isolate. In the U.S. environment of substantial ownership by
economically motivated institutional investors, a dominant pattern of board
independence locks in shareholder value as the corporation’s principal
objective.169 This pattern changes the competitive environment for all firms,
regardless of the board structure of any particular firm. Thus any firm-specific
effects that might be associated with “early adoption” of greater board
independence will be quickly obscured by competitive imitation. Assume, for
example, that a firm with a predominantly independent board will be more
likely to initiate cost-cutting to gain market share and increase profits. A rival
firm, irrespective of board structure, is likely to imitate this pattern for
competitive survival. The rival may change its degree of board independence to
signal its intention to engage in similar behavior. But the new board
composition may in turn lock the second firm into shareholder wealthmaximizing strategies in other areas where it may not yet face a competitive
threat. The point is that effects of changing board composition must be
measured, from a shareholder point of view, across the economy of firms,
particularly as a practice becomes dominant. This is econometrically very
difficult.
The evidence is also consistent with changes in board composition as
driven by factors that may serve general shareholder objectives, not firm
specific factors. In the United States, regulators have turned to independent
directors to help assure the reliability of financial disclosure. This began with
the call for audit committees staffed by independent directors in the 1970s and
culminated in the post-Enron reforms that look to independent directors to take
control of critical elements of the disclosure process.170 To be sure, better
disclosure has firm-specific benefits, insofar as it facilitates market monitoring

168. Note that arguments about thresholds and diminishing marginal effects would
play differently in the United States, where a diffuse pattern of ownership leads to
managerial agency problems, than it would in most other countries, where concentrated
ownership patterns produce controlling shareholder agency problems. A robust control
market may constrain managerial agency costs but will not rein in controlling shareholders.
169. See the argument for this claim infra text accompanying notes 245-62.
170. See supra notes 93-102 and accompanying text and infra notes 297-98.
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of managerial performance.171 This occurs through more accurate stock price
formation that can be used in both intrafirm performance comparisons over
time and cross-sectional comparisons with other comparably situated firms. It
also occurs through more informative securities analyst evaluation of
managerial performance, which can be reflected in narrative form as well in
stock-picking advice. But better disclosure also generates benefits for other
firms, i.e., interfirm externalities. By providing useful comparative information,
it facilitates monitoring of other firms’ managements (and thus may improve a
rival’s performance). It also provides competitively valuable information that
other firms can use in their planning (and also may therefore improve a rival’s
performance). More generally, more accurate disclosure can lead to more
informative stock prices, as well as more accurate narratives, that can more
efficiently guide the behavior of market actors. In short, if independent
directors make the firm’s disclosure more reliable, then markets presumably
will be allocatively more efficient. Yet none of this systematic effect will
appear in cross-sectional studies of firm performance (although the evidence
that independent directors do a better job in controlling financial fraud172 is
consistent with the presence of interfirm externalities).
Finally the evidence is also consistent with changes in board composition
that serve social interests that may not directly track shareholder interests.
Independent directors may be more likely to promote the firm’s compliance
with legal norms. Some of the push for independent directors arose from efforts
to control bribes and other questionable payments.173 Others have looked to
independent directors to monitor the corporation’s law compliance more
generally. If independent directors are effective in this regard, the benefits
(which in some cases may come at the expense of the firm’s shareholders) have
a society-wide reach. These effects, too, are not reflected in conventional
empirical studies.
B. Summary of Parts I and II
Parts I and II have put together three important bodies of evidence on
boards of U.S. public firms over the 1950-2005 period: first, the evidence of a
strong trend toward an increasing fraction of independent directors; second, the
evidence of increasing independence-in-fact for directors and boards; and third,
the anomalous evidence that changes in board composition seem to have had no
(or little) effect on firm performance as measured cross-sectionally. My
argument is that the anomalous performance evidence does not undercut the
case for independent directors because the empirical tests are looking in the
171. This discussion, which tracks the general argument for mandatory disclosure,
follows Gordon, supra note 82.
172. See supra notes 157-63 and accompanying text.
173. See infra notes 199-200 and accompanying text and supra note 30 and
accompanying text.
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wrong place. The major performance effects of board independence are
systematic; and, as I argue below, the major drivers of the trend toward board
independence are systematic as well. The independent board both reflects the
shift toward shareholder value as the ultimate corporate objective and locks in
the shareholder value criterion for the firm and for the economy of such firms.
The independent board is made feasible by stock prices that are increasingly
informative because of greater firm-specific disclosure; by enhancing the
reliability of the firm’s disclosure, the independent board helps to maintain
stock price informativeness.
III. THE RISE OF SHAREHOLDER VALUE, 1950-2005
This Part traces some of the relevant history over the 1950-2005 period in
the changing role of corporate boards, in which the “advising” board was
replaced by the “monitoring” board. This compressed account attempts to
weave together some of the principal factors that produced this change, but its
emphasis is on the co-evolution of shareholder wealth maximization and board
independence.
Boards are obviously not a creation of the late twentieth century. Adam
Smith addressed the role of boards in the joint stock company and the difficulty
in getting directors to monitor appropriately in 1776.174 Nevertheless the postWorld War II period has been an especially dynamic period in the history of
boards because of the heightened competitive pressures that led to rapid
changes in the board’s role. The recent history usefully makes us aware both of
different potential board functions, not all of which might have been conceived
of by Adam Smith, and of the changing weights of the different functions in
our conception of the well-functioning board.
The history also makes us aware that many aspects of board function are
jointly determined with the corporate purpose. For example, a corporation that
evaluates managerial performance almost exclusively in terms of shareholder
value will inevitably produce a board in composition and function quite
different from a corporation in which managers are charged with trying to
balance and in some way maximize total stakeholder value. As a positive
matter, in competitive global capital and product markets, the shareholder value

174. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS para V.1.103 (Edwin Cannan ed., Methuen and Co. 1904) (1776), available at
http://www.econlib.org/LIBRARY/Smith/smWN20.html#B.V,%20Ch.1 (“Removal from an
office which can be enjoyed only for the term of three years, and of which the lawful
emoluments, even during that term, are so very small, seems to be the utmost punishment to
which any committee-man is liable for any fault, except direct malversation, or
embezzlement, either of the public money, or of that of the company; and the fear of that
punishment can never be a motive of sufficient weight to force a continual and careful
attention to a business to which he has no other interest to attend.”).
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objective is likely to be of greater importance and therefore will drive the
conception of the board.175
Finally, the history makes us aware that the stance of managers towards
boards has changed considerably. In addition to compensation, managers are
interested in autonomy, and, generally speaking, an activist independent board
encroaches on managerial autonomy. Yet the history shows that as other forces
become important, for example, the hostile takeover market or interventionist
government regulation, managers embrace the idea of an independent board
while in practice often resisting the mechanisms that would generate genuine
independence.
This thumbnail sketch of the relevant history can be broken down into five
periods, each focusing on a characteristic view of the corporation’s most
important objective and the board’s corresponding function, and the prevalent
managerial attitude. In the general trajectory, there is an increasingly tight link
between the independent board and the priority of shareholder value.
A. The 1950s: The Heyday of Stakeholder Capitalism and Corporate
Managerialism
The 1950s is famously the high-water mark of managerialism in U.S.
corporate governance, in which boards were largely passive instruments of the
CEO, chosen by him and strongly disinclined to challenge his decisions or
authority. For a 1950s firm, in addition to the profit-making objective, there
were two other important elements: first, the impetus to balance among
competing stakeholder objectives; second, the role of corporate management as
a central planner. Both of these important elements arguably led to an
“advisory” board, in which the CEO’s trust in the board was critical, rather than
a “monitoring” board, in which the board’s trust in the CEO was the question.
The 1950s conception of the corporation and the board reflects what was
also the post-World War II high-water mark of stakeholder capitalism in the
United States. The political climate favored such a conception of the
corporation, and the dominant economic position of the United States in the
immediate post-war period permitted it. The shared sacrifice of World War II
produced a strong national feeling that the fruits of post-war prosperity should
also be shared. Organized labor was never stronger, and the demands for
employee sharing in enterprise rents enjoyed strong social legitimacy.176

175. I mean to bracket for now the question of whether this corporate objective is
efficient, and whether other goals might transcend efficiency. Certainly the thrust of current
shareholder activism, much of which is propelled by public and union pension funds, is to
advance the shareholder value objective. Some may find considerable irony in this.
176. See Kenneth M. Thompson, Human Relations in Collective Bargaining, HARV.
BUS. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1953, at 116, 118-20 (arguing that employees should receive a “fair
wage” from their employers, though also asserting that the determination of “fairness” is
unresolvable because of divergent values within American society).
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“Pluralism” was the innovation in the political science debate, and the idea of
log-rolling-as-sharing (versus creating deadweight loss) enjoyed currency.177
Notwithstanding the inevitable battling over the appropriate employee share,
managers of large public firms did not reject outright such stakeholder
claims.178 In part this was because of managers’ identification with the
ideological contest with communism over which system could provide a better
life for the “workers.”179 Moreover, the strong global position of U.S. firms—
which had avoided physical and economic devastation during the war—was a
source of rents that managers could allocate away from shareholders without
harsh capital market punishment.180 Thus a 1961 Harvard Business Review
survey of 1700 executives revealed that approximately 83% of the respondents
agreed that “[f]or corporation executives to act in the interests of shareholders
alone, and not also in the interests of employees and consumers, is
unethical.”181
177. Compare ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956)
(considering log-rolling as pluralist trading), with WILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST
POPULISM (1982) (considering log-rolling as creating deadweight loss).
178. See Robert N. Anthony, The Trouble with Profit Maximization, HARV. BUS. REV.,
Nov.-Dec. 1960, at 126, 133 (“[W]hereas 50 or 100 years ago the profit maximizing
manager would perhaps have been tolerated in some circles of some communities, today
society clearly expects the businessman to act responsibly.”); Paul G. Hoffman, The Survival
of Free Enterprise, HARV. BUS. REV., Autumn 1946, at 21, 25 (arguing that businesses had
the “responsibility,” i.e., obligation, to promote employee self-actualization).
179. See Hoffman, supra note 178, at 23, 26 (arguing that the survival of the “free
capitalistic economy” depends upon businessmen acting in the general public interest); John
W. Welcker, Fair Profit?, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar. 1948, at 207, 207 (asserting that
“[s]ocialistic tendencies in the rest of the world, a critical attitude toward private enterprise
here at home, and the development of a feeling of broad public responsibility on the part of
American businessmen themselves are all working toward the concept of ‘fair profits’”).
180. Mark J. Roe, Rents and Their Corporate Consequences, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1463
(2001).
181. Raymond C. Baumhart, How Ethical Are Businessmen?, HARV. BUS. REV., JulyAug. 1961, at 6, 10. A look at articles published in the Harvard Business Review during this
period illuminates the development of this receptiveness to stakeholders. Initially, the
legitimacy of stakeholder claims was justified by advertence to the long-term interests of
shareholders, which would benefit by increased employee morale and an improved public
image. See Frank W. Abrams, Management’s Responsibilities in a Complex World, HARV.
BUS. REV., May 1951, at 29, 30 (arguing that business firms “can be made to achieve their
greatest social usefulness . . . when management succeeds in finding a harmonious balance
among the claims of the various interested groups: the stockholders, employees, customers,
and the public at large”); Wallace B. Donham, The Social Significance of Business, HARV.
BUS. REV., July 1927, at 406, 415 (emphasizing the benefits of “the good standing of [the]
institution” to the bottom line). Such attitudes also may have stemmed from fear of
advancing socialism both at home and abroad. However, as time wore on, the interests of
stakeholders began to be seen by some as legitimate in their own right, to be balanced even
against the long-term interests of the shareholders. See Robert W. Austin, Code of Conduct
for Executives, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1961, at 53 (laying out a code of conduct for
executives based on balancing competing stakeholder interests); Gordon Donaldson,
Financial Goals: Management vs. Stockholders, HARV. BUS. REV., May-June 1963, at 116,
119 (describing the role of management as arbitration between stockholder interests and
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World War II and the contemporary influence of socialism affected the
firm in other ways. The war was waged and won by huge centralized
bureaucracies that were able to surmount logistical and planning challenges.
These lessons could be applied to the private firm in shaping and managing its
environment, it was thought. Moreover, serious intellectual efforts were
dedicated to showing how a centralized planned economy—socialism—might
successfully function and the advantages that such a system might have over an
economy of discrete firms.182 Here too the lesson was that bureaucratic
rationality could shape and manage a complex economic environment.183 Thus
one of the purposes of the firm could be said to create, organize, and administer
markets within the firm rather than simply to respond to pricing signals
provided by markets, particularly the stock markets.184
The senior management team, headed by the CEO, was thus perceived as
having two tasks: running the centralized planning and production-oversight
structures within the firm and then allocating enterprise rents among the
various potential claimants on the firm. This conception fit with the idea of an
advisory board that included many insiders and outsiders with important
economic relationships with the firm, such as bankers, lawyers, and suppliers.
Such knowledgeable parties could serve as a useful sounding board for the
CEO, a kitchen cabinet, and could provide expertise in the face of increasing

“other interests such as the labor union or the consumer”); J. Elliot Janney, Company
Presidents Look at Their Successors, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1954, at 45, 49 (claiming
that managers “regard themselves as stewards who were responsible to stockholders,
employees, customers, and the general public”). See generally HERMAN E. KROOSS,
EXECUTIVE OPINION: WHAT BUSINESS LEADERS SAID AND THOUGHT ON ECONOMIC ISSUES,
1920S-1960S, at 50-53 (1970) (describing the 1950s preoccupation with the concept of
“social responsibility”).
For other representative statements to similar effect, see many of the essays in THE
CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY (Edward S. Mason ed., 1959).
182. See, e.g., OSKAR LANGE & FRED M. TAYLOR, ON THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF
SOCIALISM (Benjamin E. Lippincott ed., 1938) (arguing that a socialist government could
solve the “calculation problem” by setting shadow prices and, because the central planner
would have more information, could do so more efficiently than the market).
183. See, e.g., Arnold J. Toynbee, Thinking Ahead, HARV. BUS. REV. Sept.-Oct. 1958,
at 23, 26 (“[T]he connotation of the word ‘business’ is changing. Instead of its original
association with the notions of enterprise and profit, it is coming to be associated in our
minds more and more with the very different notions of administration and organization.”).
184. See, e.g., ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 3132, 40-41 (1954); JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY (1958); JOHN
KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 5-6, 118, 365 (3d ed. 1978); ROBIN
MARRIS, THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF ‘MANAGERIAL’ CAPITALISM (1964); ANDREW
SHONFIELD, MODERN CAPITALISM: THE CHANGING BALANCE OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE POWER
(1965); see also Elmer W. Johnson, An Insider’s Call for Outside Direction, HARV. BUS.
REV., Mar.-Apr. 1990, at 46, 47 (noting that a former GM officer observed that a “control
mentality [in the 1960s and 1970s] gave top managers great confidence in their ability to
predict and control the future”). Indeed, the conglomerate form that rose to prominence in
the 1960s relied on a theory about centralized monitoring and capital allocation capacities of
the headquarters team. See infra text accompanying notes 305-06.
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complexity.185 In an important sense, boards were an extension of
management.186 Similarly, the 1950s-style board could also play a useful role
in finding the right balance to the corporation’s mission statement.187 Indeed,
social commentators such as Peter Drucker argued that board alignment with
shareholder interests would undercut the desirable capacity of managers to
manage in the public interest.188
On this view, a “monitoring board” would inject dissonance and distrust.
How could the CEO trust and thus confide in directors whose ultimate mission
was to hold him to account? The board selection and nomination mechanism
followed upon the managerialist conception of the board’s role. If the CEO was
looking for trusted advisors who might widen his decisional frame, then it
followed that the CEO would play a large role in director selection.
B. The 1970s: The Rise of the Monitoring Board
The 1970s were characterized by a double disillusionment about corporate
performance, and the passivity of directors that contributed to it. There were
two powerful shocks: first, the unexpected collapse of Penn Central and
second, the Watergate-related illegal domestic campaign contributions and
185. Thus another way to understand the movement from the advisory to the
monitoring board is in terms of the rise of consultants, who can better provide cross-industry
expertise and strategic counseling than board members recruited by the CEO.
186. NAT’L INDUS. CONFERENCE BD., INC., STUDIES IN BUSINESS POLICY, NO. 90:
CORPORATE DIRECTORSHIP PRACTICES 5-6, 59 (1959).
187. Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout have developed an alternative “team production”
explanation of the stakeholder balancing of the 1950s, one that focuses on the efficiency
advantages of a board that acts as a “mediating heirarch” among competing stakeholder
claims so as to encourage firm-specific investment, especially by employees. Margaret M.
Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247
(1999). But cf. John C. Coates IV, Measuring the Domain of Mediating Hierarchy: How
Contestable Are U.S. Public Corporations?, 24 J. CORP. L. 837 (1999).
188. PETER F. DRUCKER, THE NEW SOCIETY: THE ANATOMY OF INDUSTRIAL ORDER
340-43 (1950); see also C.A. Harwell Wells, The Cycles of Corporate Social Responsibility:
An Historical Retrospective for the Twenty-First Century, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 77, 99-111
(2002). Andrew Shonfield put the point colorfully in 1965:
Nowadays the manager, who is not the owner, is neither driven into automatic responses by
the forces of the market place nor guided by the exclusive desire to make the maximum profit
on behalf of his shareholders. . . . So long as the management of a large public company is
reasonably successful at making a profit, it is normally left alone to conduct the business as it
sees fit and to appoint its own successors. The position of the shareholders, which is
sometimes presented by the ideologues of business in the image of a parliament telling
ministers what to do, is in fact much closer to that of a highly disciplined army, which is
permitted by law to riot against its generals if, but only if, rations should happen to run out.

SHONFIELD, supra note 184, at 377-78. Even those who were concerned about corporate
power and suspicious of management’s benevolence did not see a reformed board as a
potential counterweight but looked instead, in a corporatist mode, to countervailing power
from unions, customers, and various sorts of substantive government regulation. See, e.g.,
Douglas M. Branson, Corporate Governance “Reform” and the New Corporate Social
Responsibility, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 605, 609 (2001) (discussing John Kenneth Galbraith).
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“questionable payments,” (less politely, probable bribes) to foreign government
officials.189 The bankruptcy of the Penn Central Railroad, regarded as the
bluest of blue chips, resonated in its day like the fall of Enron, and the
“questionable payments” scandal revealed at least as much rot as the
accounting abuses in the late 1990s. The reaction was to push the board away
from an advisory model to a monitoring model, at least in aspiration. In a sense,
much subsequent corporate governance reform is a working out of the forces
put in motion by the 1970s. The decline of insiders on the board and the rise of
independents began then; so did the regularization of audit committees.
1. The Penn Central collapse and the absence of performance monitoring
The Penn Central story laid bare the failure of the 1950s board conception
since it became apparent that the board had little inkling of the financial
troubles facing the railroad. The board was simply unaware as to how poorly
the railroad had performed. Indeed, as working capital deteriorated and
indebtedness escalated in the two years before the collapse, the board
nevertheless approved over $100 million in dividends.190 The Penn Central’s
directors (and, as it turned out, directors of many other firms) had been neither
advisors nor monitors, but figureheads.191 Much like Enron’s collapse
foreshadowed financial frauds at many other firms, the Penn Central collapse
preceded other 1970s debacles such as the Equity Funding scandal192 and the
failures of high-profile firms such as LTV,193 Ampex,194 and Memorex.195
189. A very useful account, with references to original sources, is provided by Joel
Seligman, A Sheep in Wolf’s Clothing: The American Law Institute Principles of Corporate
Governance Project, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV 325, 328-40 (1987).
190. JOSEPH R. DAUGHEN & PETER BINZEN, THE WRECK OF THE PENN CENTRAL 256,
336 (1971).
191. See Robert Townsend, The Wreck of the Penn Central, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12,
1971, at BR3 (book review). One Penn Central director who joined the board shortly before
the collapse described his colleagues this way:
[T]hey sat up there on the eighteenth floor in those big chairs with the [brass name] plates on
them and they were a bunch of, well, I’d better not say it. The board was definitely
responsible for the trouble. They took their fees and they didn’t do anything. Over a period of
years, people just sat there. That poor man from the University of Pennsylvania [Gaylord P.
Harnwell], he never opened his mouth. They didn’t know the factual picture and they didn’t
try to find out.

DAUGHEN & BINZEN, supra note 190, at 303.
192. Robert J. Cole, Insurance Fraud Charged by S.E.C. to Equity Funding, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 4, 1973, at 1; see also William E. Blundell, Equity Funding’s Worth Is $185
Million Less than Firm Had Claimed, Trustee Estimates, WALL ST. J., Feb. 22, 1974, at 6.
The way in which the public became aware of the insurance and accounting frauds at Equity
Funding set the stage for the famous insider-trading case Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
193. See LTV Recounts Its Many Ills, BUS. WK., Dec. 19, 1970, at 42.
194. See James E. Bylin, Ampex Expects $40 Million Loss for Fiscal 1972, WALL ST.
J., Jan. 12, 1972, at 4; James E. Bylin, The Music Stopped: How Ampex Saturated Recorded
Tape Market and Got Soaked Itself, WALL ST. J., Mar. 9, 1972, at 1.
195. Richard R. Leger, Memorex Concedes It’s in Financial Morass and that Bank of
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Myles Mace’s widely-read book, Directors: Myth and Reality, which
appeared in 1971, exposed the pervasiveness of director passivity and
underscored the failure of the advisory board model. Based on extensive field
research extending over the prior managerialist decades, he declared that the
board’s putative “advise and counsel” function had only limited impact—“very
rarely” leading “to a reversal of a management commitment or decision.”196
The “discipline” purportedly provided by the CEOs need to be accountable to
his board peers was highly attenuated because “managements [knew] from
previous experience that members of the board will not ask penetrating,
discerning, and challenging questions.”197 In short, the “advising board” had
been something like a fraud—simply a way of giving managers the appearance
of accountability.198
2. “Questionable payments” and the absence of controls monitoring
The second 1970s shock—the diversion of corporate funds for illicit
domestic and foreign advantage—called attention to the board’s limited
information about the corporation’s accounting practices and raised the
question about the extent of board responsibility for assuring the corporation’s
compliance with law. Boards did not think it their responsibility to oversee the
firm’s accounting or law compliance, to engage in “controls monitoring.”
The “questionable payments” scandal unfolded as a consequence of the
Special Prosecutor’s investigation into the series of abuses known as
“Watergate.”199 More than fifty public firms became the subject of criminal
prosecution or SEC enforcement action; another 400 firms, prompted by the
threat of prosecution, voluntarily admitted having made illegal campaign
contributions or bribes abroad and in the United States. In the aftermath it
became clear that while senior corporate officers often knew of these payments,
outside directors had not been clued in and were not otherwise “in the loop” of
the corporation’s internal controls. Inquiry that would lead to such knowledge
was beyond the job description of the advising board. This was evident in the
Delaware Supreme Court’s 1963 exoneration of a board that was unaware of
criminal antitrust violations by the corporation: “[A]bsent cause for suspicion
there is no duty upon the directors to install and operate a corporate system of
espionage to ferret out wrongdoing which they have no reason to suspect

America Has Intervened, WALL ST. J., May 16, 1973, at 4.
196. MACE, supra note 22, at 180.
197. Id.
198. See also EISENBERG, supra note 29, at 170-202 (identifying corporate failures of
early 1970s as evidence of the failure of the advising board model).
199. See Seligman, supra note 189, at 333-36; see also Report of the Securities and
Exchange Commission on Questionable and Illegal Corporate Payments and Practices, Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep (BNA), No. 353, Special Supplement (May 19, 1976).
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exists.”200 This seemed to give the advising board a free pass on a duty to
become informed and monitor.
3. Corporate social responsibility
Additional pressure on the advising board model came from a different
direction as well, the corporate social responsibility movement fueled in the
1970s by concern about corporations’ involvement in the Vietnam War and
their policies on the environment, employment, and other social issues. The
1970s social responsibility movement presented a different challenge than the
stakeholder claims that traditionally were the main competitor with shareholder
claims. In addressing stakeholder claims, the corporation of the 1950s and
1960s was asked to give due weight to the interests of those within the
corporate family, most importantly, the employees and the communities in
which they lived.201 Directly addressing broader social issues was at the
margin, a justification for limited charitable giving.202 The 1970s movement
argued for a broader sense of corporate purpose that would attend to the wellbeing of the general society, not the corporation, even broadly defined, and
often asked for much deeper corporate engagement with social problems.203
The most common tactic of the social responsibility movement was to try
to put forward a shareholder proposal for vote at the annual meeting as a way to
call public attention to the issue and to pressure management for an
accommodation. This was the heart of the “Campaign GM” approach,204
which, as a structural reform measure, also called for liberalization of the SEC
rule giving shareholders limited access to the corporate proxy. Other
governance reform proposals were much further reaching and focused on the

200. Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963).
201. Indeed, one might distinguish between “corporate stakeholder responsibility” and
“corporate social responsibility.”
202. E.g., A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581 (N.J. 1953) (permitting a
charitable contribution to Princeton University).
203. Compare Norman A. Adler, The Sounds of Executive Silence, HARV. BUS. REV.,
July-Aug. 1971, at 100, 102 (“Even the most profit-motivated stockholder can have no
legitimate cause for complaint when the corporation contributes reasonable sums in support
of the public weal.”), with Burton G. Malkiel & Richard E. Quandt, Moral Issues in
Investment Policy, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1971, at 37, 38 (“In recent years portfolio
managers (especially those of nonprofit private institutions) have been asked to deploy their
funds with specific reference to social, political, and moral objectives.”). The corporate
social responsibility movement made increasingly broad appeals for corporate action. The
call in the late 1960s for the corporation to address urban decay and racial tension may be
seen as less far-reaching than the 1970s claims made by the consumer and environmental
movements. The former called for plant location and job training decisions well within the
corporation’s traditional roles; the latter called for a quite different relationship to society.
See Wells, supra note 188, at 112-13.
204. See Donald E. Schwartz, The Public-Interest Proxy Contest: Reflections on
Campaign GM, 69 MICH. L. REV. 419 (1971).
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board. Nader, Green, and Seligman famously called for federal incorporation of
major firms under rules that required full-time directors who were nominated
exclusively by disinterested shareholders and that gave weight to board
representation of various constituency groups.205 There were other calls for socalled “constituency directors.”206
Thus the social responsibility movement and the “monitoring board”
movement found common ground on the importance of the independent
director, although there was no genuine meeting of the minds. Independent
directors who monitored vigorously on behalf of shareholder interests would
pursue an agenda quite different from a “constituency director” infused with a
broader sense of corporate mission. One irony of the social responsibility
movement was its kindred spirit to managerialist claims about the need for
appropriate balance in the corporation’s objectives. One difference, of course,
was the managers’ persistent desire for control and autonomy, the exclusive
power to strike the balance, without the noisome assistance of constituency
directors. So if there was broad support in the 1970s for an infusion of
“independent directors” into board activity, there was no crisp consensus on
exactly what ends these directors were to pursue.
4. Reconceptualization of the board
The cumulative effect of these pressures led, by the end of the 1970s, to a
significant reconceptualization of the board’s role and structure. First, the
advising board model was replaced as aspirational paradigm by the “monitoring
board,” as presented in Mel Eisenberg’s influential 1976 book, The Structure of
the Corporation: A Legal Analysis. The new model rapidly became
conventional wisdom, endorsed by the Chairman of the SEC,207 the corporate
bar,208 and even the Business Roundtable.209 Second, the audit committee,
staffed by independent directors, came to be seen as an essential part of the
board’s monitoring capacity. The SEC initially had made the existence of an
205. See RALPH NADER ET AL., TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION 123-28 (1976).
206. See Victor Brudney, The Independent Director—Heavenly City or Potemkin
Village?, 95 HARV. L. REV. 597, 598-607 (1982).
207. See Seligman, supra note 189, at 338 (“What is missing on too many boards is a
truly independent character that has the practical capacity to monitor and to change
management.” (quoting Corporate Rights and Responsibilities: Hearings Before the S.
Comm. on Commerce, 94th Cong. 303-04 (1976) (statement of Roderick Hills, Chairman,
Securities and Exchange Commission))).
208. See ABA Comm. on Corporate Laws, supra note 31 (“[T]he board of directors is
[the] reviewer of management initiatives and monitor of corporate performance . . . .”).
209. Bus. Roundtable, The Role and Composition of the Board of Directors of the
Large Publicly Owned Corporation, 33 BUS. LAW. 2083, 2087, 2092-93 (1978). The
Business Roundtable’s acceptance of the full entailments of the “monitoring board” should
not be overstated. For example, Business Roundtable insisted on the importance of the
traditional function of the board as a strategic advisor and the value of inside directors in this
context. Id. at 2098, 2107.
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audit committee a matter of disclosure only, but in 1976 requested that the
NYSE amend its listing requirements to include an audit committee composed
of independent directors with access both to accounting information and to the
outside auditors on a private basis.210 Ironically by the time the NYSE adopted
the requirement, audit committees had become a widely accepted element of
board structure, found in almost 95% of large public companies.211 Third, the
composition of the board began to shift in favor of independent directors rather
than insiders and pressure grew to increase the independence of the nominating
committee.212 The idea of a “constituency director” never gained real traction,
but nevertheless the view persisted that independent directors could help the
corporation find that sweet spot where maximizing shareholder welfare over an
appropriate horizon could coincide with attention to social interests as well.
The result of the corporate governance reforms of the 1970s might be
described as reflecting a mixed strategy, in which managerial elites made
significant concessions to address the governance failures revealed by Penn
Central’s bankruptcy and the questionable payments scandal, but held onto
significant managerial prerogative over the composition and function of the
board. The rhetoric of the monitoring board and independent directors gained
widespread currency, but the work of genuine change in the habits and
practices of the board had barely begun. Moreover, the traditional stakeholder
balancing as now broadened by the corporate social responsibility movement
was employed by managerial elites to counter a potentially single-minded
board focus on shareholder welfare that would threaten managerial control. In
the midst of the Business Roundtable’s 1978 acceptance of the performancemonitoring board, it finds a link between social responsibility and profitability

210. See Seligman, supra note 189, at 338.
211. In 1972, the SEC “endorse[d] the establishment by all publicly held companies of
audit committees composed of outside directors.” Standing Audit Committees Composed of
Outside Directors, Exchange Act Release No. 33-5237, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 78,670 (Mar. 23, 1972), 1972 WL 125505. In 1974 and 1978, the SEC
adopted rules requiring disclosures about audit committees. Additionally, in 1978, the New
York Stock Exchange required all listed securities to have an audit committee composed of
non-management members meeting its policy standards. ABA Comm. on Corporate Laws,
The Overview Committees of the Board of Directors, 34 BUS. LAW. 1837, 1839 (1979). In
1967, the Conference Board found audit committees at 19% of manufacturing companies
and 31% of nonmanufacturing companies, as compared to 93% and 94%, respectively, in
1977. JEREMY BACON, CORPORATE DIRECTORSHIP PRACTICES: MEMBERSHIP AND
COMMITTEES OF THE BOARD 50 (1973) (Conf. Bd. Report No. 588); ABA Committee on
Corporate Laws, supra note 208, at 1644 (citing JEREMY BACON, THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS:
PERSPECTIVES AND PRACTICES IN NINE COUNTRIES (1977) (Conf. Bd. Report No. 728)).
212. The Business Roundtable went so far as suggest that the nominating committee
have a “majority of outside directors,” i.e., substantial insider representation, but was cold to
the idea of shareholder access to the proxy statement for the purpose of nominating directors.
Bus. Roundtable, supra note 209, at 2108. For evidence on the shifting composition of the
board in the 1970s, see supra Figures 1 and 2 and infra Appendix Table 1.
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as necessary to assure “the political and social viability of the enterprise over
time.”213
By contrast, Milton Friedman’s 1970 essay, The Social Responsibility of
Business Is to Increase Its Profits,214 was a scandale because of its unvarnished
emphasis on the shareholder value as virtually the sole criterion by which
corporate performance should be judged. This view seemed far out of the
mainstream.
C. 1980s: The Takeover Movement, Shareholder Value, and the Rise of the
Independent Director
The 1980s were the crucial decade in cementing the connection between
independent directors and shareholder value. The decade was marked by an
emerging belief about shareholder value as the ultimate measure of corporate
success and by the deepening acceptance of a governance model focused on the
monitoring board composed of independent directors. The hostile takeover was
a catalyst for both developments.
1. The monitoring board as safe harbor in the “Deal Decade”
The dominance of the monitoring board model was by no means assured
by the end of the 1970s, since its endorsement by managerial elites was at least
partially a tactical concession to forestall further reaching reforms, such as
national chartering. Indeed, as the national political consensus, as reflected in
the presidential and congressional elections, turned away from the critique of
corporate power, the Business Roundtable retreated on prior positions.215 Yet
by the end of the decade managerial elites were aggressively promoting the

213. Bus. Roundtable, supra note 209, at 2099.
214. Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits,
N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 32, reprinted in THOMAS G. MARX, BUSINESS AND
SOCIETY: ECONOMIC, MORAL AND POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS 145-50 (1985). Friedman had
two points: the first was that the direction of corporate activity other than to maximize
shareholder welfare was inefficient; the second was that use of corporate funds for any other
purpose amounted to theft from shareholders. For another argument regarding the economic
efficiency point, see Eugene V. Rostow, To Whom and for What Ends Is Corporate
Management Responsible?, in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY, supra note 181, at
46.
215. This was reflected in the Business Roundtable’s vehement exception to the
American Law Institute’s new project on corporate governance, which promised (or
threatened) fuller elaboration of the legal entailments of the monitoring board model. See
generally Seligman, supra note 189. The attacks included the objection that the ALI’s
Principles of Corporate Governance “would make every board of directors adopt a
monitoring method that cannot work.” Id. at 326 (quoting Andrew Signler, Chairman,
Business Roundtable Corporate Responsibility Task Force). Some academics also attacked
the monitoring board model. See, e.g., Daniel J. Fischel, The Corporate Governance
Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259 (1982).
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virtues of the monitoring board, since a robust board seemed to offer a safe
harbor against the pressure of the takeover movement.
The 1980s became known as the “Deal Decade.” Although in aggregate
terms, hostile transactions were dominated by friendly deals, the “hostile bid”
became a fearful threat. Nearly a quarter of the major U.S. corporations
received an unwanted bid.216 Many “friendly deals” were negotiated in the
shadow of a potential hostile bid.217 Even very large firms came under attack
from financial buyers whose access to the junk bond market meant they could
engineer a highly leveraged transaction that would ultimately be repaid through
the sale of various corporate divisions and other assets (a “bust-up”). The
stakes never seemed higher for managerial autonomy.
Hostile takeovers in the United States were highly controversial during the
1980s and raise similar controversies in other countries when they appear for
the first time. Economists typically describe merger activity as arising from
economic adjustment to industry shocks, and in particular have identified some
specific shocks as important in the 1980s: deregulation, oil price shocks,
foreign competition, and financial innovation.218 But the argument that
legitimated hostile bids throughout the 1980s was that such activity was a
corrective to managerial inefficiency.219 The U.S. economy had not thrived in
the 1970s, and for the first time it seemed that firms modeled on the U.S. model
of managerialist governance were out-competed on the world stage.
The market in corporate control was offered as the cure for economic
sclerosis, with both specific and general effects. First, a hostile bid was
described as an expression of the competition among management teams for
control over the assets of a particular firm. The team that could put the assets to
highest and best use would be able to offer the highest price and would prevail.
Thus a successful hostile bid would make particular assets more productive.
Second, the background threat of a hostile bid would have a disciplining and
stimulating effect on other managements. This would lead to more productive
use of assets throughout the economy.
An additional factor in the “Deal Decade” (and beyond) was the increasing
importance of institutional investors. By 1980, institutions held more than 40%

216. Mark L. Mitchell & J. Harold Mulherin, The Impact of Industry Shocks on
Takeover and Restructuring Activity, 41 J. FIN. ECON. 193, 199 (1996).
217. Often the difference between a “hostile” and a “friendly” bid is just a timing
question of when the proposed transaction becomes public. See G. William Schwert,
Hostility in Takeovers: In the Eyes of the Beholder?, 55 J. FIN. 2599 (2000).
218. See Gregor Andrade et al., New Evidence and Perspectives on Mergers, 15 J.
ECON. PERSP., Spring 2001, at 103, 108.
219. See, e.g., William E. Fruhan, Jr., Corporate Raiders: Head’em Off at Value Gap,
HARV. BUS. REV., July-Aug. 1988, at 63 (“[R]aiders and arbitrageurs . . . are a symptom of
the large value gaps that persist throughout corporate America”); Peter D. Goodson &
Donald J. Gogel, Managing as if Shareholders Matter, HARV. BUS. REV., May-June 1987, at
24, 26 (“The economics behind the takeover phenomenon are simply too powerful.”).
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of the value of U.S. equity markets, concentrated in the largest firms.220 This
created a class of shareholders singularly focused on shareholder value and
quite willing, indeed eager, to sell to a bidder offering a significant market
premium. In part this was because institutional investors observed that target
managements’ claims that the bid was “low ball,” that higher values were just
around the corner, rarely proved out.221 In part the eagerness to sell was
because institutional investment performance was often assessed on the basis of
a relatively short track record. For example, a mutual fund marketed itself on
the basis of annual performance; a money manager for a pension fund or an
endowment benchmarked itself against an unmanaged index, or against peers,
often on a quarterly basis.222 Moreover, institutions were crucial funding
sources for financial buyers. Some provided equity capital to buyout firms;
others purchased the indebtedness that financed leveraged acquisitions. Early in
the cycle, the return from such investments was spectacular.223 This, in turn,
drew in even more money.
Obviously many incumbent managers disagreed with the efficiencyenhancing justification for hostile takeovers, instead seeing such activity as
driven by control arbitrageurs looking for quick profits through the exploitation
of stock market mispricing and other quick-buck strategies. Even worse, many
managers argued, an active market in corporate control was itself a cause of
inefficiency, because of the “short-termism” induced in managerial time
horizons.224 Instead, the key to the European and Japanese success, they
alleged, was “patient capital.”225 Nevertheless, hostile bids were powerful
phenomena; what to do?
In this environment, managers turned to the monitoring board and to
independent directors as the best available protection against the hostile
takeover movement, despite the encroachment on managerial autonomy. First,
business elites needed a credible board-centered governance mechanism to
address performance issues in substitution for the market-centered approach
220. For time-series information on institutional ownership, in absolute terms and as a
fraction of U.S. public equity, see infra Table 4 and Figure 6 in the Appendix.
221. See Michael Bradley et al., The Rationale Behind Interfirm Tender Offers:
Information or Synergy?, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 183 (1983).
222. See MICHAEL USEEM, INVESTOR CAPITALISM: HOW MONEY MANAGERS ARE
CHANGING THE FACE OF CORPORATE AMERICA (1996).
223. See Steven Kaplan, The Effects of Management Buyouts on Operating
Performance and Value, 24 J. FIN. ECON. 217 (1989).
224. See, e.g., Warren A. Law, A Corporation Is More than Its Stock, HARV. BUS.
REV., May-June 1986, at 80, 81 (arguing that managers have “resisted debt until prodded by
takeover fears” because of their long-run view as opposed to the short-run view of
investors).
225. E.g., MICHAEL E. PORTER, THE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS 528-29
(1990); Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, A New System of Corporate Governance:
The Quinquennial Election of Directors, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 187, 201-24 (1991); Michael E.
Porter, Capital Disadvantage: America’s Failing Capital Investment System, HARV. BUS.
REV., Sept.-Oct. 1992, at 65.
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associated with the hostile tender offer. What was the answer, after all, to
institutional and other shareholders who might strongly suspect management’s
motives in resisting a hostile bid? The blessing of takeover resistance by
independent directors who would, in theory, independently evaluate the
adequacy of the hostile bid against the firm’s “intrinsic value,” was an
indispensable part of the legitimating mechanism.226 But note that
management’s (and then the board’s) objection to the hostile bid was almost
invariably framed in terms of shareholder value: the unwanted bid
“undervalued” the target, from the shareholder point of view.227
Second, independent directors also provided legal cover under the
developing Delaware fiduciary standards for resistance to a hostile bid.
(Delaware’s standards were important because of the number of large public
firms incorporated there and because of Delaware’s leadership role in the
fashioning of fiduciary duty law.) In a series of pivotal cases, the Delaware
Supreme Court permitted a target board to “just say no” to a hostile bid.228
Boards were permitted to adopt and maintain a so-called “poison pill,” a clever
corporate finance artifice that imposed potentially ruinous costs on a hostile
bidder. But judicial approval of such measures appeared to be tied to informed
decisionmaking by independent directors. And the conditions of director
independence became more stringent throughout the period.
2. Judicial promotion of director independence
Director independence was a touchstone of Delaware takeover cases even
before the tumultuous 1980s, but it became especially critical then because of
the extraordinary, unprecedented measures undertaken by targets to thwart
hostile bids. The courts were faced with unpalatable choices: prohibit tactics
such as the poison pill and leave the matter of corporate control to shareholder
action, which Delaware law otherwise strongly constrained;229 give
managements unbridled discretion to resist hostile bids, which raised obvious
conflict problems; or put it to courts to decide on the reasonableness of

226. E.g., Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target’s Boardroom, 35 BUS. LAW.
101, 119-22 (1979); Ira M. Millstein, The Evolution of the Certifying Board, 48 BUS. LAW.
1485, 1493-95 (1993).
227. As discussed below, managements (and boards) almost always declined the
gambit of state “constituency statutes” (and language in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum
Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985)) that would have permitted invocation of the interests of nonshareholder constituents. See infra note 237.
228. For a doctrinal account, see Jeffrey N. Gordon, Corporations, Markets, and
Courts, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1931 (1991). See also Alan R. Palmiter, Reshaping the
Corporate Fiduciary Model: A Director’s Duty of Independence, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1351
(1989).
229. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 141(a), 251(b) (2007). See generally Jeffrey
N. Gordon, Shareholder Initiative: A Social Choice and Game Theoretic Approach to
Corporate Law, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 347 (1991).
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takeover defenses in particular transactions, which would transform courts into
economic regulators. By contrast, placing the onus on the board of directors
had a statutory base,230 a doctrinal foundation,231 and might thread the needle
of the warring parties with conflicting agendas. Yet the 1970s were too fresh to
permit casual assumptions about board diligence if the Delaware courts wanted
to mollify key pro-takeover constituencies such as institutional investors and
the federal government.232 Thus we saw a strategy emerge in which the court
policed not only board process but also director independence.
The invocation of board independence was a critical component in the
sustaining of unprecedented defensive measures in the two pivotal takeover
cases of the 1980s, Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.233 and Moran v.
Household International, Inc.234 In Unocal, which sustained a self-tender that
(remarkably) discriminated against a significant shareholder, here, the raider,
the Delaware Supreme Court repeatedly invoked the role of the independent
directors in the board’s evaluation of the raider’s bid and the particular
defensive measures: the independent directors constituted a majority (eight of
thirteen) of the board, the board heard from independent experts, the
independent directors met privately with financial advisors and attorneys and
met privately together, and the board unanimously agreed on the measures.235
This focus on independence-in-fact was a development from prior doctrine.236
It was not merely that a majority of the directors were independent, in the sense
of no personal pecuniary interest, but that the independent directors had played
an independent role in reviewing and approving the defensive undertaking.237
230. Section 141(a) of the Delaware Code says, “The business and affairs of every
corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a
board of directors . . . .” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2007)
231. See Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964). The defensive measure in
question was an early instance of “greenmail,” in which the target repurchased a putative
raider’s 17.5% block at an above-market price to end a takeover threat. In holding that such
use of corporate funds was valid unless the board “acted solely or primarily because of the
desire to perpetuate themselves in office,” id. at 554, the court provided a roadmap of how a
board could show that a defensive measure was “primarily in the corporate interest,” id.
(quoting Bennett v. Propp, 187 A.2d 405, 409 (Del. 1962)). Because only two of seven
directors had a “personal pecuniary interest” in the board’s decisions, the board was not held
to the “self-dealing” standard, id., and could satisfy its burden simply “by showing good
faith and reasonable investigation,” id. at 555, the now-standard formulation of the business
judgment rule. In other words, the presence of (relatively) independent directors insulated
the corporation and its management from attack for a deal-stopping defensive measure.
232. See Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588 (2003)
(describing Delaware’s responsiveness to the federal government’s pro-takeover stance).
233. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
234. 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
235. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 950.
236. See also supra note 231 and accompanying text; cf. Cheff, 199 A.2d 548.
237. As to why the Unocal court rested so heavily on the mechanics of independent
director scrutiny—rather than the mere fact of an independent majority—there are at least
two related explanations. First, the court might have been influenced by the 1970s debates
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Similarly, in Moran, which validated the implementation of a poison pill,
the court noted approvingly the independence of the directors and described the
process of director deliberation.238 A majority of the board (ten of sixteen)
were independent, and all but two of the independent directors (one of whom
was contemplating a leveraged bid for the firm) voted for the plan. The
directors extensively discussed the shareholder rights plan with the
corporation’s financial advisors and counsel, illuminated by debate with the
particular independent director who opposed the plan most vigorously. The
board had the burden of showing that the defensive measure was “‘reasonable
in relation to the threat posed’”239 but “that proof is materially enhanced . . .
where, as here, a majority of the board favoring the proposal consisted of
outside independent directors who have acted in accordance with the foregoing
standards.”240
Perhaps most tellingly, in Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time,
Inc.,241 the pivotal 1990 case that opened the way to a “just say no” defense,242
the Delaware Supreme Court opened the opinion with an elaborate description
of the directors,243 in particular the independents (twelve of sixteen), and then
emphasized throughout the independents’ decisionmaking role. After
Paramount’s bid, Time’s independent directors met frequently in executive
session, both among themselves and with the corporation’s financial advisor
and legal counsel, we are told.244 Indeed, the court’s narrative presents the
board as the protagonist of Time’s strategy and choices, as opposed to, say, the
CEO who was actually driving the Warner merger. Thus the court invokes the
engagement of independent directors as a key element in a remarkable legal
conclusion: that a target may adopt preclusive defensive measures to block an
about the activist role of independent directors (as embodied in the then ongoing work of the
ALI corporate governance project). Second, the court might have been looking for as much
cover as possible for the genuinely radical step of permitting corporate action that
discriminated against a shareholder. The court was of course disingenuous in asserting that
the discriminatory self-tender in Unocal was just a version of the targeted repurchase
permitted in Cheff v. Mathes, which “discriminated” by giving the raider a selling
opportunity not available to other shareholders. This analogy omitted a critical difference. In
Cheff, the discriminated-against shareholders purportedly benefited from the greenmail
payment, because it drove away a bidder who was offering too low a price, and was
undertaken by their agent, the board, whose interests were aligned with theirs. In Unocal, the
discriminated-against shareholder, Boone Pickens/Mesa Petroleum, did not benefit, indeed
was the target of the discrimination by a board consciously acting against his interests. In
other words, the distortion of traditional corporate antidiscrimination norms could be
defended as truly necessary to protect the corporation and its other shareholders only
because of the heightened independence in fact as well as in form of the Unocal board.
238. 500 A.2d at 1348 n.2, 1356.
239. Id. at 1356 (quoting Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955).
240. Id.
241. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990).
242. See Gordon, supra note 228, at 1944-45.
243. Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1143.
244. Id. at 1147-48.
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all-cash, all-shares bid at a substantial premium to market. The lesson to a
planner was clear. The price of the power to “just say no” to a hostile bidder
was a board that consisted of a majority of independent directors and a process
that would call on those directors to exercise (at least the appearance of)
independent judgment.245
3. Summary
The hostile takeover movement of the 1980s brought unprecedented
emphasis to shareholder value as the ultimate corporate objective. In response,
director independence came to be understood as a critical element in the
intellectual and legal architecture necessary to preserve managerial autonomy
against the pressure of the market in corporate control. A managerial elite that
in prior decades had no use for independent directors now embraced them as an
essential element of shareholder capitalism. The reformers’ case for
independent directors in the 1970s pointed in several different directions. The
takeover movement of the 1980s crystallized that the independent directors’
role would be crucially tied to shareholder value.
D. The 1990s: The Triumph of Shareholder Value and the Independent Board
1. Introduction
In the 1990s the independent board came to be heralded as the solution to a
three-way paradox. First, shareholder wealth maximization gained increased
acceptance as the ultimate corporate objective and also the ultimate measure of
managerial performance. Second, business elites were increasingly successful
in persuading the courts to permit far-reaching defensive measures against a
hostile bid, a driver of shareholder wealth maximization. And third, hostile bids
came to be seen as too costly a way of solving the managerial agency problem.
The independent board could resolve this trilemma by benchmarking
managerial performance in terms of stock market prices. This was expressed in
both executive compensation contracts that heavily used stock-based
compensation and in greater reliance on stock market returns in CEO
termination decisions. These moves, in turn, produced two immediately visible
developments: first, the highest level of CEO compensation in U.S. business
245. The Delaware Supreme Court also excoriated nominally independent directors
who had not fulfilled their role of vetting and legitimating what would otherwise be a
conflicted transaction, most notably in the management buyout case Mills Acquisition Co. v.
MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1280 (Del. 1989):
The board was torpid, if not supine, in its efforts to establish a truly independent auction, free
of Evans’ interference and access to confidential data. By placing the entire process in the
hands of Evans, through his own chosen financial advisors, with little or no board oversight,
the board materially contributed to the unprincipled conduct of those upon whom it looked
with a blind eye.
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history and second, the shortest average CEO tenure. In this way the
independent board helped lock in shareholder value as the guide for
management behavior.
2. Shareholder value without hostile bids
The 1980s had a somewhat paradoxical legacy. On the one hand, the
shareholder value criterion became increasingly influential, yet hostile bids—a
straightforward application of the shareholder value principle—became more
difficult as a legal matter and came under some challenge as a business
strategy. As the 1990s progressed, managerial elites were increasingly
successful in persuading the courts to permit far-reaching defensive measures
against a hostile bid. For example, in a series of cases culminating with Unitrin,
Inc. v. American General Corp. in 1995,246 the Delaware Supreme Court
seemed to narrow the conception of a “preclusive,” and thus legally
objectionable, defensive measure to a limited realm of interference with the
shareholder franchise. Almost anything else was permitted, giving the target
management (assuming the board agreed) a virtual veto over a hostile bid.247
Indeed, the economic failure of many high profile late-1980s contested
transactions—highly leveraged deals, financed in part with exotic debt
securities dumped on junk bond mutual funds—had damaged the business
credibility of hostile bids generally.248 The post-1980s conventional wisdom
was that the hostile bid was a high cost mechanism to solve the managerial
agency problem. Where the raider was a “financial” bidder, a 1980s pattern, the
hostile bid could disrupt the target’s business, distract management, and often
end in a financial crisis that reduced organizational rents. Where the raider was
a “strategic” corporate bidder, a 1990s pattern, a hostile bid often proceeded in

246. 651 A.2d 1361, 1382 (Del. 1995).
247. As a practical matter, the veto was much more effective in the case of a classified
board than otherwise, because of the interaction between the poison pill and classification. In
the case of a board elected at a single election, the board veto could be readily overridden by
coupling a proxy contest to a conditional bid. A classified board makes an override much
tougher, since the electoral coalition that would replace the vetoing board with one that
would accept the bid must hold together over two election cycles. See Jeffrey N. Gordon,
“Just Say Never?” Poison Pills, Deadhand Pills, and Shareholder-Adopted Bylaws: An
Essay for Warren Buffett, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 511 (1997). In Moore Corp. v. Wallace
Computer Services, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1545 (D. Del. 1995), a federal district court purporting
to apply Delaware law permitted a classified target board to maintain its poison pill even
after the insurgents had prevailed in an initial election. But as the recent Oracle v. PeopleSoft
litigation demonstrated, the validity of such resistance is an open matter of Delaware law.
In other jurisdictions, statutory innovations protected managerial autonomy. For
example, boards were given explicit permission in “constituency statutes” to balance the
interests of the competing corporate stakeholders; shareholders need not be privileged.
248. See, e.g., BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY, INC., 1989 ANNUAL REPORT (1990), quoted in
RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE
ACQUISITIONS 438-40 (2d ed. 1995).
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a relatively impoverished information environment, which reduced the chances
of a successful bidder/target match. Moreover, the transaction costs associated
with a hostile takeover meant that they could directly address only cases of a
substantial shortfall in managerial performance and such visible “lumpiness”
might reduce the general deterrence effects.
Underlying the concern about hostile bids was also a nagging suspicion
that unfettered control markets might be subject to “common mode failure,”
meaning a ubiquitously adopted innovation that proved, in the end, disadvantageous. For example, adding significant leverage to the capital structure
initially seemed to be a value-creating innovation with wide application,249 but
the troubles that plagued many later deals and the rate of reverse LBOs250
seemed to indicate strong limits. It was apparent that the mergers and
acquisitions market was subject to fads and fashions. A successful transaction
in an industry spurred imitators long before the value of the new configuration
proved out.251 The concern was that if the barriers to a hostile takeover were
too low, raiders could quickly pursue a takeover of a firm that was not
following the current conventional wisdom, in effect treat a nonconforming
firm as an arbitrage opportunity—and that this threat would, in turn, make
managers too responsive to consensus opinion.252 This sort of critique was in
the spirit of skepticism about the allocative validity of the efficient market
hypothesis that increased after the 1987 stock market break.253 The implication
was that some friction was desirable in the control markets to slow down the
transmission of a structural or strategic innovation so that its virtues might be
tested over some meaningful period.
Nevertheless the shareholder value criterion was ascendant, an increasingly
powerful guide to managerial behavior. In significant measure this was fueled
by the shareownership and activism of institutional investors, who
benchmarked managerial performance in shareholder value terms.254 Indeed,
one of the most striking trends throughout the 1950-2005 period was the rise of
249. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation, HARV. BUS. REV.,
Sept.-Oct. 1989, at 61.
250. See, e.g., Steven N. Kaplan, The Staying Power of Leveraged Buyouts, 29 J. FIN.
ECON. 287 (1991).
251. Steven N. Kaplan & Bengt Holmstrom, Corporate Governance and Takeovers in
the United States: Making Sense of the 1980s and 1990s, 15 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES, Spring
2001, at 121.
252. See Gordon, supra note 130.
253. See generally ANDREI SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT MARKETS: AN INTRODUCTION TO
BEHAVIORAL FINANCE (2000).
254. See generally USEEM, supra note 222; James M. Tobin, The Squeeze on
Directors—Inside Is Out, 49 BUS. LAW. 1707 (1994). The role of institutions was buttressed
by the SEC’s 1992 proxy rule reforms that made it easier for institutions to confer and to
influence shareholder votes without incurring the expense of a proxy filing. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-1(2) (2007). On institutional investor activism generally, see Bernard S. Black,
Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811
(1992).
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institutional ownership, both in absolute terms and as a percentage of public
traded stock.255 Institutional investors publicly targeted firms that
underperformed,256 strongly backed stock-based compensation for senior
management to align their interests with shareholders,257 and organized “just
vote no” campaigns in director elections to protest continued poor
performance.258
But no less significantly, the maximization of shareholder value as the core
test of managerial performance had seeped into managerial culture. The nod to
“corporate social responsibility” in the 1978 Business Roundtable statement on
corporate governance was omitted from the comparable 1997 statement.
Instead, we are given to understand that “the paramount duty of management
and of boards of directors is to the corporation’s stockholders; the interests of
other stakeholders are relevant as a derivative of the duty to stockholders.”259
Managerial elites rejected the invitation tendered by so-called “constituency
statutes” adopted by many states in the heat of the takeover movement that
specifically countenanced the balancing of stakeholder and shareholder
interests.260 A shareholder-oriented focus seemed part of the necessary
restructuring of the American economy in a more competitive world.261 It also

255. Figure 6 in the Appendix vividly illustrates the increasing growth of institutional
ownership, both in absolute amount and as a percentage of publicly traded stock of U.S.
firms. See also Appendix Table 4.
256. See Steven L. Nesbitt, Long-Term Rewards from Shareholder Activism: A Study
of the “CalPERS Effect,” 6 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Winter 1994, at 75 (describing campaign
by California Public Employees Retirement System and its purported performance effects).
257. See, e.g., James E. Heard, Executive Compensation: Perspective of the
Institutional Investor, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 749, 766 (1995) (noting institutional focus has not
been on level of executive compensation but on aligning “pay and performance”); CalPERS,
Why Corporate Governance Today? (Aug. 14, 1995), available at http://www.calpersgovernance.org/viewpoint/default.asp.
258. See Grundfest, supra note 91 (advocating a “just vote no” campaign to
symbolically chastise underperforming management).
259. Compare Bus. Roundtable, supra note 209, at 2099 (identifying “corporate social
responsibility” as a discreet function of the board of directors, where “[t]he owners have an
interest in balancing short-range and long-term profitability, in considering political and
social viability of the enterprise over time”), with Bus. Roundtable, Statement on Corporate
Governance (Sept. 1997) [hereinafter 1997 BRT Statement], available at
http://www.businessroundtable.org/pdf/11.pdf.
260. See ABA Comm. on Corporate Laws, Other Constituencies Statutes: Potential
for Confusion, 45 BUS. LAW. 2253, 2268-69 (1990) (rejecting effort to sever management
action from shareholder welfare because it “would conflict with directors’ responsibility to
shareholders and could undermine the effectiveness of the system that has made the
corporation an efficient device for the creation of jobs and wealth”). Ironically constituency
statutes have often in practice worked out to the detriment of the stakeholders they purport to
protect. Managers who have invoked these statutes to resist a takeover bid typically accede
after the bidder raises its price; but this additional benefit for the shareholders of course puts
more financial pressure on the bidder to cut jobs or wages at the target.
261. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Employees, Pensions, and the New Economic Order, 97
COLUM. L. REV. 1519 (1997).
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seemed to fit an historical moment in which maximizing the overall size of the
pie had greater acceptance than distributional considerations.262 By the end of
the 1990s, the triumph of the shareholder value criterion was nearly complete.
3. Resolving the paradox through the market for managerial services
So now we come to the paradox: serving shareholder value was paramount,
yet a major force for addressing the managerial agency problem, the hostile
takeover, was off the table. The 1990s board undertook to solve the dilemma by
focusing on the market in managerial services, employing three strategic
elements: executive compensation contracts, termination decisions, and
severance packages. All three mechanisms were designed to build in the pursuit
of shareholder value into managerial behavior.
a. Executive compensation
The first strategy was to fashion executive compensation contracts that
better aligned managerial and shareholder objectives, to give managers highpowered incentives to maximize shareholder value.263 In light of other
institutional constraints, this meant stock options. Both tax and accounting rules
favored the use of “plain-vanilla” stock options, meaning immediately
exercisable, at-the-money options on the company’s stock. Such options were
taxable to the executive only when exercised, not when issued; the grant of
such options did not reduce the corporation’s net income (in other words, they
were not expensed). The consequence was to work a revolution in managerial
compensation over the period.264 For example, the composition of CEO
compensation in the largest firms, as reflected by the S&P 500, shifted over the

262. Id. at 1520, 1534 (discussing evidence on increased income inequality in the
United States). The well known empirics show decreasing inequality in the two immediate
post-WWII decades and increasing inequality thereafter. On most standard indices,
inequality sharply increased in the 1990s. See U.S. Census Bureau, Press Briefing on 2001
Income and Poverty Estimates, Chart 12 (Sept. 2002), available at http://www.census.gov/
hhes/www/img/incpov01/fig12.jpg; see also U.S. Census Bureau, The Changing Shape of
the Nation’s Income Distribution, 1947-1998 (June 2000), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2000pubs/p60-204.pdf (including several methods to show
accelerating inequality in the 1990s). The focus on shareholder value could be the variable
that links the rise of income inequality to the rise of director independence.
263. This was consistent with the advice of academic observers, who had contended
that managers were “paid like bureaucrats,” meaning that their pay was increasing with the
size of their organization and was relatively insensitive to performance. See, e.g., Michael C.
Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives—It’s Not How Much You Pay, But How, HARV.
BUS. REV. May-June 1990, at 138; Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Performance Pay
and Top-Management Incentives, 98 J. POL. ECON. 225 (1990). But see Brian J. Hall &
Jeffrey B. Liebman, Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?, 113 Q.J. ECON. 653 (1998).
264. Some of this Part follows Gordon, supra note 82.
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1992-2000 period from 27% in stock options to 51% in stock options.265 Using
a broader definition of equity-based compensation that includes stock grants,
the stock-related portion of compensation for so-called “New Economy” CEOs
shifted over the same period from 34% to 83%, and for other CEOs, from 25%
to 59%.266 This had two pronounced effects: first, it led to unprecedented levels
of CEO compensation,267 but second, it also produced compensation packages
that, more than ever, embedded an explicit focus on shareholder value.268
b. CEO termination
The second strategic element of the 1990s boards’ focus on shareholder
value was increasingly to evaluate CEO performance with respect to
shareholder returns and to terminate more quickly. This view seems to have
been accepted even among the managers whose tenures were therefore at
greater risk.269 The change in board behavior is borne out by a number of

265. See Kevin Murphy, Explaining Executive Compensation: Managerial Power
Versus the Perceived Cost of Stock Options, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 847, 848 fig.1 (2002)
(calculating valuations in 2001 dollars). The options were valued as of the grant day using a
modified version of the standard Black-Scholes option pricing model, which will yield a
much lower figure than the value of the option when exercised after substantial market
appreciation. This latter figure is the one that is typically reported by the business and
popular press. See also Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, Stock Options for Undiversified
Executives, 33 J. ACCT. & ECON. 3 (2002); Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy,
Remuneration: Where We’ve Been, How We Got to Here, What Are the Problems, and How
to Fix Them 26 fig.2, 31 fig.3 (European Corporate Governance Inst., Finance Working
Paper No. 44/2004, 2004) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=561305.
266. Kevin J. Murphy, Stock-Based Pay in New Economy Firms, 34 J. ACCT. & ECON.
129, 132-33 (2003).
267. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 109, at 1.
268. This shift to accept stock-based compensation was facilitated by a historical
contingency. To address “unearned excesses” in managerial compensation, Congress in 1993
adopted a “reform” that would deny a public corporation a business deduction for
compensation greater than $1 million, unless the compensation is paid “solely on account of
the attainment of one or more performance goals.” I.R.C. § 162(m) (2007). In effect, the tax
code placed a $1 million cap on salary and discretionary bonus payments and required a
showing that additional compensation was performance-based. One very clear qualifier was
a stock option plan using plain-vanilla options, see id. § 1.162-27(e)(2)(vi), and it was a
virtual corollary that any level of stock option grant would qualify as “performance-based,”
since the value of the option was increasing the stock price. Moreover, since plain-vanilla
options were not expensed, their grant was “free” to the corporation. By contrast, a cash
bonus geared to accounting or other measures would be expensed. Thus, boards would
predictably be more generous in stock option grants than other performance-related
compensation that might not have such a sharp shareholder value focus. In sum, the tax
reform deprived managers of large flat salaries, but in trade for allegiance to the shareholder
value criterion, it held out the promise of higher compensation overall.
269. For example, in its 1997 Statement on Corporate Governance, the Business
Roundtable, an association of 200 CEOs, stated that “the principal objective of a business
enterprise is to generate economic returns to its owners” and that “good corporate
governance practices provide an important framework for a timely response by a
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empirical studies. A study by Booz Allen Hamilton of CEO turnover in the
1995-2001 period for the 2500 largest companies worldwide shows a near
doubling in the 1995 versus 2000 CEO turnover rate and a trebling of the rate
of explicitly performance-related turnovers (twenty-five in 1995 versus eighty
in 2000). The study indicates that stock prices had become the bellwether
performance measure.270 Its “first and most obvious[]” conclusion is that
CEOs must deliver acceptable and consistent total returns to shareholders. In
the U.S. and Europe, the growing democratization of shareholding has clearly
placed total shareholder returns higher on the management and board agenda
than it was in years past, when net income and return on assets were the
measures by which a firm’s managers were judged. In those bygone days,
management focused on effective stewardship; the relevant benchmarks were
competitors in the same industry. Today, however, shareholders—from
individual investors to giant pension funds—are increasingly judging each
company against all others . . . . This requires a fundamental change in
management behavior and perspective.271

Similarly, in evaluating CEO turnover in a sample of large U.S. firms in
the 1992 to 2005 period, Kaplan and Minton found that CEO turnover
increased in the post-1998 period and that the performance-to-turnover effect
strengthened in the later period.272 One of the most notable findings of a 2001
study by Huson, Parrino, and Starks of CEO turnover in the 1971-1994 period
is that the rate of CEO firings in large firms (both in absolute terms and as a
fraction of CEO turnover) was as high (or higher by some measures) in the
1989-1994 period as in the 1983-1988 period, the height of the hostile takeover
wave, and much higher than in earlier periods in the evolution of corporate
governance.273 They also show that for the poorest performing firms, where the
likelihood of a CEO firing is highest, industry-adjusted stock returns were a
better predictor of a firing than income measures, and that the relevance of this
predictor was highest in the 1989-1994 period.274 Moreover, it appears that the
use of industry-adjusted returns in the Huson et al. study may have masked
corporation’s board of directors to situations that may directly affect stockholder value.”
1997 BRT Statement, supra note 259, at 1. The BRT also asserted that “selection and
evaluation” of the chief executive officer and his or her team “is probably the most important
function of the board,” and that this role “includes considering compensation, planning for
succession and, when appropriate, replacing the CEO or other members of the top
management team.” Id. at 5.
270. CHUCK LUCIER ET AL., BOOZ ALLEN HAMILTON, WHY CEO’S FALL: THE CAUSES
AND CONSEQUENCES OF TURNOVER AT THE TOP, 3-7 (2002), available at
http://extfile.bah.com/livelink/livelink/110173/?func=doc.Fetch&nodeid=110173.
271. Id. at 9 (emphasis in original).
272. Steven N. Kaplan & Bernadette A. Minton, How Has CEO Turnover Changed?
Increasingly Performance Sensitive Boards and Increasingly Uneasy CEOs (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Research Working Paper No. W12465, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=924751.
273. Mark R. Huson et al., Internal Monitoring Mechanisms and CEO Turnover: A
Long-Term Perspective, 56 J. FIN. 2265, 2279-90 (2001).
274. Id. at 2290 tbl.V.
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evidence of a straightforward reliance on shareholder returns by the 1990s
board; this becomes apparent from an event study they performed that captures
stock returns upon announcement of a CEO firing. For the 1989-1994 period,
the average cumulative abnormal return upon such a termination is 4.00%
compared to only 1.75% for the 1983-1988 period,275 suggesting that firings by
the 1990s board were, to a greater degree than previously, guided by the
anticipation of an increased stock price.276
These trends are consistent with related work by Farrell and Whidbee,
whose analysis of CEO turnover in the 1986-1997 period shows that the rate of
CEO firings (both in absolute terms and as a fraction of CEO turnover) was
higher in the 1995-1997 period than in the preceding 1989-1994 period.277
Moreover, they show that a significant predictor of managerial turnover is
failure to meet analysts’ consensus earnings forecasts, that is, a strongly
unexpected negative earnings surprise.278 Although they do not map this onto
stock price changes, the association between a negative earnings surprise and a
stock price decline seems straightforward.
The result of this more demanding standard for CEO performance was,
according to the Booz Allen study, to shorten average CEO tenure from 9.5
years (1995) to 7.3 years (2001) and to shorten the average tenure of fired
CEOs from 7.0 years (1995) to 4.6 years (2001).279
c. Golden parachutes
The third element of the 1990s board’s focus on shareholder value in the
market for managerial services was the “golden parachute,” a generous
severance package that was another alignment mechanism. The typical “chute”
provided for a severance of approximately three times salary plus the average
bonus of prior years, and, in the case of a change in control transaction, added
the accelerated vesting of stock options that had been granted but were not yet
275. Id. at 2295 tbl.VII. The difference between the two periods is statistically
significant.
276. In other words, the board has rational expectations about whether a CEO firing
will increase the stock price and acts accordingly. For further discussion on stock returns
versus earnings as predicting CEO turnover, see Benjamin A. Hermalin & Michael S.
Weisbach, Endogenously Chosen Boards of Directors and Their Monitoring of the CEO, 88
AM. ECON. REV. 96 (1998). Cf. Dirk Jenter & Fadi Kanaan, CEO Turnover and Relative
Performance Evaluation 18-19 (MIT Sloan Research Paper No. 4594-06, 2006), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=885531 (evaluating 1995-2001 CEO turnovers and finding that
CEOs are more likely to be replaced following poor industry and poor market performance,
suggesting that boards incompletely filter out the effects of exogenous factors; average
CARs are negative following forced turnover).
277. Kathleen A. Farrell & David A. Whidbee, Impact of Firm Performance
Expectations on CEO Turnover and Replacement Decisions, 36 J. ACCT. & ECON. 165, 173
tbl.1 (2003).
278. Id. at 166-67, 175.
279. LUCIER ET AL., supra note 270, at 8-9.
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vested.280 The severance payments were nice but the option acceleration
provisions could make the CEO genuinely rich. The chute could be a seen as
compensation for the depreciation in the terminated CEO’s human capital in
respect of the termination decision. This was a significant consolation prize for
the terminated CEO, which presumably reduced resistance, and also made it
easier for the board to attract a replacement CEO under similarly unforgiving
performance expectations. In the case of an uninvited premium takeover bid,
such packages often converted CEOs from opposition to acquiescence. One
consequence was that despite the availability for many U.S. firms of the nearly
bullet-proof antitakeover defense of a poison pill combined with a classified
board,281 takeover activity in the United States reached new heights in the
1990s. In particular, in the 1996-2000 period, fewer than 100 (of 40,000 total)
acquisitions in the U.S. takeover market were reported as “hostile”; only in
thirty-two did managers resist to the point where the target remained
independent.282
The intensity of takeover activity despite the availability of strong defenses
illustrates the power of the shareholder value criterion in the 1990s corporate
culture. Boards seemed to welcome, not fight, an appropriately rich bid, and
managers went along because of compensation contracts that truly did align
their interests with those of the shareholders. The shift in elite managerial
opinion during the 1990s in favor of the shareholder value criterion even at the
cost of some managerial autonomy had a certain historical contingency and
much self-interest, but was real nevertheless.

280. See generally MICHAEL S. SIRKIN & LAWRENCE CAGNEY, EXECUTIVE
COMPENSATION § 9 (1998).
281. See supra note 247.
282. Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered
Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887 (2002). In this study, of the 100
hostile bids, only thirty-two firms remained independent over the long term, twenty-one of
which had “effective staggered boards.” Losses to target shareholders from defeated hostile
transactions were approximately $30 billion if calculated using the figures in the study, id. at
926 tbl.2, 933 fig.4, 935 tbl.3. But, there were over 40,000 acquisition transactions in the
period, valued at $6.4 trillion; the accrued gains were $1.9 trillion. This means that the
percentage of defeated transaction was vanishingly small (0.08%); those cases account for
1.2% of the total M&A activity and 1.5% of the gains. Moreover, the study presents no
evidence of a selection effect of targets based on the availability of a classified board, and
the sheer volume of acquisition activity combined with the ubiquity of classified boards
(approximately half of public firms) makes a powerful selection effect unlikely. The study’s
findings in the context of the overall U.S. takeover market demonstrate the limited effect of
antitakeover measures in the United States. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, An American Perspective
on Anti-Takeover Laws in the EU: A German Example, in REFORMING COMPANY AND
TAKEOVER LAW IN EUROPE (Guido Ferrarini et al. eds., 2004).
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4. Markets generally
A final element in the 1990s embrace of shareholder value in contrast to
1950s managerialism is a different conception of the role of markets. As argued
previously, the 1950s tendency was to believe that the firm could create and
manage markets. By contrast, as evidenced by the growth of disaggregated,
networked firms, the 1990s tendency was to use market signals to manage the
firm.283 Independently, the collapse of the Soviet Union was taken to
demonstrate the superiority of market-based governance over centralized
planning. From a different perspective, one important consequence of the
downfall of communist regimes was the elimination of a potential political
competitor for the allegiance of workers. If part of the rationale for the 1950s
concern for stakeholders rested on the Cold War, that particular ideological
competition was over. Capitalism, and capitalism’s recourse to markets, was
the only game in town. It was simply a lot easier for managers (and others) to
ignore some of the adjustment costs associated with market-guided
decisionmaking, what might be called the “transition costs of capitalism,” in
this environment. Managers were able to rest on the normatively attractive
claim that shareholder wealth maximization would in fact maximize social
surplus, and so workers in general, even if not a particular group of laid off
workers, would be better off.284
E. The 2000s: New Roles for Independent Directors and New Standards of
Director Independence
1. Introduction
The collapse of Enron, WorldCom, and similar but less catastrophic
disclosure failures vividly demonstrated weaknesses in the board governance
system produced by the 1990s and pointed the way towards new roles for

283. Naomi R. Lamoreaux et al., Beyond Markets and Hierarchies: Toward a New
Synthesis of American Business History, AM. HIST. REV., Apr. 2003, at 404; William Savitt,
A New New Look at Corporate Opportunities (Columbia Law Sch. Ctr. for Law & Econ.
Studies, Working Paper No. 235, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=446960
(reviewing network industries literature); cf. Charles F. Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin, Neither
Modularity nor Relational Contracting: Inter-Firm Collaboration in the New Economy, 5
ENTERPRISE & SOC’Y 388 (2004) (describing richer forms of collaboration relying on
pragmatist theories of knowledge).
284. There are, of course, critical ways of reading the history. Englander and
Kaufman, for example, claim that during the 1990s U.S. managerial capitalism shifted from
a “technocratic” form concerned with balancing stakeholder interests to a “proprietary” form
in which managers competed in tournaments whose ultimate payoff was a disproportionate
share of the firm’s wealth and society’s wealth. Ernie Englander & Allen Kaufman, The End
of Managerial Ideology: From Corporate Social Responsibility to Corporate Social
Indifference, 5 ENTERPRISE & SOC’Y 404 (2004).
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independent directors and standards of independence.285 The 1990s system
depended on an independent board’s contracting with managers using stock
market-based measures of managerial success to determine both compensation
and tenure. Appropriate operation of the contracts critically depended upon the
quality of the firm’s disclosure, since otherwise stock prices would not reflect
managerial performance. Yet the managers whose compensation and tenure
depended on these stock prices were principally responsible for producing the
disclosure on which the contracts relied. Boards had simply failed to appreciate
and protect against some of the moral hazard problems that stock-based
compensation created, in particular, the special temptations to misreport
financial results.286 The principal objective of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
then, was the protection of the integrity of financial disclosure, both through
extensive new regulation of accountants and through new disclosure
monitoring responsibilities imposed on directors.
2. Contractual vulnerabilities
As noted above, the favored form of performance-based compensation in
the 1990s was a large load of plain-vanilla stock options. The payoff from a
stock option is asymmetric by design: unlimited upside potential, limited
downside exposure. This is particularly the case where options are doled out so
freely as to be almost free (i.e., no foregone cash compensation) and where
underwater options may be repriced. The payoff from stock is itself asymmetric
(and hence has been likened to an option), but stock has value (is “in the
money”) at any positive price, whereas an option that expires below its exercise
price (“out of the money”) is valueless. Thus, a too-rich stock option package
can create a distinctive set of moral hazard problems.287 First, and most
obviously, stock options can be redistributive. Exercised stock options increase
the number of shares outstanding and thus dilute the existing holders’ claim on
the firm’s cash flows. Stock options grants are redistributive if the value of the
options is greater than the executive services received; large or “mega” grants
of nonexpensed options seem likely candidates.
Second, more seriously, managers with large option grants may be strongly
tempted to manipulate financial results, most typically through the
overstatement of earnings. Several recent studies find that the probability of

285. Some of this Part draws from Gordon, supra note 82, and Gordon, supra note 83.
286. The emerging evidence of questionable practices in the timing of stock option
grants suggests that board members were insufficiently attentive to this temptation as well.
See, e.g., Randall A. Heron & Erik Lie, Does Backdating Explain the Stock Price Pattern
Around Executive Stock Options Grants?, 83 J. FIN. ECON. 271 (2007). This could be
because of their own stock-based compensation. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 81 (finding
favorable timing in option grants to outside directors that is inconsistent with sheer chance).
287. For further exploration of problems associated with the use of options, see
Gordon, supra note 83.
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accounting fraud, though small, nevertheless increases with the amount of
stock-based compensation, and increases as well with the fraction of total
compensation that is stock-based.288 The source of the temptation becomes
apparent in comparing two forms of incentive compensation, cash bonuses and
stock options. Bonus payments will typically increase linearly with earnings
but the value of stock options can increase (decrease) exponentially because of
the double effect that earnings changes have on stock prices. Earnings changes
affect prices both through operation of the price/earnings ratio and through the
impact on the market’s perception of the company’s growth rate and thus the
p/e ratio itself.289
Nevertheless, on the “chickens come home to roost” theory,290 it might
appear that achieving financial results through manipulation would be
irrational, and thus not so serious a threat. The firm’s true condition will
eventually come to light, the stock price will fall, and the executives’ options
may well become worthless. (This is not to mention the potential legal
sanctions for fraud.) But such reasoning does not appreciate the benefits and
risks from the executive’s perspective. Before the revelation, the executive may
have become rich through prior option exercises (and a prompt sale of the
underlying stock, or a “cashless exercise”) at the inflated price; the firm might
reprice the worthless options or grant some new ones; the necessary earnings
restatement may be buried with some other extraordinary adjustment; or a
positive shift in market conditions may overtake the earlier misrepresentation.
Certainly under prevailing practices in the 1990s, even a significant restatement
was unlikely to trigger an SEC enforcement action, much less a criminal
prosecution, and any civil litigation would be resolved well short of a finding of
fraud, meaning that either the D&O insurer or the company (but not executive)
will fund any settlement. Thus, as compensation came increasingly to consist of
288. These studies are canvassed in Jensen & Murphy, supra note 265. See also David
J. Denis et al., Is There a Dark Side to Incentive Compensation? (Mar. 2005) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=695583.
289. To take a simple example: Assume in year t=1 a company earns $5 per share and
its stock trades with a p/e ratio of 10, so the stock price is $50 a share. In year t=2 the
company earns an additional $1 per share, that is, earnings increase by 20%. Assume there
are 1 million shares outstanding and that the CEO has 50,000 expiring options with a $50
exercise price. A cash bonus will amount to some fraction of the total additional earnings,
but obviously would never exceed $1 million. By contrast, through operation of the p/e ratio
alone, the additional $1 of earnings produces a $10 per share increase. But if this 20% yearover-year improvement changes the market’s perception of the company’s growth rate and
thus the p/e ratio, it will generate a much greater increase in the stock price. So, for example,
if the p/e ratio increases from 10 to 15, the price will increase not from $50 to $60, but from
$50 to $90. The effect on CEO wealth is amazing: an increase of $2 million, double the total
amount of additional earnings. The calculation, via the Black-Scholes method, becomes
more complex for options of greater duration, but the point remains. Thus, it is not surprising
that earnings manipulations to generate and sustain a higher p/e ratio is more tempting as the
level of options increases.
290. Cf. In re Pure Resources, Inc., Shareholders Litig., 808 A.2d. 421, 446 (Del. Ch.
2002) (explaining the “goose and gander rule”).
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high-powered incentives like stock options and as the absolute level of
potential stock option payout over a short period of time increased,
management’s temptations grew. This is the source of the most difficult moral
hazard problem associated with the 1990s governance pattern.291
In short, managements had high-powered incentives with foreseeable
moral hazard problems. The necessary institutional complement was highpowered monitoring by the board. This was missing at many firms.
3. Contracting failures
The problems with stock option packages arose not only from the
asymmetric payoff structure but also from their very size. The temptation to
manipulate earnings was presumably increasing with the size of the payoff.
Certainly the risks of shareholder dilution were increasing with the size of the
option package. Observers have debated whether boards pervasively failed in
their obligation to establish arm’s length bargaining with the senior
managers.292 Regardless of the board’s independence in other matters, it seems
clear that independence was undercut in the setting of compensation. In some
cases the CEO or other members of the management team participated in
compensation committee activities. This participation included retaining the
same consultants hired by senior managers for larger and more lucrative human
resource assignments for the firm. Often nominally independent directors were
not actually independent in this domain, either because of a pecuniary
relationship with the firm that management could control or because of the
“backscratch” problem that arose because of director interlocks. The
conception of director “independence” had been insufficiently rigorous to
manage the powerful managerial self-interest that was unleashed by the writing
of increasingly rich executive compensation agreements.
4. Director independence reconsidered
The principle institutional failure that produced Enron and its ilk was the
failure of the gatekeepers, especially the accountants, not the insufficiency of
director independence.293 Yet boards had not performed well either, having
291. Another moral hazard problem arguably arose from the board’s focus on stock
price performance in its termination decision, see supra Part III.D.3.b, which added to
management’s temptation to manipulate results.
292. Compare BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 109 (explaining high compensation
levels as managerial rent-seeking), with Jeffrey N. Gordon, Executive Compensation: If
There’s a Problem, What’s the Remedy? The Case for Compensation Discussion and
Analysis, 30 J. CORP. L. 675 (2005) (arguing that many other factors also important, perhaps
more so in most cases).
293. See JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE (2006); John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of
Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301 (2004).
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failed to address management’s undercutting of gatekeeper integrity. There
certainly was a substantive case for enhancing the independence-in-fact of
directors, particularly if the managerial agency problem was to be addressed
through incentive-based compensation and termination contracts rather than
through control markers. As post-Enron reform pressure mounted, managerial
elites moved to ramp up board independence as an alternative to more intrusive
regulation, in this way protecting managerial autonomy to the extent possible in
the changed environment. The New York Stock Exchange impaneled a
corporate governance task force to restore public confidence and to show that
private regulation could address the governance failures that Enron revealed
without need for federal legislation. This was the origin of the tightened
director independence requirements added to the NYSE’s listing standards,
including compensation committees staffed solely by these more stringently
qualified independents.294 The Business Roundtable emphasized the
importance of independent directors and the importance of the board’s role in
“[f]ocusing on the integrity and clarity of the corporation’s financial statements
and financial reporting.”295 Just as it seemed that managerial elites were going
to succeed in defeating legislative action, the WorldCom scandal broke in
spring 2002, which raised the saliency of corporate governance problems and
created unstoppable momentum for the legislation that became Sarbanes Oxley.
Ironically, then, some of the emphasis on director independence in the postEnron environment is the byproduct of a failed effort to offer up stronger board
monitoring to forestall legislative change. Most recently, managerial elites have
invoked the independent board, especially its nominating committee, as part of
the effort to beat back the SEC’s proposal for limited shareholders access to the
management proxy statement to make director nominations.
The post-Enron reforms lay the groundwork for a revised model of
corporate governance. The model operates at many different levels. It ratchets
up the liability for primary wrong-doers, particularly corporate officers. It
imposes new duties, new liabilities, and a new regulatory structure on certain
gatekeepers, accountants in particular but also lawyers and, in a fashion,
securities analysts. The effect of the reforms on the board’s role is to make the
role of the independent director more important than ever. Both the federal
securities law and the stock exchange listing requirements imposed more
rigorous standards of director independence.296 Boards, particularly the audit
committee, are given a specific mandate to supervise the firm’s relationship
with the accountants and thus to oversee the corporation’s internal financial
controls and financial disclosure.297 Boards are more likely to hear about their
lawyers’ concerns that the firm’s managers are not in compliance with the

294.
295.
296.
297.

See supra notes 50-52, 107 and accompanying text.
BUS. ROUNDTABLE, supra note 102, at 5 (emphasis omitted).
See supra notes 50-53, 107-09 and accompanying text.
Id.
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federal securities laws or even state fiduciary duty.298 Directors, then, will have
a particularized monitoring role, what might be called “controls monitoring,” in
addition to “performance monitoring.”
F. Summary
This brief and partial history aims to give context to the secular trend
observed in Part I: a dramatic shift in the composition of the board away from
insiders and toward independents. The shift towards independent directors is
reflected not just in the numbers or percentages but also in the likelihood of
independence in fact. What the history also reveals is that the rise of the
independent board is associated with an increasing orientation of the corporate
purpose toward shareholder wealth maximization and with a growing role for
the board in mediating between the firm and the stock market. The legal
resolution of the hostile takeover battles of the 1980s was, first, that the firm is
not always up for sale (meaning the shareholders don’t decide), but second, that
the ultimate decisionmaker was not to be the highly conflicted managers but the
somewhat conflicted board. The growing focus on director independence was
stimulated by the desire to enhance the credibility of such decisionmaking to
the relevant audiences, particularly increasingly active institutional investors.
But the board’s mediation between the firm and market was not limited to
accepting or refusing a hostile takeover bid. Rather, in acceptance of the claim
that the managerial goal was to maximize shareholder value, boards
increasingly employed stock prices in compensation arrangements and in
making termination decisions. Managers were thus exposed to “soft-form”
stock market pressure rather than the “hard form” pressure of hostile bids.
What was insufficiently recognized in this transformation is the importance of a
new role for the board: the monitoring of financial controls and disclosure.
Stock market prices were not spontaneous creations; they could be manipulated
and inflated by self-interested managerial action, and the new approach that
incorporated stock prices into both compensation and termination created
powerful incentives for such behavior. This would place new and greater
demands on the monitoring capacity of boards and would lead in turn to more
rigorous standards of director independence.

298. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 307, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2007) (as implemented
by 17 C.F.R. pt. 205 (adopted by Implemenation of Standards of Professional Conduct for
Attorney, Securities Exchange Act Rel. No. 47,276, 79 SEC Docket 1351 (Jan. 29, 2003))).
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III. THE INCREASING INFORMATIVENESS OF STOCK PRICES, 1950-2005
A. Introduction
This Part argues that the rise of independent directors is partly explained by
the increasing informativeness of stock prices over the 1950-2005 period. As
more information about the firm is impounded in the stock price, insiders lose a
privileged claim of insight about the firm’s performance and prospects. More
importantly, the nature of performance monitoring changes. As stock prices
become more informative, the directors’ monitoring role increasingly consists
of using stock price metrics to measure the firm’s performance over time and
against relevant intra-industry comparisons. This is not to deny the existence of
private information nor the value of the directors’ critical perspective on stock
market measures, particularly over short time frames. Nevertheless, in light of
the positional conflicts that undermine insiders’ capacity to monitor senior
management, the increasing informativeness of stock prices changes the
comparative advantage of independent directors. The independents’
information debilities decrease and their monitoring advantages become more
apparent.
An informal model may help to clarify the point. Assume that directors’
monitoring capabilities are a function of two variables, information about the
firm (which includes information about expected future results as well as
current results) and independence from the senior management team. Start with
a polar case, a private firm, in which there is no public disclosure and thus no
stock market prices that impound disclosure. The tradeoff between firmspecific information and independence may favor a predominantly inside
board, even for monitoring purposes. Independent directors (which excludes
significant shareholders or their agents or other affiliated directors) have
insufficient incentives to become informed and get no help from public
investors’ assessment of value. Uninformed independence has limited value;
hence we should expect to see more insiders on the board. Assume instead that
the firm is public. As the market becomes increasingly well informed about the
firm’s performance and prospects, the directors get increasing help in
understanding the firm from competitive stock price formation (and softer
forms of market feedback, such as analysts’ reports). The independents’
information deficit is ameliorated. All other things equal, from the monitoring
perspective, board composition will shift in favor of the independents. In other
words, holding other things constant, the percentage of insiders (independents)
should be decreasing (increasing) in the degree of stock price informativeness.
There is a second explanatory element that followed from the increasing
informativeness of stock prices over the period. Managers increasingly turned
to stock market signals for strategic guidance, rather than relying solely on
internally-generated information. This too undermined the case for insiders on
the board. The 1950s firm embodied a strong belief in the power of
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bureaucratic rationality to accurately sense and determine the appropriate
strategy, indeed, of bureaucratic rationality’s power to shape the market
environment in which the firm operated. The success of this managerial form
was celebrated by Alfred Chandler’s Strategy and Structure, which emphasized
the importance of management’s information gathering, forecasting, planning,
and resource allocation.299 Indeed, as firms undertook more complex tasks of
planning and organization, many companies apparently replaced outside
directors with insiders, precisely because of their deep knowledge.300
Moreover, information was power. As Chandler observed: since senior
managers “provided the board and the stockholders and, of course, any
government or regulatory agency with whatever detailed data about the
company these groups might want, their actions were controlled only
negatively by their legal superiors.”301
But it was actually the 1960s conglomerate firm that reflected the high
water mark of the managerial belief in internally generated information as the
ultimate strategic tool. Managers took the multidivisional or “M-form”
structure that had evolved in the early 20th century to manage the large firm
that focused on a unitary, if complex, business302 and extended it to the
management of diverse business units that had no necessary relation to one
another. The conglomerate was premised on the belief that the headquarters
team could outperform external capital markets in monitoring the managers of
diverse business units and in making appropriate resource allocations among
them.303 The failure of several conglomerates in the 1970s, the evidence of the
general inefficiency of the conglomerate form,304 and the successful leveraged
bust-up of many conglomerates in the 1980s led to an emphasis on “focus” in
drawing the boundaries of the firm.305 One important implication of this shift
299. ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., STRATEGY AND STRUCTURE: CHAPTERS IN THE
HISTORY OF THE INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE 99, 149, 152, 282, 291-92, 396 (1962) [hereinafter
CHANDLER, STRATEGY AND STRUCTURE]. Chandler sounds similar themes about the rise of
“managerial capitalism” (the “visible hand”): although the market “remained the generator
of demands for good and services . . . modern business enterprise took over the functions of
coordinating flows of goods through existing processes of production and distribution, and
of allocating funds and personnel for future production and distribution.” ALFRED D.
CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS
1 (1977).
300. See PETER F. DRUCKER, THE NEW SOCIETY: THE ANATOMY OF INDUSTRIAL ORDER
223 (rev. ed. 1993).
301. CHANDLER, STRATEGY AND STRUCTURE, supra note 299, at 314.
302. The M-form structure replaced “the centralized, functionally departmentalized or
unitary (U-form) structure” that proved a much less efficient way to manage large enterprise.
Oliver E. Williamson, The Modern Corporation: Origins, Evolution, Attributes, 19 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 1537, 1555 (1981). Identifying and describing this shift was Chandler’s signal
achievement in STRATEGY AND STRUCTURE, supra note 299.
303. Williamson, supra note 302, at 1557-60.
304. See GILSON & BLACK, supra note 248, at 336-46 (summarizing evidence).
305. See, e.g., Philip G. Berger & Eli Ofek, Bustup Takeovers of Value-Destroying
Diversified Firms, 51 J. FIN. 1175 (1996); Sanjai Bhagat et al., Hostile Takeovers in the
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was heightened appreciation of stock market prices as a guide to capital and
other resource allocation as against internally generated information in the
complex firm. The insiders’ firm-bound information did not necessarily give
them superior insight into how best to monitor managers or allocate capital. An
independent director looking to increasingly informative stock prices might
have insight unbiased by the internal perspective.306
There are many reasons to believe that stock prices have became more
informative over the 1950-2005 period. First, important empirical work by
financial economists shows that individual stock price movements over the
period became increasingly decoupled from overall market movements,
meaning that firm-specific factors became increasingly influential. This greater
firm-specific return variation is best explained, in the United States, in terms of
increasingly informative stock prices. Second, firms in fact have been
disclosing increasingly more information, as measured by a simple survey of
public filings over the period. Third, the SEC’s disclosure regime has promoted
more disclosure, and more useful disclosure, through: (i) mandatory disclosure
of information that firms were unlikely to disclose voluntarily, (ii) permissive
disclosure of information (like projections) that the SEC had previously
prohibited, and (iii) prescriptive standardization that has made comparisons
easier. Fourth, the pronouncements of the Financial Accounting Standards
Board (and its predecessors) have led to the disclosure of more value relevant
information and also aided uniformity. Fifth, a grab bag of other factors also
have made stock prices more informative, including an increase in the number
of analysts and other investment professionals, the rise of mutual funds and
other institutional investors with sufficient scale to undertake securities
research, and information technology and information dissemination
mechanisms that lower the cost of securities research.
B. Market-Level Empirical Evidence on Stock Price Informativeness:
Synchronicity and R2
Important recent work by financial economists provides evidence that U.S.
stock prices have become more informative over a long time frame, particularly
since 1950. Using a 1926-1995 time series, Morck et al. show that the
movement of U.S. stock prices has become less “synchronous” over time,
meaning that a decreasing fraction of stocks move up or down together.307 (See

1980s: The Return to Corporate Specialization, 1990 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON.
ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS 1.
306. Thus, the increasing informativeness of stock prices helps address the
“monitoring vs. managing” tradeoffs that some thought were inherent in the independent
board. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Taking Boards Seriously, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 265 (1997).
307. See Randall Morck et al., The Information Content of Stock Markets: Why Do
Emerging Markets Have Synchronous Stock Price Movements?, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 215 (2000).
The article’s principal thrust is a cross-country study of cross-sectional variation in
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Figure 3. Declining Synchronicity of U.S. Stock Prices
Random 400

All Stocks

90%

80%

70%

60%

50%
1926

1934

1942

1950

1958

1966

1974

1982

1990

Source: Morck et al., supra note 307, at 221 fig.2, described as “[t]he fraction of stocks
moving together each month from 1926 to 1995 using all available U.S. stocks and
using a portfolio of 400 stocks randomly chosen each month. Returns include
dividend income and are from Center for Research in Securities Prices.”

Figure 3.) This pattern gains importance in light of cross-country evidence that
shows that synchronicity is inversely related to capital market development.
Emerging market economies exhibit a high degree of synchronous stock price
movement; developed market economies exhibit a low degree. Moreover,
although U.S. stock price volatility has remained roughly constant over the
period, an increasing percentage of the returns on individual stocks is
attributable to firm-specific factors, rather than market factors. This effect is
captured by a variable called R2, which measures the extent to which the
market model accounts for the variation in stock returns. As with synchronicity,
R2 has declined over the 1926-1995 period, particularly since 1950.308 (See
Figure 4 below.)
Morck et al. attribute the declines in synchronicity and R2 to an increasing
payoff to arbitrageurs from a focus on firm-specific factors rather than marketwide factors, including speculation and fads. Looked at from the cross-country
perspective, the value of a firm-specific focus is principally a function of the
levels of property right protection and investor protection. For the United

synchronous stock price movements, which shows much greater synchronicity in emerging
markets than in developed markets. The article also explores U.S. time-series data, noting
the sharp changes over time. See also Merritt B. Fox et al., Law, Share Price Accuracy, and
Economic Performance: The New Evidence, 102 MICH. L. REV. 331 (2003).
308. For confirmation of the decline of R2 in the United States in the post-1960 period,
see Cambell et al., Have Individual Stocks Become More Volatile? An Empirical Exploration
of Idiosyncratic Risk, 56 J. FIN. 1, 23-25 (2001).
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States, where these institutions have been relatively stable, particularly in the
post-1950 period, the increasing information content of prices seems likely to
account for the decline in synchronicity and R2. Durnev et al. support this
argument with evidence that firms with lower R2 exhibit a higher correlation
between current stock returns and future earnings.309 This suggests that R2
reflects the extent to which information about future returns is impounded into
the stock price. Thus, the post-1950 decline in average R2 for U.S. stocks can
be taken as a measure of the increasing informativeness of stock prices during
the period.310
C. Firm-Level Empirical Evidence of More Disclosure by Firms
The stock market evidence that increasingly more firm-specific
information has been impounded into stock prices is supported by additional
evidence that examines the disclosure practices of firms. We conducted a
simple survey to assess the amount of public firm disclosure over the 19502004 period.311 The general strategy was to look at the key annual disclosure
document required by the SEC, the Form 10-K, for a sample of large public
firms over the period. The Form 10-K includes a narrative description of the
firm, its businesses, and its competitive situation, as well as detailed financial
information. A major driver, if not the principal driver, of the growth in Form
10-K disclosure has been changing SEC requirements and new accounting
pronouncements.312 Important information that firms “voluntarily” disclosed
would ordinarily be subject to subsequent inclusion in the Form 10-K, so the
Form 10-K should be a good general disclosure indicator.
We measured the Form 10-K in different categories: the number of total
pages, the number of pages of financial information, the number of notes to the
309. Artyom Durnev et al., Does Greater Firm-Specific Return Variation Mean More
or Less Informed Stock Pricing?, 41. J. ACCT. RES. 797 (2003) (covering 1983-1995 period);
see also Qi Chen et al., Price Informativeness and Investment Sensitivity to Stock Price, REV.
FIN. STUD. 619 (2007) (showing that the R2 measure of private information impounded in
stock prices predicts sensitivity of corporate investment to stock price); Art Durnev et al.,
Value-Enhancing Capital Budgeting and Firm-Specific Stock Return Variation, 59 J. FIN. 65
(2004) (marginal changes in Tobin’s q performance measure are positively correlated with
increased informativeness as measured by R2). But see Kewei Hou et al., R2 and Price
Inefficiency (Fisher Coll. of Bus., Working Paper No. 2006-03-007, 2006), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=954559 (finding a negative relationship between R2 and
overreaction-driven price momentum, suggesting a connection between R2 and inefficiency,
and citing to other working papers skeptical of a positive relationship to efficiency).
310. Other empirical work also supports the disclosure/informativeness link by
showing that stock returns of firms with higher Association for Investment Management
Research-Financial Analysts Federation corporate disclosure ratings are better predictors of
future earnings changes. See, e.g., David S. Gelb & Paul Zarowin, Corporate Disclosure
Policy and the Informativeness of Stock Prices, 7 REV. ACCT. STUD. 33 (2002).
311. Benjamin Whetsell bore the laboring oar in this project.
312. See infra text accompanying notes 315-78.
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Figure 4. Declining Fraction of U.S. Stock Return Variation
Explained by the Market
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Source: Morck et al., supra note 307, at 222 fig.3, described as “[t]he declining fraction of
U.S. stock return variation explained by the value-weighed market index estimated
by running a simple market model regression of using monthly returns including
dividend income for sequential disjoint four year periods from 1926 to 1995, using
all available U.S. stocks and a portfolio of 400 stocks randomly chosen each
period. Returns and indexes include dividend income and are from the Center for
Research in Securities Prices.”

financial statements, and the number of pages of notes. Our sample was drawn
from the seventy-seven firms that have appeared in the Fortune 500 since its
inception in 1955, and the page counts were based on Form 10-Ks on digitized
microcards from Thompson ONE Banker, microfiche, and film microcards.
Where only annual reports were available (typically the case before 1969, when
regulatory change more clearly distinguished the Form 10-K from the annual
report), we subtracted pages that, on the basis of section headings and content,
were not Form 10-K material (picture spreads, etc.). Occasionally the Form 10K included detailed information about employee retirement plans, specifically,
informational pamphlets for employees, that would be of dubious value to an
investor. We omitted these from the page count. More generally, Form 10-Ks
identify key contracts (such as loan agreements) that are occasionally attached
but more often are “made available” elsewhere. Such exhibits were not
included in the tally. Nor did we count the pages of material about the issuer’s
officers and directors, board structure, and executive compensation that is
typically incorporated by reference into a Form 10-K from the issuer’s Form
14A, the proxy statement. Mandatory proxy statement disclosure has certainly
increased during the period, so non-inclusion of this material will understate the
level of additional disclosure.
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Figure 5. Increased Disclosure, 1950-2005
(Form 10-K and Components)
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Source: Average page counts (means) of Form 10-Ks and components compiled every
five years from a sample (n=20) of Fortune 500 firms that continuously made
public disclosure over the period (universe=77). Data appear in Appendix
Table 2. Right y-axis measures increased page numbers of financial statements
and footnotes to financials; left y-axis measures increased page numbers of
entire Form 10-K.

As Appendix Table 2 and Figure 5 illustrate, the number of pages in all
categories substantially increased over the period. The average number of
pages in a Form 10-K was approximately sixteen in 1950, twenty in 1965, but
then grew rapidly thereafter, from forty in 1970 to 125 in 2000, and, in the
post-Sarbanes-Oxley world, 165 in 2004. The financials (including notes) grew
from four pages in 1950 and 1960 to ten pages in 1970, twenty-three in 2000,
and thirty-eight in 2004. The number of notes to the financial statements grew
in parallel, from five notes in 1950 to nineteen notes in 2000 and 2004. Most of
the increase in the length of the financials was from the addition of notes.
This reflects an enormous increase in firm-specific disclosure over the
period. The 1970s marked a period of especially rapid growth in these
disclosure categories. As described above, this is the decade of corporate
governance upheaval, and, in terms of board composition, the point at which
the number of insiders began to decline and independents to increase.
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D. Additional Disclosure Because of SEC Regulation
Changes in SEC disclosure regulation have led to considerably more
disclosure, and more useful disclosure, over the 1950-2005 period and have
thus enhanced the informativeness of stock prices. SEC regulatory action has
affected disclosure in three ways. First, some actions have been disclosure
forcing, leading to more information disclosure than would have voluntarily
occurred. Second, some actions have been disclosure permitting, eliminating
barriers to disclosures that firms would make voluntarily. Third, some actions
have been disclosure standardizing, making firm-specific disclosure more
readily comparable across firms.
The claim that SEC action enhanced the level of disclosure over the period
depends only in part on the case for mandatory disclosure, since some of the
most important interventions over the period were first, the elimination of
barriers to forward-looking disclosure that firms wanted to make and investors
wanted to have and, second, the establishment of disclosure conventions that
made disclosure more useful. Without engaging the mandatory disclosure
debate in full force,313 it seems straightforward that an effective regulator could
mandate disclosure of information that firms would not voluntarily disclose and
that would otherwise not be available to the market. First, because disclosure
affects shareholder monitoring, managers would exercise discretion to produce
suboptimal disclosure from the shareholder point of view. Suboptimal
disclosure is one element of managerial agency costs, and good mandatory
disclosure policy can help overcome it. Second, because disclosure often
reveals competitively sensitive information, optimal disclosure from a firmspecific perspective is suboptimal from a social perspective. Shareholders of
any particular firm face a classic prisoner’s dilemma: full disclosure by other
firms enables better managerial monitoring because of comparative
performance benchmarks, yet each firm’s locally rational course is not to
disclose. Mandatory disclosure overcomes this collective action problem and
produces particular gains when shareholders are diversified. Third, the
alternative way of delivering information to the market, insider trading, is a
noisy, awkward vehicle for disclosure, and in any event has probably declined
in importance since the SEC began its enforcement efforts in the 1960s.314

313. This is ably canvassed in Fox et al., supra note 307, at 335-44. See also Allen
Ferrell, The Case for Mandatory Disclosure in Securities Regulation Around the World
(John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., and Bus., Harvard Law Sch., Paper No. 492, 2004),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=631221.
314. See, e.g., SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), aff’g in
part and rev’g in part 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), cert. denied 394 U.S. 976 (1969);
Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
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1. Disclosure forcing
Section 13(a) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act requires public
companies listed on an exchange to file annual and quarterly reports as
prescribed by the SEC. The practice of sending annual reports to security
holders apparently derived from early state corporate and tax law requirements
for the annual filing of financial statements and for the issuer’s distribution of
such reports, sometimes only upon request, to all security holders or a certain
proportion of security holders.315 The New York Stock Exchange
independently required the distribution of annual and quarterly reports for listed
companies in 1933.316 In 1942, the SEC required that an annual report
“containing such fi[n]ancial statements for the last fiscal year as will, in the
opinion of the management, adequately reflect the position and operations of
the issuer” be sent to security holders in connection with a management proxy
solicitation for the annual election of directors.317 Professor Loss’s 1961
edition of Securities Regulation suggests, through an absence of discussion,
that the SEC during the 1950s did not attempt to deepen disclosure.318 To the
contrary, the SEC backed down in 1953 on a proposal to require quarterly
reports, and, in its subsequent adoption of a semiannual reporting requirement,
permitted, in effect, informal financial statements.319 The SEC appeared to be
deferring to managers, who, among other reasons, objected to possible
competitive disadvantage from disclosure, despite the protestations of securities
analysts, “who reported through their national organization that their efforts to
obtain voluntary agreement from companies to provide quarterly sales reports
had been discouraging.”320 Managerial deference seemed to be a theme of the
Eisenhower-era SEC, reflected in a narrowing of shareholder access to the
management proxy, as well as budgetary cutbacks for the agency.321

315. See 2 LOUIS LOSS, SECURITIES REGULATION 825 (2d ed. 1961). But cf. David F.
Hawkins, The Development of Modern Financial Reporting Practices Among American
Manufacturing Corporations, 37 BUS. HIST. REV. 135, 142-43 (1963) (showing only some
states required distribution).
316. 2 LOSS, surpra note 315, at 804-08.
317. Exchange Act Release No. 3347, 1942 WL 34864 (Dec. 18, 1942).
318. See 2 LOSS, supra note 315, at 809-57.
319. Id. at 815-16.
320. Id. at 815; see also Hawkins, supra note 315, at 140-42, 160-61 (describing the
persistence of competitive concerns about disclosure). The major effort of the reformers was
aimed at broadening the coverage of Securities Exchange Act disclosure to include public
companies that were not listed on an exchange. See, e.g., JOEL SELIGMAN, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 310-14 (1982); Philip A. Loomis, Jr., The Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and the Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 214,
220, 226-28 (1959). These efforts culminated in the Securities Acts Amendments of 1964,
Pub. L. No. 88-467, 78 Stat. 565.
321. See SELIGMAN, supra note 320, at 265-73.
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a. Disclosure integration.
In the ensuing decades, however, beginning around 1970, there were many
new disclosure requirements.322 It is sufficient for illustrative purposes here to
sketch some of the most important, including the development of segment
reporting beginning in 1969 and the development of “management discussion
and analysis” (MD&A) beginning in 1972. But a pervasive source of disclosure
deepening over the period was the effort to “integrate” the disclosure
requirements of the 1933 and 1934 securities acts. As famously argued by
Milton H. Cohen in 1966, the happenstance enactment sequence of the 1933
Act (addressing public offerings) followed by the 1934 Act (addressing
secondary market activity) distorted the disclosure system.323 In light of the
small number of public offerings and the massively greater volume of share
turnover in secondary market trading, “integration” of the two schemes should
proceed by building on the continuous disclosure pattern of the 1934 Act, he
argued. Thus, a seasoned issuer should market securities through a 1933 Act
registration process that relied substantially on information already disclosed to
the market through the 1934 Act filings. “Yet, as a broad generalization, the
disclosure process under the 1934 Act (apart from proxy solicitations) appears
never to have been taken quite as seriously as under the 1933 Act, very likely
because of differences in the attendant liabilities and sanctions and in
Commission procedures.”324
The SEC came to embrace the project of disclosure integration
wholeheartedly.325 It saw that robust continuous disclosure was an essential
component, and thus at every turn it sought to ratchet up the 1934 Act periodic
filings to the same depth and currency as would be expected of a 1933 Act
registration statement. Notably, in 1977 the SEC adopted Regulation S-K,
which prescribes the substance and form of non-financial disclosure for both

322. See generally 2 LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 599-751
(3d ed. rev. 1999).
323. Milton H. Cohen, “Truth in Securities” Revisited, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1340, 134142 (1966). For a dissenting view, which argues that Congress would not have contemplated
1933 Act disclosure requirements incorporated into 1934 Act filings, see Paul G. Mahoney,
Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1047, 1081-88
(1995) (arguing that 1934 Act disclosure was aimed at controlling self-dealing and other
duty of loyalty problems, not enhancing stock price accuracy).
324. Cohen, supra note 323, at 1361.
325. The key moments were the so-called “Wheat Report” in 1969, SEC. & EXCH.
COMM’N, DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS: A REAPPRAISAL OF FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES
UNDER THE ’33 AND ’34 ACTS (1969), which was named after the director of the small group
which prepared the report, Commissioner Francis M. Wheat, and the “Sommer Report” in
1977, H. COMM. ON INTERSTATE & FOREIGN COMMERCE, 95TH CONG., 1ST SESS., REPORT OF
THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE TO THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION (Comm. Print 1977) [hereinafter Sommer Report], which was named after the
committee’s chairman, former Commissioner A.A. Sommer, Jr. See 2 LOSS & SELIGMAN,
supra note 322, at 599-624.
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1933 Act and 1934 Act filings.326 Similarly, through Regulation S-X and
various accounting pronouncements, the SEC has developed a common
standard for the substance and form of financial disclosure for filings under
both acts whose consequence is much deeper disclosure for 1934 Act filings
than previously.327
b. Segment reporting
In 1969, the SEC began to require firms to disclose “industry segment”
data, meaning disclosure that broke out revenues and income for separate lines
of business.328 The impetus for this change was the conglomerate merger
movement of the 1960s, in which firms expanded through unrelated
diversification. Under the prevailing consolidation rules, the operating and
financial results of substantial enterprises could disappear into undifferentiated
totals. This created problems for antitrust enforcement as well as shareholder
monitoring. Although some firms voluntarily disclosed line-of-business results,
the overwhelming majority did not.329 The SEC’s initial approach was to
require segment disclosure for a “product-line” that accounted for at least ten
percent of the firm’s total revenues or pre-tax income, but giving management
considerable discretion to define product lines and address issues like common
costs and intra-company transfers. Although this initial formulation of segment
reporting was sharply criticized for the discretion given managers (by the FTC,
for example), contemporary empirical studies found that the additional
disclosure still enabled investors to better anticipate future earnings and
improved the accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts.330
By 1977, the SEC’s Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure weighed
in on the question, reporting, among other things, “the almost universal

326. Industry Segment Reporting, Securities Act Release No. 5893, Exchange Act
Release No. 14,306, Investment Company Act Release No. 10,070, 42 Fed. Reg. 65,554
(Dec. 30, 1977); see 2 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 322, at 627-724.
327. See 2 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 322, at 724-32.
328. This is account is based principally on SELIGMAN, supra note 320, at 433-38, and
2 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 322, at 654-64.
329. See Daniel W. Collins, SEC Product-Line Reporting and Market Efficiency, 2 J.
FIN. ECON. 125, 126 & nn.2-3 (1975). Of 600 firms surveyed, twenty-one had some segment
reporting in 1967, ninety-three in 1968, and 194 in 1969 (the last year in the shadow of
impending regulatory change). The survey did not test the voluntary disclosure against the
ultimate regulatory standard.
330. See id.; Daniel W. Collins, SEC Line-of-Business Reporting and Earnings
Forecasts, 4 J. BUS. RES. 117 (1976). Compare Bertrand Horwitz & Richard Kolodny, Line
of Business Reporting: A Rejoinder, 9 BELL J. ECON. 659 (1978) (viewing the effect
negatively), with Richard R. Simonds & Daniel W. Collins, Line of Business Reporting and
Security Prices: An Analysis of an SEC Disclosure Rule, 9 BELL J. ECON. 646 (1978)
(rebutting Horwitz and Kolodny’s argument). Among other things, Collins’s 1975 study
showed that differences in stock price movements between firms that did and did not
voluntarily disclose segment data disappeared after 1970. See Collins, supra note 329.
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dissatisfaction analysts express with the level of segmentation currently
provided by the registrants in SEC disclosure documents.”331 Acting quickly,
the SEC simply embraced the recently (1976) promulgated accounting standard
that imposed a more exacting test based on “whether products and services are
related (and, therefore, should be grouped into a single industry segment) or
unrelated (and, therefore, should be separated into two or more industry
segments) . . . .”332 Although the standard admitted of certain management
discretion, it added to investors’ capacity to see the different elements of the
business.
Twenty years later, in 1997, the Financial Accounting Standards Board
revisited the question with a new accounting standard that framed segment
disclosure in terms of the enterprise’s internal organization. Among other
features, a “segment” is a component of the enterprise “[w]hose operating
results are regularly reviewed by the enterprise’s chief operating decisionmaker
to make decisions about resources to be allocated to the segment and assess its
performance”; in effect, a profit center approach.333 The goal was to move
away from the subjectivity of the industry approach, which had been gamed by
some large firms that reported all their activities as occurring in one large
industry. In contrast, the internal organization approach was designed to permit
financial statement users “to see an enterprise ‘through the eyes of
management[,]’ [which] enhances a user’s ability to predict actions or reactions
of management that can significantly affect the enterprise’s prospects for future
cash flows.”334 The structure of Regulation S-K, which requires reporting in
terms of “generally accepted accounting principles,” automatically picked up
this further elaboration of the segment reporting requirement.335 The
reformulated segment accounting standard, as incorporated into mandatory
disclosure, provided new information to the market and thus made stock prices
more informative.336
331. 2 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 322, at 659 (quoting Sommer Report, supra note
325).
332. See FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING
STANDARDS NO. 14, FINANCIAL REPORTING FOR SEGMENTS OF A BUSINESS ENTERPRISE ¶ 100
(1976). The standard used a 10% threshold for revenues, profits (losses), and assets.
333. FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING
STANDARDS NO. 131, DISCLOSURE ABOUT SEGMENTS OF AN ENTERPRISE AND RELATED
INFORMATION ¶ 10(b) (1997).
334. Id. ¶ 60.
335. Reg. S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(b) (2007) (Financial Information About
Segments). It is also noteworthy that Item 101 also requires financial information about
geographic areas, another way to disaggregate overall results into national segments. Id. §
229.101(d).
336. See Bruce K. Behn et al., The Predictive Ability of Geographic Segment
Disclosures by U.S. Companies: SFAS No. 131 vs. SFAS No. 14, 1 J. INT’L ACCT. RES. 31
(2002) (using a sample of 172 of the largest 1000 firms and finding that the new standard led
to more informative geographic sales data that increased reliability of forecasting models);
Don Herrmann & Wayne B. Thomas, An Analysis of Segment Disclosures Under SFAS No.
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What bears underscoring about segment reporting, then, is that it makes
available to the market information about the separate businesses within the
firm that the firm itself has collected for internal management purposes. Seeing
the information from management’s perspective, investors can better measure
the firm’s past performance and can better predict the future. This makes stock
prices more informative. Moreover, the various regulatory changes in segment
reporting over the period made “external” segments (i.e., what is disclosed)
more closely reflect the firm’s “internal” segments. This increase in
“congruency” made the resulting disclosure increasingly reliable throughout the
period and thus enhanced informativeness. 337
c. Management’s discussion and analysis
In 1974, the SEC began to require a so-called “Management’s Discussion
and Analysis” (MD&A) to be added to disclosure documents to provide a
narrative account of the financial results and, in particular, to provide a
managerial perspective on material changes. Intially these changes were to be
measured in quantitative terms.338 In 1980, the SEC considerably broadened
the MD&A requirement in response to criticisms of the quantitative test. The
new full title is quite descriptive: “Management’s Discussion and Analysis of
Financial Condition and Results of Operations.”339 As the SEC later explained,
“MD&A is intended to give the investor an opportunity to look at the company
through the eyes of management by providing both a short and long-term
analysis of the business of the company.”340
A major goal of the 1980 reformulation of MD&A was to advise investors
how things might change, not just a retrospective account of why they did.
Management was called upon to “identify known trends or uncertainties” that

131 and SFAS No. 14, 14 ACCT. HORIZONS 287, 287 (2000) (finding that in a sample of 100
of the 250 largest U.S. firms under the new accounting standard, more firms reported
segments and reported them in more detail; authors concluded that the change in reporting
requirements had a “relatively significant impact on the disclosure of segment information”);
Donna L. Street et al., Segment Disclosures Under SFAS No. 131: Has Business Segment
Reporting Improved?, 14 ACCT. HORIZONS 259 (2000) (finding that in a sample of 160 of the
1000 largest firms, fewer firms claimed to operate in one line-of-business, more segments
were reported, and more detail was included in segment reports).
337. Laureen A. Maines et al., Implications of Proposed Segment Reporting Standards
for Financial Analysts’ Investment Judgments, 35 J. ACCT. RES. 1 (Supp. 1997).
338. The quantitative threshold was non-trivial: a 10% change in revenues or expenses
from the prior period coupled with a 2% change in net income. See Securities Act Release
No. 5520, Exchange Act Release No. 10,961, 39 Fed. Reg. 31,894 (Sept. 3, 1974). This
discussion follows 2 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 322, at 688-98, and Fox et al., supra note
307, at 369-70.
339. See Reg. S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (2007).
340. Concept Release on Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial
Condition and Operations, Securities Act Release No 6711, Exchange Act Release No.
24,356, 38 SEC Docket 145 (Apr. 17, 1987).
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could have material positive or negative results for any of earnings, liquidity or
capital resources. In particular, MD&A was to “focus specifically on material
events and uncertainties known to management that would cause reported
financial information not to be necessarily indicative of future operating results
or of future financial condition.”341 Although historically the SEC had been
quite skeptical of forward-looking information,342 MD&A disclosure required
firms to project “known trends or uncertainties” onto the company’s future
prospects.343
Although the MD&A formulation remained substantially unchanged in the
1980-2000 period, the SEC prodded firms at various times to provide richer
accounts of prospective developments that could affect future performance.344
The Enron shock revealed the way that off-balance sheet and other contingent
liabilities could affect future prospects (to put it mildly), and, in 2003 the SEC
added substantial new requirements in this area to MD&A.345
The SEC’s efforts to promote deeper discussion of the firm’s financial
statements are reflected in the growth of MD&A disclosure over the period. As
Appendix Table 3 indicates, the average length of MD&A disclosure in Form
10-Ks among the sampled firms grew significantly, from two pages (1974, the
original requirement) to four pages (1980, expanded version) to six pages
(1990) to eleven pages (2000). The effect of the new post-Enron disclosure
requirements and the generally heightened demand for a heads-up on risk
factors was dramatic: average MD&A more than doubled to twenty-four pages
(2004).
One important question is whether mandatory MD&A did in fact make
stock prices more informative. Conceivably (if improbably) the information
had been otherwise communicated to the market through indirect means. Fox et
al. test the proposition with an application of the R2 methodology referred to
above. In a before-after test of the effects of MD&A, they find that the new
regime leads to earlier disclosure of information with earnings implications,
meaning that the R2 for a group of firms expected to be slow disclosers is lower
341. Reg. S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a), Instruction 3 (2007).
342. See infra Part IV.D.2.
343. Reg. S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(3)(ii) (2007).
344. See, e.g., Concept Release on Management’s Discussion and Analysis of
Financial Condition and Operations, Securities Act Release No. 6711, Exchange Act Release
No. 24,356, 38 SEC Docket 145 (Apr. 17, 1987); Management’s Discussion and Analysis of
Financial Condition and Results of Certain Operations, Securities Act Release No. 6835,
Exchange Act Release No. 26,831, Investment Company Act Release No. 16,961, 43 SEC
Docket 1330 (May 18, 1989).
345. See Disclosure in Management’s Discussion and Analysis About Off-Balance
Sheet Arrangements and Aggregate Contractual Obligations, Securities Act Release No.
8182, Exchange Act Release No. 47,264, 79 SEC Docket 1251 (Jan. 28, 2003) (adding
Regulation S-K Item 303(a)(4) (“Off-balance sheet arrangements”) and Item 303(a)(5)
(“Tabular disclosure of contractual obligations,” which focuses on long-term financing
contracts). These new MD&A requirements respond to the mandate in Section 401(a) of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act for enhanced disclosure in this area. Id.
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after the new regulation.346 This implies that post-MD&A, stock price changes
derive less from market-wide movement and more from firm-specific factors.
Such evidence supports the view that disclosure-forcing regulatory action can
and did make stock prices more informative.347
2. Disclosure permitting
One of the most significant SEC actions with respect to stock price
informativeness over the period was to permit the disclosure of “soft” or
“forward-looking” information that many firms wanted to disclose (often
because of investor and analyst pressure) but were constrained from doing
so.348 From the 1930s through 1973, the SEC prohibited the disclosure of
earnings projections or other forward-looking information, at one point
declaring that projections were per se misleading.349 Multiple factors played a
role in the SEC’s position, including: an investor protection mindset framed in
terms of the least sophisticated investor; an intellectual conservatism that
mimicked the accountant’s traditional reliance on historical information, in
which the verifiability of figures trumped the possible utility of projections; and
a cross-cutting belief that investors, given the “facts,” were as competent as
managers to make projections.350 An influential 1970 article by Professor
Homer Kripke, a one-time SEC staffer, rebutted these various concerns:
managements, which were already generating such projections in internal
decisionmaking, had immense advantages over investors in such forecasting.
The efficient market would protect unsophisticated investors against noncredible projections because of the role of analysts and sophisticated investors

346. See Fox et al., supra note 307, at 370-78 (using the period before implementation
of the 1980 changes as the baseline).
347. Another important recent empirical test of mandatory disclosure’s role in stock
price informativeness is provided by Allen Ferrell, Mandated Disclosure and Stock Returns:
Evidence from the Over-the-Counter Market (John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., and Bus.,
Harvard Law Sch., Discussion Paper No. 453, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=500123. See also Michael Greenstone et al., Mandated Disclosure, Stock Returns,
and the 1964 Securities Acts Amendments, 121 Q.J. ECON. 399 (2006).
348. In general, this account is based on JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & JOEL SELIGMAN,
SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 231-33 (9th ed. 2003); 2 LOSS &
SELIGMAN, supra note 322, at 629-48; Mahoney, supra note 323, at 1105-07. See also Garry
F. Goldring, Note, Mandatory Disclosure of Corporate Projections and the Goals of
Securities Regulation, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1525 (1981); Kimberly Till, Note, The SEC Safe
Harbor for Forecasts—A Step in the Right Direction?, 1980 DUKE L.J. 607.
349. See Securities Act Release No. 5699, Exchange Act Release No. 12,371, 9 SEC
Docket 472 (Apr. 23, 1976) (withdrawing earlier statement relating to projections of future
economic performance).
350. For a sense of the zeitgeist of the SEC staff, see Harry Heller, Disclosure
Requirements Under Federal Securities Regulation, 16 BUS. LAW. 300, 307 (1961).
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in price formation. In any event, knowingly false projections were subject to
SEC anti-fraud rules.351
In 1973, the SEC announced its intention to permit but not require
disclosure of projections that met various criteria for reliability and general
dissemination.352 Therein lay the rub, because firms and their advisers were
quite concerned about liability for projections that subsequently turned out
otherwise. For almost five years and several iterations of proposals, the SEC
struggled to produce a satisfactory “safe harbor rule,” eventually succeeding in
1979.353 Rule 175 provided that a “forward looking statement” is not a
“fraudulent statement . . . unless it is shown that such statement was made or
reaffirmed without a reasonable basis or was disclosed other than in good
faith.” “Forward looking statement” was defined broadly to include projections
of revenues and various financial items as well as earnings, and statements of
management’s “plans and objective for future operations.”354
Notwithstanding the safe harbor protections and generally favorable
judicial interpretations,355 firms and their advisors became leery in light of
attorney-driven shareholder plaintiff litigation in the 1990s and succeeded in
including in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLSRA”)
statutory protection for forward looking information.356 New section 27A of
the 1933 Securities Act and new section 21E of the 1934 Act provide a safe
harbor for a forward-looking statement that is identified as such and “is
accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements identifying important
factors that could cause actual results to differ materially from those in the
forward-looking statement.”357
There is some uncertainty about firms’ willingness to make forwardlooking statements outside the mandatory provisions of MD&A.358 For

351. Homer Kripke, The SEC, the Accountants, Some Myths and Some Realities, 45
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1151, 1197-99 (1970).
352. See Securities Act Release No. 5362, Exchange Act Release No. 9984, 1973 WL
149257 (Feb. 2, 1973) (describing prior history and intention to change in light of strong
consensus reflected in public hearings and comments).
353. See Securities Act Release No. 6084, Exchange Act Release No. 15,944, 1979
WL 181199 (June 25, 1979) (adopting rule 175, 17 C.F.R § 230.175).
354. The parallel 1934 Act rule was Rule 3b-6.
355. See COFFEE & SELIGMAN, supra note 348, at 232-33.
356. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 102, 109
Stat. 737, 749 (amending Securities Act of 1933 § 27A, 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2 (1994); Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 § 21E, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5 (1994)).
357. Securities Act of 1933 § 27A(c)(1)(A)(i), 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2(c)(1)(A)(i) (2007);
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21E(c)(1)(A)(i), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1)(A)(i) (2007).
The statutory safe harbor essentially brigades Rule 175 with the “bespeaks caution”
approach of courts in construing the safe harbor in suits alleging securities fraud.
358. Compare Marilyn F. Johnson et al., The Impact of Securities Litigation Reform on
the Disclosure of Forward-Looking Information by High Technology Firms, 39 J. ACCT.
RES. 297, 306-07 (2001) (before PSLRA, only 44% of sample of high tech firms made
voluntary forward-looking disclosure; 50% made such disclosure after PSLRA), with David
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example, some evidence suggests that as many as half of the firms in the hightech area, where the prediction of future trends is particularly important,
voluntarily provide forward-looking information.359 But many practitioners
believe that making projections entails unacceptable legal risk, given possible
new duties to update a projection once made.360 The PSLRA may have
encouraged more firms to disclose projections and other forward-looking
information.361 In any event, disclosure-permitting regulation has made firms
freer to provide forward-looking information across a broad domain of the
firm’s activity, which will make stock prices more informative.
3. Disclosure standardizing
Apart from the effect on the volume of disclosure from mandatory rules,
SEC regulation played an important role in standardizing how disclosure was
made. This too made stock prices more informative. Conceivably pressure from
investors and analysts would have led firms to make more extensive disclosure
over the period. Such voluntary disclosure would have itself made stock prices
more informative. But SEC standardization made disclosure more valuable by
reducing the information processing costs for analysts and investors of firmspecific information. Moreover, standardization made inter-firm comparisons
easier as well. The consequence was information that was more quickly and
completely impounded in stock prices.
E. Additional Disclosure Because of Accounting Pronouncements and Changes
Although the debates about the connection between mandatory disclosure
and stock price informativeness have focused on SEC action, another important
source of disclosure regulation has been the standard setting bodies of the
accounting profession, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (“FASB”)
and its predecessors.362 We have already seen the interaction of accounting
M. Levine & Adam C. Pritchard, The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998:
The Sun Sets on California’s Blue Sky Laws, 54 BUS. LAW. 1, 43 & n.219 (1998) (citing
trade association survey that found 17% of firms made voluntary forward-looking statements
pre-PSLRA).
359. See Johnson et al., supra note 358, at 306-07.
360. See, e.g., Harvey L. Pitt & Matt T. Morley, Through A Glass Starkly: A Practical
Guide for Management’s Forward-Looking Disclosures, INSIGHTS, June 1993, at 3; see also
Backman v. Polaroid Corp., 910 F.2d 10, 17 (1st Cir. 1990); In re Phillips Petroleum Sec.
Litig., 881 F.2d 1236, 1245 (3d Cir. 1989).
361. See Johnson et al., supra note 358, at 323 (finding evidence of “a significant postAct increase in both the frequency of firms issuing forecasts and the mean number of
forecasts issued . . . primarily attributable to managers issuing more long horizon forecasts of
good news and short horizon forecasts of bad news”). But see Levine & Pritchard, supra
note 358, at 46-48 (finding at best only a small change in frequency of voluntary forwardlooking statements).
362. For accounts of this succession and why FASB’s predecessors were deemed

1558

STANFORD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:1465

standards with SEC disclosure requirements in the case of segment reporting.
In the first instance, the SEC promoted segment reporting and the accounting
standard setters followed; subsequently, FASB tightened the standard and the
SEC followed. In many other cases, however, the accounting standard setters
were at the leading edge, in effect mandating additional disclosure with the
adoption of new accounting standards. The dissolution of the Accounting
Principles Board (APB) and its replacement by FASB in 1973 had two
important consequences: first, an increase in the output of accounting
standards; second, enhanced authoritativeness of the announced standard and
less tolerance for deviations. These developments led to more disclosure and
also greater standardization of existing and new disclosure requirements. In
both respects, new accounting standards during the period enhanced the
informativeness of stock prices.
This is not the place to canvass the myriad accounting standards changes
over a fifty year period, but there are several examples that demonstrate the
importance of new accounting standards as expanding the scope of mandatory
disclosure and enhancing stock price informativeness. Four seem particularly
noteworthy: first, APB No. 22, Disclosure of Accounting Policies, adopted in
1972; second, SFAS No. 52, Foreign Currency Translation, 1982; third, SFAS
No. 95, Statement of Cash Flows, 1987; and fourth, SFAS No. 106, Employers’
Accounting for Post-Retirement Benefits Other than Pensions, 1990.
1. APB No. 22, Disclosure of Accounting Policies (1972)
APB Opinion No. 22 mandates that “a description of all significant
accounting policies of the reporting entity should be included as an integral part
of the financial statements.”363 Frequently, accounting permits alternative
presentations for a particular transaction or account. The opinion requires the
firm to state which convention it is following, which avoids confusion in cases
where alternatives exist and enhances comparability of data across firms. At
least one contemporary study demonstrates the value of the opinion. In a
before-after survey of 120 firms, Rao showed that before the adoption of APB
No. 22, approximately 75% of firms disclosed common accounting policies,
such as the conventions they followed for depreciation and amortization. After
adoption, 97% did.364 The opinion seems to have made disclosure more
informative by reducing accounting confusion.
inadequate, see GILSON & BLACK, supra note 248, at 578-586; 2 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra
note 322, at 733-51. On the SEC decision to privatize the setting of accounting standards
despite its undoubted power to set them, see COFFEE & SELIGMAN, supra note 348, at 67 n.1.
Professor Lawrence A. Cunningham was particularly helpful in identifying important
accounting standards adopted over the period.
363. ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES BD., OPINION NO. 22, DISCLOSURE OF ACCOUNTING
PRINCIPLES ¶ 8 (1972).
364. Kailis J. Rao, An Evaluation and Empirical Study of the Disclosure of Accounting
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2. SFAS No. 52, Foreign Currency Translation (1982)
SFAS No. 52 addressed some of the failings of a predecessor accounting
standard, SFAS No. 8 (1975), which was a first attempt to address
systematically the accounting problems that arose in foreign operations.
Unfortunately, SFAS No. 8 did not take a functional approach, meaning that
“firms were compelled to report foreign currency gains and losses that bore
little correspondence to the economic effects that they were actually
experiencing.”365 SFAS No. 52 remedied this and provided better disclosure by
requiring firms to measure the results of foreign operations in the foreign
country’s “functional currency,” typically (but not always) the local currency.
The translation technique of SFAS No. 8 had, in effect, required the U.S. dollar
as the functional currency for all countries. Various contemporary studies
suggest that the change enriched the information environment.366
3. SFAS No. 95, Statement of Cash Flows (1987)
SFAS No. 95 responded to a change in valuation methodology associated
with the leveraged buyouts of the 1980s, namely, a focus on cash flow as
opposed to accounting earnings as a critical measure of enterprise value, on the
view that cash flow was less distorted by accounting conventions. Investors and
other users of financial statements wanted better and more standardized
measures of cash flow. SFAS No. 95, which required cash flow reporting,
replaced APB Opinion No. 19, Reporting Changes in Financial Position, 1971,
which had required instead a “change in financial position” under a formula
that could be confused with a cash flow measure.367
The informativeness of earnings and cash flow has been a major topic in
the accounting literature, which investigates the information content (“value
relevancy”) of a profitability indicator by measuring its association with
returns. Earnings are demonstrably a primary indicator; whether cash flow
Policies in Published Financial Statements, 30 J. FIN. 1160, 1160 (1975).
365. Lawrence Revsine, The Rationale Underlying the Functional Currency Choice,
59 ACCT. REV. 505, 505 (1984).
366. See, e.g., Billy S. Soo & Lisa Gilbert Soo, Accounting for the Multinational Firm:
Is the Translation Process Valued by the Stock Market?, 69 ACCT. REV. 617 (1994)
(examining market incorporated foreign translation gain and loss information reported in
stockholders’ equity under SFAS 52 when valuing equity securities); David A. Ziebart &
David H. Kim, An Examination of the Market Reactions Associated with SFAS No. 8 and
SFAS No. 52, 62 ACCT. REV. 343 (1987) (showing event studies found positive market
response upon adoption of SFAS No. 52, but negative response upon adoption of SFAS No.
8 and interim FASB decisions postponing final action).
367. APB Opinion No. 19 was an apparently unsuccessful attempt to improve on a
1963 predecessor, APB Opinion No. 3, The Statement of Source and Application of Funds.
See Earl A. Spiller & Robert L. Virgil, Effectiveness of APB Opinion No. 19 in Improving
Funds Reporting, 12 J. ACCT. RES. 112 (1974) (presenting a before-after study of 143 firms
and concluding that the new opinion did not substantially improve on APB Opinion No. 3).

1560

STANFORD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:1465

disclosure provided additional information was an open question.368 Before
SFAS No. 95, most studies reported mixed results. But after SFAS No. 95, the
results of cash flow studies sharply changed; there appears to be no doubt that
cash flow disclosure as required by SFAS No. 95 enhances stock price
informativeness.369 Cash flows are particularly informative when the firm
reports outlier earnings (meaning out of line with prior years and thus not likely
to persist),370 for firms that are cash-dependent because of high leverage or
shorter operating cycles,371 and for firms where earnings management372 or
fraud373 is a risk.
4. SFAS No. 106, Employers’ Accounting for Post-Retirement Benefits
Other than Pensions (1990)
Before SFAS No. 106, employers accounted for post-retirement benefits on
a cash basis. An actual payout produced an expense, meaning “pay as you go.”
SFAS No. 106 requires firms to account for post-retirement benefits on an
accrual basis, meaning expensed over the life of an employment contract, not
on a cash basis. For a young employee hired today, a firm must accrue—
meaning take as a charge to earnings—an actuarially determined amount
reflective of future post-retirement benefits, even though there is no current
cash payment. (SFAS No. 106 also mandates extensive disclosure about
pension plan funding and payment projections.) The accounting standard
requires companies to account for distant post-retirement obligations (like
retiree health care benefits) that in many cases were grossly under-funded,374

368. See generally Ashiq Ali, The Incremental Information Content of Earnings,
Working Capital from Operations, and Cash Flows, 32 J. ACCT. RES. 61 (1994).
369. See, e.g., C.S. Agnes Cheng et al., Earnings Permanence and the Incremental
Information Content of Cash Flows from Operations, 34 J. ACCT. RES. 173 (1996).
370. C.S. Agnes Cheng & Simon S.M. Yang, The Incremental Information Content of
Earnings and Cash Flows from Operations Affected by Their Extremity, 30 J. BUS FIN. &
ACCT. 73 (2003) (finding that cash flow disclosure has mixed impact on firm valuation, with
greatest impact when earnings are high and cash flows are moderate).
371. Mark DeFond & Mingyi Hung, An Empirical Analysis of Analysts’ Cash Flow
Forecasts (Univ. S. Cal. Leventhal Sch. of Accounting Working Paper, 2001), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=265773.
372. Paul M. Healy & James M. Wahlen, A Review of the Earnings Management
Literature and Its Implications for Standard Setting, 13 ACCT. HORIZONS 365 (1999).
373. Thomas A. Lee et al., The Difference Between Earnings and Operating Cash
Flow as an Indicator of Financial Reporting Fraud, 16 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 749 (1999).
374. Eli Amir, The Market Valuation of Accounting Information: The Case of
Postretirement Benefits Other than Pensions, 68 ACCT. REV. 703 (1993).
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made perhaps cavalierly without full appreciation of the ultimate liability,375
and which were poorly disclosed to investors.376
There appears to be general agreement that this post-retirement benefit
disclosure mandated by the new accounting standard added to the informational
landscape and led to more fine-grained evaluation by investors.377 It certainly
had a powerful effect on observed behavior by firms, triggering wide-scale
cutbacks in post-retirement health benefits in anticipation of the 1993 effective
date.378 Presumably managers believed that shareholders would take account of
the earnings impact of a non-cash accrual, reflecting, as it did, a genuine future
liability.
In sum, what these examples show is that throughout the 1950-2004
period, particularly in the post-1970 period, the FASB’s accounting standard
setting process has added to the informativeness of stock prices by requiring
more disclosure and by limiting the variations in the presentation of similar
information.
F. Other Factors Enhancing the Informativeness of Stock Prices
Several other additional factors also have made stock prices more
informative over the period, including an increase in the number of analysts
and other investment professionals, the rise of mutual funds and other
institutional investors with sufficient scale to undertake securities research, and
information technology and information dissemination mechanisms that lower
the cost of securities research. For example, membership in the Financial
Analysts Federation, the national association of securities analysts, grew from
approximately 2400 in 1950 to approximately 11,750 in 1967.379 By 2000, the
successor organization, the CFA Institute,380 had approximately 38,500 North
American members (45,750 worldwide),381 and in 2005, more than 70,000

375. FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING
STANDARDS (SFAS) NO. 106, EMPLOYERS’ACCOUNTING FOR POSTRETIREMENT BENEFITS
OTHER THAN PENSIONS ¶¶ 124-26 (1990).
376. Id.
377. See, e.g., Amir, supra note 374. Eli Amir, The Effect of Accounting Aggregation
on the Value-Relevance of Financial Disclosures: The Case of SFAS No. 106, 71 ACCT. REV.
573 (1996); Paquita Y. Davis-Friday et al., The Value Relevance of Financial Statement
Recognition vs. Disclosure: Evidence from SFAS No. 106, 74 ACCT. REV. 403 (1999).
378. See Jensen & Murphy, supra note 263.
379. 2 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 322, at 609 (citing 1969 Wheat Report).
380. The CFA Institute is the new name of the Association for Investment
Management and Research, which was created in the 1990 merger of the Financial Analysts
Federation and the Institute of Chartered Financial Analysts. See CFA Inst., History of CFA
Institute, http://www.cfainstitute.org/aboutus/overview/history.html.
381. See ASS’N FOR INVESTMENT MGMT. & RES., 2002 ANNUAL REPORT: PLACING
INVESTORS FIRST 40 (2002), available at http://www.cfainstitute.org/aboutus/reports/pdf/
ar2002.pdf.
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members worldwide.382 There are simply many more people devoting their
careers to assessing firm valuations.
This rise in the number of security analysts is linked on the demand side to
the increasing stake of financial intermediaries that invest in sufficient scale to
make economical use of securities research. The value of institutional
ownership increased dramatically during the period. As Appendix Table 4
indicates, institutional investors owned domestic equities valued at a mere $12
billion in 1950 (approximately 9% of the U.S. domestic equity market
capitalization) and only $56 billion in 1960 (14%). Over the remainder of the
period, institutional investor ownership skyrocketed, both in absolute terms and
as a fraction of the market value of U.S. domestic equity. As of 2004,
institutions owned $9.6 trillion in equity, representing 68% of the market value
of U.S. firms.383 With these sums at stake, the competitive focus on firmspecific information has become ever more intense.
The growth and spread of information technology has expanded access to
firm-specific data, lowering the cost of securities research and increasing the
informativeness of stock prices. Originally SEC documents were made
available at the SEC’s offices in Washington, and lawyers of a certain vintage
can remember a booming trade in services that would physically copy
documents using increasingly better copying technology for shipment to users,
or, in urgent cases, for reading over the telephone of crucial provisions.
Beginning in the mid-1980s, and required in the 1990s, companies made
electronic filings with the SEC’s EDGAR system (for “Electronic Data
Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval”).384 Initially private firms, like Disclosure,
Inc., compiled databases of this information for resale, but as the internet
became increasingly robust in the 1990s, highly detailed, firm-specific
information became available to all at virtually no cost, and the proprietary
databases became ever more sophisticated in their flexibility of data
presentation and manipulation. The rise of the computer, then the personal
computer, drastically reduced the cost of information processing, which
fostered cross-sectional and time-series analysis of a firm’s performance.385 As
costs fell, sophisticated information gathering and analysis became increasingly
“democratized”; institutional investors were no longer the only ones with these

382. See ASS’N FOR INVESTMENT MGMT. AND RES., 2005 ANNUAL REPORT: SERVING
GLOBAL INVESTMENT COMMUNITY 27 (2005), available at http://www.cfainstitute.org/
aboutus/reports/pdf/cfa_ar_final.pdf.
383. Compiled from Federal Reserve System, Flow of Funds, Table L213 (compilation
provided by Bogle Financial Markets Research Center, on file with author).
384. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Important Information About EDGAR (Feb. 3, 2005),
http://www.sec.gov/edgar/aboutedgar.htm; see Donald C. Langevoort, Information
Technology and the Structure of Securities Regulation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 747, 758 n.41
(1985).
385. Langevoort, supra note 384, at 757-59.
THE
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capabilities. All of these factors contributed to the informativeness of stock
prices over the period.
CONCLUSION: A NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PARADIGM
This Article starts with a puzzle. There is a powerful trend in favor of
independent directors for public firms in the United States, yet the empirical
evidence adduced thus far gives us no convincing explanation. The Article
suggests that this trend reflects two interrelated developments in the U.S.
political economy. First is the shift to shareholder value as the primary
corporate objective; the second is the greater informativeness of stock market
prices. The overriding effect is to commit the firm to a shareholder wealthmaximizing strategy as best measured by stock price performance. Stock prices
are taken as the measure of most things. In this environment, independent
directors are more valuable than insiders. They are less committed to
management and its vision. Instead, they look to outside performance signals
and are less captured by the internal perspective, which, as stock prices become
more informative, becomes less valuable. They can be more readily mobilized
by legal standards to help provide the public goods of more accurate disclosure
and better compliance with law. In this way, independent directors are an
essential part of a new corporate governance paradigm. In the United States,
independent directors have become a complementary institution to an economy
of firms directed to maximize shareholder value. Thus, the rise of independent
directors, a very important change in the political economy landscape, should
be evaluated in terms of this overall conception of how to maximize social
welfare.
Although this new paradigm is bound up with the use of stock market
signals in the monitoring of managers, including the evaluation of
management’s strategic choices, it also opens up space for a distinctive role for
the independent board: deciding when prevailing prices misvalue the firm and
its strategies. In light of imperfectly efficient capital markets, such a role may
be efficiency-based rather than an ineradicable residue of agency costs. For a
particular firm, a disfavored strategy may in fact maximize shareholder value
over a reasonable time horizon. If the market got it wrong, rejecting its signals
may lead to putting the firm’s assets to highest and best use. But the most
significant efficiency gains (or losses) are systematic: idiosyncratic decisions of
an independent board may keep a particular subsector of the economy from
converging too rapidly on today’s conventional wisdom.
The board’s role in this regard is most vividly expressed in the case of an
unwanted takeover bid, which, if the board resists, will ultimately be decided
through an election contest rather than an immediate market test, under current
Delaware law. Presumably the shareholders who would (almost always) accept
a premium tender offer would (almost always) vote for directors who would be
receptive to the premium offer. The differences between the two mechanisms
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of acceptance are transaction costs and time. On the imperfectly efficient
markets view, this small dose of sand in the gears may give markets the
opportunity to test predictions of how to create value before the prescription
has been universally applied. Some frictions may be efficient. Note that this
element of the new paradigm is not inconsistent with maximizing shareholder
value; it merely imagines a somewhat longer horizon for its realization than
today’s stock price.
One open question is whether the independent board has even this
independence from the stock market. Before, barring the arrival of a hostile
bidder, the board had substantial insulation from shareholder pressure. The
costs of maintaining a proxy contest interacted with the collective action
problems of diffuse share ownership to produce this result. After the advent of
hostile takeovers, the adoption of the pill reinvigorated the board’s importance.
Now, however, as institutional ownership approaches 70% of the market and
activist shareholders have learned to coordinate their activities without
triggering either the notice obligations of the federal securities laws or the
target’s poison pill, independent boards have much less space to protect an
idiosyncratic strategy. The apogee of a corporate governance paradigm resting
on independent directors and the independent board may also mark the moment
of its decline.
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APPENDIX

a

b
c
d

e
f

g

Table 1. Board Composition, 1950-2004
Year
Inside (%)
Affiliated (%)
a
1950
49
26
1955b
47
30
43
31
1960b
42
33
1965b
41
34
1970b
58
21
1970c
54
26
1970d
49
13
1971e
39
31
1975f
35
29
1977g
33
30
1980f
43
26
1980d
34
12
1983e
30
31
1985f
26
14
1990h
26
14
1991i
21
15
1995j
19
15
1997k
18
15
2000k
16
15
2000l
16
11
2003m
16
11
2004n
15
11
2005n

Independent (%)
22
23
24
25
25
21
20
38
30
36
37
31
54
39
60
60
64
66
67
69
73
73
74

Lehn et al., supra note 8. The breakdown of outside directors is based on the 1970
breakdown in Baysinger & Butler, supra note 15 (based on proxy statement analysis of
266 large firms); accord Smith, supra note 10, at 48 (based on estimate of affiliates and
independents on “typical” board). The Baysinger and Butler 1970 breakdown, in which
approximately 43% of the outsiders are “independent,” is applied to the 1950-1970 period
as a conservative assumption. There is some anecdotal suggestion that genuine
independents were even rarer before 1970. See Baysinger & Butler, supra note 15, at 103
n.2 (citing sources).
Lehn et al., supra note 8.
Smith, supra note 10.
Baysinger & Butler, supra note 15, at 113 (reporting the board composition of large
public firms in 1970 and 1980, and finding that the boards of 266 firms from Forbes list
existed in substantially the same form in both 1970 and 1980).
Hermalin & Weisbach, supra note 16, at 593 (reporting the board composition of 288
NYSE-traded firms with available information over the 1971-1983 period).
Lehn et al., supra note 8. The breakdown of outside directors is based on SEC STAFF
REPORT, supra note 11, which, for 1200 major firms surveyed in 1978-1979, classified
55% of outside directors as independent.
SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 11, at 598 tbl.2 (surveying 1200 major firms drawn from
NYSE, Amex, Nasdaq, and OTC, in 1978-1979).
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Lehn et al., supra note 8. The breakdown of outside directors is based on Bhagat & Black,
supra note 17, at 245 tbl.1, which, for 934 large firms included in the Institutional
Shareholder Services database in 1991, classified 81% of outside directors as independent.
Bhagat & Black, supra note 17, at 245 tbl.1 (934 large firms in the Institutional Investor
Services database). This is consistent with the multi-year composites of Nikos Vafeas,
Board Meeting Frequency and Firm Performance, 53 J. FIN. ECON. 113, 121 tbl.1 (1999)
(307 firms in Fortune 500 over 1990-1994 period: 28% insider, 19% affiliated, and 53%
independent), and David Yermack, Higher Market Valuation of Companies with a Small
Board of Directors, 40 J. FIN. ECON. 185, 191 tbl.1 (1996) (452 Fortune 500 firms over
1984-1991 period: 36% insider, 10% affiliated, 54% independent).
Lehn et al, supra note 8. The breakdown of outside directors is based on Vidhi
Chhaochharia & Yaniv Grinstein, The Transformation of U.S. Corporate Boards: 19972003, at 36-42 tbls.1-2, panel B (May 2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=556270 (showing that in 1997, firms in the S&P 500 classified
81% of outside directors as independent).
Chhaochharia & Grinstein, supra note j, at 36-42 tbls.1-2, panel B. This is consistent with
Ivan E. Brick & N.K. Chidambaran, Board Monitoring and Firm Risk 12, 20 (EFA 2005
Moscow Meetings Paper, July 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=677123
(approximately 2841 firms in 1997-2001 from IRRC and Corporate Library universe).
Lehn et al, supra note 8. The breakdown of outside directors based on Chhaochharia &
Grinstein, supra note j, at 36-42 tbls.1-2, panel B.
Chhaochharia & Grinstein, supra note j, at 36-42 tbls.1-2, panel B. Brick & Chidambaran,
supra note k, report the percentage of non-insider directors for 2001 as 82%.
Investor Responsibility Research Center (now Institutional Shareholder Services), S&P
500 Corporate Governance Database (accessed through Wharton Research Data Services).
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Table 2. Increases in Disclosure, 1950-2004 (Form 10K and Components)
Date Total 10-K Pages Financials Pages Notes Number Notes Pages
1951
15.71
4.41
5.2
1.2
1955
17.37
4.26
6.22
1.26
1960
18.37
4.47
6.68
1.34
1965
19.42
4.47
6.89
1.26
1970
40.56
10.17
12.67
6.22
1975
61.53
13.16
14.47
9.26
1980
74.7
13.95
17.2
9.85
1985
75.15
12
16.95
8.4
1990
88.6
13.55
18.6
9.73
1995
105.75
19.15
19.15
14.75
2000
126.1
23.2
19.15
18.7
2004
166.25
38.15
19.85
33.3
Source: Average page counts (means) of Form 10-Ks and components compiled at five-year
intervals for a sample (n=20) of Fortune 500 firms that continuously made public
disclosure over the period (universe=77). Once the firm is drawn by a random
process, its Form 10-Ks are tracked throughout the period. Not every firm has data
for every year. “Financials pages” includes footnote pages. Medians were checked
as well as means; the results are qualitatively unchanged. There is no adjustment for
firm size other than continuous inclusion in the Fortune 500.

Table 3. Increases in Management’s Discussion and Analysis, 1974-2004
1974 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2004
MD&A Pages
1.88 2.61
3.5
4.45 5.85
8.8
10.6 24.05
Source: Average page counts (means) of Management’s Discussion and Analysis compiled
at approximately five-year intervals beginning in 1974 for a sample (n=20) of
Fortune 500 firms that continuously made public disclosure over the 1955-2004
period (universe=77). Once the firm is drawn by a random process, its MD&A is
tracked throughout the period. Medians were checked as well as means; the results
are qualitatively unchanged. There is no adjustment for firm size other than
continuous inclusion in the Fortune 500.
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Table 4. Institutional Ownership of U.S. Public Equities, 1950-2004
Institutional Ownership
Institutional Ownership
Year
(Billions of U.S. Dollars)
(Fraction of U.S. Market Cap)
1950
$12
9%
1955
$30
11%
1960
$56
14%
1965
$115
16%
1970
$266
33%
1975
$345
43%
1980
$599
42%
1985
$1183
55%
1990
$1713
53%
1995
$4201
56%
2000
$8874
58%
2004
$9632
68%
Source: Compilation provided by the Bogle Financial Markets Research Center based on
Federal Reserve System, Flow of Funds, Table L213 (on file with author). Figures
are in nominal dollars.

Figure 6. Growth of Institutional Ownership
of U.S. Public Equities
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Source: Compilation provided by the Bogle Financial Markets Research Center based on
Federal Reserve System, Flow of Funds, Table L213 (on file with author). This
graph vividly illustrates the increasing growth of institutional ownership, both in
absolute amount (billions of dollars on the right axis) and as a percentage of
publicly traded stock of U.S. firms (on the left axis). See supra note 255.

